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ABSTRACT
The study of fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict has often diminished women’s political participation and deemed it a 
force that causes or hastens moderation. Contrary to this claim, women’s involvement in 
Gush Emunim and Hamas occurred after their respective groups’ moderation, and 
demonstrated strong ideological commitment to their movements’ original tenets. As 
both groups became institutionalized, they were forced to moderate their stances toward 
their expansionist territorial goals. These concessions restricted the political and military 
freedoms of the leaderships. Criticizing the men’s political ineffectiveness, exemplary 
women assumed more prominent positions within their movements by advocating actions 
that were in line with their movements’ founding principles. Initially lacking the support 
of their male counterparts, these women, unconstrained by their movements’ 
institutionalization, forced the formal leadership of Gush Emunim and Hamas to accept 
their new roles in the quests for settlement expansion and military jihad respectively.
iii
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
The successful militarization of ethnoreligious societies, such as Israel and 
Palestine, entails instilling the conviction in both men and women that men’s “own 
manhood will be fully validated only if they perform as soldiers either in the state’s 
military or in insurgent autonomous or quasi-autonomous forces.”1 In these wars, some 
argue that it is women who suffer the most, “united around their identities as mothers.”2 
The existing literature, however, misconstrues women’s experiences in nationalist 
struggles and religious conflicts by depicting women as maternal pacifists. This reductive 
approach ultimately fails to appreciate women’s active roles in militant religious- 
nationalist fundamentalist groups.
On both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, women’s participation in acts of 
aggression in the nationalist struggle has been discursively cloaked with overtly 
‘feminine’ symbols: Palestinian fighters become roses, female Israel Defense Forces 
soldiers embody charm, suicide bombers personify purity and settlers exemplify fashion 
savvy. Labelling women as flowers, and stressing their purity and beauty, masks 
women’s violence as perpetrators. It underscores their vulnerability, sensuality and 
victimhood. This imagery contradicts the fact that many Israeli and Palestinian women 
are as militant and willing to engage in political violence as their male counterparts.4 By 
highlighting the seemingly paradoxical political activities of women who perpetrate 
patriarchal and violent religious-nationalist systems, this study addresses the need for 
scholarship in this area.
1
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Using the cases of Gush Emunim and Hamas, this work argues that after 
fundamentalist religious-nationalist groups become moderate, their female members 
challenge gender norms within the parameters of the organizations’ discourses. Due to 
their institutionalization, these movements make pragmatic choices that do not reflect 
their original ideological tenets. These changes are indicative of political and ideological 
moderation. Nevertheless, after this moderation has occurred, some women continue to 
adhere to the original ideology and act accordingly. In demonstrating their commitment 
to the original and more ‘extreme’ political and gender ideologies, women challenge 
some of their movements’ gender expectations.
In each nation, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shapes national identity and informs 
perceptions of gender. These identities, in turn, affect women’s political, economic and 
social status. Moreover, how one perceives gender helps mould one’s national identity.5 
An understanding of women’s social and political relationships with men, as well as 
prevalent attitudes toward masculinity and femininity, are essential to fully 
comprehending religious-nationalist politics in Israel and Palestine. As this chapter 
makes evident, a discussion of women’s involvement in Gush Emunim and Hamas 
necessarily entails contextualizing women’s actions within the discourses of maternal 
pacifism, nationalism, religion, fundamentalism and feminism. Together, these discourses 
form a multiple critique framework, in which this work is best situated.
Women and Pacifism
Women have sometimes used their identities as mothers as a platform on which to 
protest war, thereby contributing to the myth that women are innately more peaceful than
2
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men.6 Among the strong proponents of this myth is Sara Ruddick, who questions “in the 
glare of war’s destruction and the light of women’s hope, what mother would hesitate to
n
‘cast her lot’ with peacemakers.” In her pivotal book Maternal Thinking: Toward a 
Politics of Peace. Ruddick asserts that “women devote the thinking and practices of 
motherhood to peacekeeping and world repair rather than to war making and world 
destruction.” 8 Women’s preference for peace over war, however, may not arise from an 
aversion to destruction, but a competition for resources. Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner 
suggest that “women might be more predisposed than men toward the peaceful resolution 
of international conflicts because they are the principal users of social programs that 
compete with the military for governmental funds.”9 In either case, maternal thinkers are 
still depicted as pacifists.10
The portrayal of women as pacifists relies upon linking motherhood with 
protectiveness, morality, nurture and love. First, women’s potentiality for motherhood is 
relied upon by society, which instills in women a moral obligation to preserve life. 
“Maternal thinking,” explains Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “begins in a stance of 
protectiveness,” where protectiveness is equated with pacifism.11 Second, unlike men, 
women are credited with the inability to divorce their actions from “the moral and human 
significance of their actions.” 12 This moral obligation, as Carol Gilligan argues, is
directed toward “the concrete needs of particular individuals in the private realms of
1 "2necessity,” rather than in the public sphere. Third, their role as nurturers is believed to 
encourage women to be more compromising. Conversely, men are perceived to be less 
accommodating and therefore more violent. Since they are seldom nurturers, their 
negotiation and co-operation skills are less developed than those of women. For this
3
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reason, maternal feminists claim that men are more concerned with “hierarchy, hegemony,
and justice in intercommunal and international relations” than they are with 
14compromise.
Women’s capability for compromise, along with protectiveness, morality and 
nurture, foster a quality that, as Ruddick argues, ultimately renders women pacifist: love. 
Viewed as the antithesis of violence, “preservative love is opposed in its fundamental 
values to military strategy” and seeks to ensure the well-being of all people.15 For 
Ruddick,
the contradiction between military destruction and preservative love is obvious. 
Seen by “the patient eye of love” in the light of maternal humility, military fantasies 
of violent control, defense, and domination seem like garish nightmares that 
threaten a living world. Military endeavours endanger what a mother seeks to 
preserve, wasting the bodies, insulting the sensibilities, threatening the sanity of 
beings she has treasured.16
Learned by daughters from their mothers, preservative love and maternal thinking
counter militarism and death with motherhood, birth and “feminine connection.” 17 A
mother-warrior, therefore, is paradoxical because
when a maternal thinking takes upon itself the critical perspective of a feminist 
standpoint, it reveals a contradiction between mothering and war. Mothering begins 
in birth and promises life; military thinking justifies organized, deliberate deaths. A 
mother preserves the bodies, nurtures the psychic growth, and disciplines the 
conscience of children. . . Mothers protect children who are at risk; the military 
risks the children mothers protect.18
Thus, preservative love is often portrayed as diametrically opposed to military destruction.
Women are not only labelled as preservers, but also as non-combatants, while
men play the role of designated combatants.19 Mothers, wives and sisters, observes Jean
Bethke Elshtain, “are designated noncombatants because of the part they play in the
reproductive process; because women have been linked symbolically to images of
4
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succoring nonviolence; because men have had a long history of warrioring and 
policing.”20 Women who vicariously crave heroism through the military actions of their 
men, and who sacrifice far more than what is demanded of them, are labeled “aggressive 
mother[s].”21 Yet in spite of their strong support, “aggressive mothers” still remain non- 
combatants.
Many Israeli and Palestinian women, particularly those affiliated with the 
movements Gush Emunim and Hamas, might be deemed “aggressive mothers” for their 
overwhelming support for their husbands’ and sons’ military involvement. More often, 
however, they and other Israeli and Palestinian are labelled by maternal thinkers as
“women of sorrow. . . meant to accept their suffering, protesting only against enemy
00aggressors.” Their public mourning becomes a site of empowerment, according to 
Ruddick: “Women who act as women in public spaces transform the passions of
attachment and loss into political action, transform the women of sorrow from icon to
00agent.” These “women of sorrow,” exhausted from mourning the loss of their children, 
use ‘private’ suffering as a ‘public’ platform for political protest.24
Beliefs in women’s preservative love, innate pacifism and inherent capacities for 
motherhood and nurture offer distressingly faulty explanations for women’s involvement 
in fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements. In the past, critiques of these 
supposedly innate traits have pointed to the exclusion of childless women from the 
‘maternal thinking’ viewpoint; they are simply ignored. 26 Also neglected are the 
“aggressive mothers,” who may promote the very actions that give rise to the “women of 
sorrow,” but who may also join the “women of sorrow” in using public mourning for 
political ends. Clearly, different concerns can motivate women’s political protest.
5
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Alternatively, the aforementioned inherent capacities attributed to women may 
actually encourage women to become violent, especially in cases where women’s 
protection of their own children can only be ensured by attacking the enemies’ children. 
For this reason, Tessler and Warriner caution that “an emphasis on motherhood and 
maternal thinking reduces women to unidimensional actors and obscures the diversity of
O '?the factors that influence their attitudes and behaviour.” Nevertheless, scholars may 
consider women one-dimensional political actors for reasons other than motherhood.
For Tami Amanda Jacoby, women are unified actors not because they are mothers,
but because they are products of conflict zones that foster subjugation:
Women and men struggle together in zones of conflict for rights and representation; 
however, women often encounter structures of patriarchal authority -  in the national 
movement, the military, the private sphere, and through the discourses and practices 
of dominant belief systems. In these structures, women are either domesticated or 
rendered subordinate to men. As a result, a cross-cultural component of women’s 
organizing in zones of conflict is women’s contestation of gendered norms and 
practices within their own societies in order to promote the liberation of women 
alongside the liberation of society as a whole.28
Jacoby challenges the idea of a global sisterhood, which she argues is a “Western
feminist notion linked to the perceived coincidence between women and pacifism in the
OQfield of international relations.” In this contestation, however, Jacoby fails to indicate 
when women’s attempts to destabilize patriarchal structures are most likely to occur. The 
timing of women’s subversion of gender norms within a conflict raises questions as to 
why women do not act immediately, whether their actions are the result of male absence 
due to war, whether they are forced to appropriate alternative roles because o f war, and 
whether they allow nationalist aspirations to overshadow ‘women’s’ concerns. In the 
Middle East, where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has embodied six decades of war and 
social change, when and how women contest gender norms is significant; so too is the
6
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question of which women and which norms, and the perspective from which the 
problems are studied.
Past Approaches to Women’s Issues in the Middle East
The unleashing of male aggression in the Middle East has traditionally been 
examined from an androcentric perspective. Both male and female scholars have 
habitually excluded women and gender issues from political accounts of the Middle 
East.30 Margaret L. Meriwether and Judith E. Tucker, in their book A Social History of 
Women and Gender in the Modem Middle East, outline different approaches to women’s 
issues in the Middle East. These methodologies include highlighting the contributions of 
exceptional women and their impact, and using the frameworks of political and 
institutional history, social and economic history, cultural history and discourse, law,
T1property, family and/or religion.
In nationalist narratives, men have used gender differences to emphasize 
citizenship and the quest for nationalist fulfillment as “masculine prerogatives defined in 
contrast to the feminine.”32 This diminishes the role of women in the nationalist cause.33 
Feminism and women’s issues compete with the nationalist agenda outlined by men and 
consequently, women are expected to demonstrate their devotion to the nationalist cause 
by deferring gender concerns until after liberation is achieved. For example, numerous 
Algerian women fought for nationalist objectives without overtly campaigning for 
women’s rights, mistakenly believing that Algerian men would address women’s issues 
after independence. Explaining this deferral, Algerian feminist Marie-Aimee Helie-Lucas 
stated:
7
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Most of the women [at the symposium]. . . take for granted that they belong to a 
country, a nation, which does not have to prove its existence; it allows for 
transcending the concept of nation, and criticizing it. It has not been allowed for 
[Algerian women].34
Much feminist literature has also negated women’s roles as nationalist actors.35 By 
viewing nationalist identity as a solely masculine construct that entirely oppresses women, 
feminist writers erase the presence of the female actors who harbour strong nationalist, 
but not feminist, affiliations, such as some of the women of Gush Emunim and Hamas.36
For this reason, “femininity as a concept and women as actors need to be made 
the objects of analytical curiosity when we are trying to make sense of international 
political processes.” Feminist literature continues to ignore the limited number of 
women who solely identify with nationalism, despite recent recognition in mainstream 
literature that women and gender roles have always coexisted with other marginalized 
groups in nationalist struggles. Furthermore, very little attention has been paid to 
politically active women who fully identify with fundamentalist religious-nationalist 
causes. In other words, women who advocate these fundamentalist systems are absent 
from Israeli-Palestinian fundamentalist religious-nationalist discourse. The dearth of 
literature mendaciously promotes the myth that religious-nationalist women never enter
IQ
the public realm. As the next section explains, when women are discussed, they are 
depicted as “victims of fundamentalist belief systems rather than active participants.”40
Religion, Fundamentalism and Women
Israelis and Palestinians share a decades-long history that is marked by intensive 
struggle for the same land. Not surprisingly, parallel religious or fundamentalist groups 
have emerged in both communities. Moreover, two of these groups even share the same
8
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belief structure: both sanctify the land and rigidly believe their possession of it is divinely 
ordained. Astonishingly, until now, these two movements have never been contrasted. 
Neither their ideologies and processes of moderation, nor the political activities of their 
women, have received academic attention in comparative literature.41
On the Israeli side, the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) became the forefront 
settlement movement. Viewing retention of the Land of Israel as a religious 
commandment, Gush Emunim deems surrendering any land as serious an offence to God 
as forfeiting one’s life.42 Similarly, on the Palestinian side, Harakat al-Muqawama al- 
Islamiya (Islamic Resistance Movement) or Hamas, considers the British Mandatory 
Palestine as land entrusted by Allah to all Muslims. Here, too, control over the land is a 
religious obligation. This goal also sanctions violence and if necessary, the sacrifice of 
one’s life.43 In order to ensure victory in the seemingly eternal conflict over the same land, 
each movement reinforces the need for its group’s cohesiveness.
Marty and Appleby define fundamentalism as a “strategy, or set of strategies by 
which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or 
group.”44 The need for the preservation of the group’s distinctiveness often affects 
women’s status within the groups, for as the symbolic cultural bearers who reproduce the 
nation, women “are therefore in need of protection.”45 Consequently, scholars describe 
fundamentalism as simultaneously modem, vis-a-vis politics and the economy, and anti­
modem, because of the emphasis on women’s familial obligations in the protected private 
sphere.46 This dichotomization, however, ignores the instances in which women have 
extended their roles within the family and the private sphere to the political realm. In 
instances where women are required to be politically active, they are expected to do so
9
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while adhering to traditional gender norms.47 Women must preserve tradition at any cost, 
while men may change according to the environment.
Others have pointed to fundamentalism as a “backlash against women’s 
participation in the public sphere.” 49 In this view, the group’s identity is retained through 
the preservation of women’s roles. For instance, modifications in familial structure, 
caused by women working outside the home, or by perceived gains vis-a-vis their 
independence, including property, inheritance and citizenship rights and freedoms, are 
changes that can result in subsequent restricted access to the public sphere.50 This does 
not imply that non-fundamentalist men do not react at all: rather, they may confront the 
issues differently. Nor does it assume that women abstain from participating in the 
backlashes. For example, in many regions, well-educated women are consistently the 
most eager to assume religious roles in ideologically patriarchal religions. 51 If 
fundamentalism is indeed a “protest against the assault on patriarchal structural principles 
in the family, economy and politics,” as Martin Riesebrodt argues, then it must cease to 
be treated as a gender-neutral term.52
There exists what Janet Bauer deems a “men’s studies” of fundamentalism, which 
includes studying the movement’s creation, its male leader, its followers’ socioeconomic 
backgrounds, its recruitment methods, its ideology and its public political persona. In 
each of these instances, minimal attention is paid to individuals’ perceptions, attitudes 
and feelings. Furthermore, as a result of this distance, the experiences of these individuals 
can become generalized and essentialized to the extent that the ideological commitment 
of women is questioned.53 This begs the question of whether the paradox of women’s
10
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choice to immerse themselves in a religion or movement that “oppresses” them exists 
only from an outsider’s viewpoint.
Accordingly, an undertaking of a “women’s studies” of fundamentalism, in which 
the emphasis is placed on agency rather than structure, is imperative. This is not to 
suggest that women are unaffected by factors such as class, socioeconomic conditions, 
political structures or policies; rather, in order to determine whether and to what degree 
women gain autonomy in religious fundamentalist movements, these factors are not as 
relevant as those based on ethnography. A “women’s studies” approach entails a 
methodological adjustment, in which the woman’s standpoint is the centre of reference.54 
In fundamentalist discourse, for example, the meaning of the term anomie (alienation) 
varies between the sexes. For “men’s studies,” it is “used to convey emotions of 
dissatisfaction and displacement, presumed from particular external conditions, often 
with little reference to actual individuals’ perceptions, while ‘women’s studies’ more 
frequently talks of ‘life crises,’ with a focus on personal responses to those conditions.”55 
Significantly, the relationships in which individuals negotiate their ideological and social 
positions with themselves and with others become interwoven in the political fabric of 
fundamentalism. Thus, the incorporation of “women’s studies” in the study of 
fundamentalist discourse is essential to fully understanding fundamentalism.
The goals of movements such as Gush Emunim and Hamas include “attempts to 
reconstruct the fundamentals of an ideational system in modem society, in accordance 
with political and ideological positions taken in relation to current issues and 
discourses.”56 Nearly all fundamentalist movements aspire to return to an era in which 
people were perceived as content, perhaps as a result of everybody fulfilling their
11
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“proper” roles within society.57 Women are therefore relegated to the private or 
‘maternal’ realm, within which women’s political actions can be contextualized and 
deconstructed for feminist content. Consensus is lacking, however, in how the actions of 
women should be interpreted. These actions they take place within an environment where 
women are ‘double-bound’ to the matemalism found within both religious and nationalist 
contexts, where “militarized motherhood. . . also requires marginalizing or suppressing 
alternative notions of motherhood.”58
Motherhood is militarized in both instances and the womb is consequently 
conceived as a means by which one can increase national security through the creation of 
potential fighters.59 Both Israeli and Palestinian women “have had to consider and 
reconsider their understandings of mothering’s relationships to militarism, to children, to 
nationalism, and to the state and the would-be state.”60 Nevertheless, there have been 
significant instances in which women have occupied public space for the sake of the 
movement’s religiopolitical goals: as settlers, settlement founders, politicians and suicide 
bombers. These actions draw attention to the tension between women’s private and public 
roles, and whether women’s actions reinforce or subvert normative notions of 
motherhood and femininity. Through their actions in the public domain, Gush Emunim 
and Hamas women challenge some of their movements’ gender expectations, but through 
actions that cannot be immediately labelled feminist.
Feminism: A Problematic Term
Feminism not only motivates or is motivated by political movements, it also seeks 
to explain how sex-based expectations create unjust circumstances primarily, though not
12
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exclusively, for women.61 In her work The Second Sex. Simone de Beauvoir attributes 
the root of women’s subordinate status as follows: “Humanity is male and man defines
woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous
(\)being.” Miriam Cooke asserts that feminism “provides a cross-cultural prism through
which to identify moments of awareness that something is wrong in the expectations for
women’s treatment or behaviour, of rejection of such expectations, and of activism to
effect some kind of change”63 The expectations that women identify as unjust are often
the products of patriarchal systems.
Privileging men and elders over women, minorities, and men of low
socioeconomic status, patriarchy is
a system for monopolizing resources, maintaining kinship status, reproducing the 
patriline, controlling women’s sexuality and bodies, legitimizing violence, 
regulating education to reproduce the roles and relations socialized in the family, 
focusing healthcare exclusively on maternity and procreation, and limiting women’s 
access to the labour market as well as defining the types of work in which women 
may engage.64
The patriarchal systems found today in the Middle East are the products of “the 
intersection between the colonial and indigenous domain of state and political 
processes.”65 Feminism’s goal of destabilizing the hegemony of patriarchal hierarchies 
is to allow other non-patriarchal relationships to exist.66 By pushing for women’s equal 
access to opportunities and by encouraging women to shape their own destinies, feminist 
movements seek to realize this goal. While this understanding of patriarchy helps 
situate women’s position in both Israeli and Palestinian societies, it remains “unsuitable 
as a universal framework for analyzing women’s oppression” as citizens.68
Because of the nationalist element of Gush Emunim and Hamas, women’s actions 
must also be analyzed within citizenship discourse. Social contract theory, which
13
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emerged with the modem nation-state and became the “compulsory political form for the
rest of the world,” stipulates that in return for certain freedoms granted by the state, the
citizen relinquishes natural freedom.69 John Locke explains that
men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can 
be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his 
own consent. The only way, whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, 
and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and 
unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one 
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security 
against any, that are not of it.70
Within the social contract narrative, this theory was seen as eclipsing the familial
patriarchy with the creation of constitutional government, which embodies civil rights,
laws, freedoms and the concept of a detached individual.71 According to Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, this individual relinquishes some of his power to a higher authority: “Each of
us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the
77general will; and we as a body receive each member as an individual part of the whole.” 
The question of who constitutes an individual has caught the attention of some feminists, 
who assert that without modification, this theory cannot be applied to feminism for three 
reasons.
First, the citizen of contract theory is an individual male property owner. 
Throughout the theory’s evolution, from John Locke to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, women 
and members of certain minorities could not hold property.73 For this reason, Carole 
Pateman has deemed the modem state a “fraternal patriarchy.” 74 Moreover, the 
exclusively masculine character of the citizen supports a second criticism: not all citizens 
are equal and not all individuals are citizens. Scholars approach the problem of the 
unequal standing of the citizen in a variety of ways. Liberal feminist thought attempts to
14
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incorporate women into the existing state framework.75 Marxist criticism, however, 
asserts that the liberal approach only benefits elite women, leaving the issue of gendered 
citizenship largely unaddressed. The majority of women, along with working-class and 
minority men, are not granted full citizenship and therefore, cannot fully participate as 
political citizens.76 This predicament can only be remedied by a transformation of the 
class structure.
Utilizing both Marxist and liberal critiques, other feminists cite patriarchy and 
class as equally oppressive tools that reinforce each other and are thus equally responsible 
for women’s oppression.77 Alongside this critique is yet another that regards the issue of 
class as embedded within a greater patriarchal framework. This approach is common 
among some Palestinian feminists, who view the economic emancipation of women as a 
precondition for the eradication of patriarchy. Although each concern addresses the 
unequal standing of the female citizen, consensus is clearly lacking regarding the main 
form of oppression for Palestinian, and to a lesser extent Israeli, women.
The last of these three critiques of social contract theory, and the most pertinent
when discussing the Middle East, is that the social contract overcomes patriarchy only in
the civil arena, not in the private sphere. This division is not always viewed along
gendered lines. For instance, Jurgen Habermas does not explicitly use sex as a means of
dividing the public and private spheres. Alternatively, he argues that the two spheres are
products of modernity:
In bourgeois society, over against those areas of action that are systemically 
integrated in the economy and the state, socially integrated areas of action take the 
shape of private and public spheres, which stand in a complementary relation to one 
another. The institutional core of the private sphere is the nuclear family, relieved of 
productive functions and specialized in tasks of socialization; from the systematic 
perspective of the economy, it is viewed as the environment of private households.
15
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The institutional core of the public sphere comprises communicate networks 
amplified by a cultural complex. . . From the systemic perspective of the state, the 
cultural and political public spheres are viewed as the environment relevant to 
generating legitimation.78
The public sphere, therefore, embodies social labour and the economic system. The
private sphere becomes the locus of socialization, cultural education and raising a family.
Rather than defining actions primarily in terms of the public or private realms,
70Habermas instead identifies two spheres that he calls system and lifeworld. The former 
fuses capitalism and administration, and the latter constitutes the “subsystem that defines 
the pattern of the social system as a whole.”80 Habermas’s lifeworld involves welding the 
concept of the modem family or private sphere, with the political arena or public sphere. 
Together, the family and the space in which one can politically participate are responsible 
for symbolic reproduction. Habermas’s public and private spheres embody 
contradistinctive attributes. The public is the site of conflict and the family the site of 
love and freedom, and there can be no overlap between the two sites.81 Seyla Benhabib 
observes that Habermas’s theory of system and lifeworld could have been universal had 
he not assumed a male world and relegated women to a familial role.82
Evidently, Habermas’s implicit gendered division is problematic. Many 
contemporary feminists draw attention to the biological and gendered division of the 
public and private spheres, where men are seen as “naturally” occupying the former and 
women the latter. Because this order is understood as “natural,” women accept, even 
unconsciously, their subordinate position in the home. This division ultimately produces 
inequality in different realms. In the private realm, using social contract theory as a basis, 
the economic and social inequalities found in employment contracts are reflected in the 
sexual inequality articulated in marriage contracts. Both contracts involve exploitation,
16
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and marriage contracts in particular create a “relationship of domination and 
subordination.”84
In the political realm, women are absent, since politics is “public” and women 
exist in the “private” realm.85 Contemporary scholar Hanna Herzog views the public-
o /
private division as a “basic cultural mechanism to exclude women from politics.” This 
division has been and is still justified biologically. Sex differences between men and 
women are imbued with social meanings, which are understood as “natural” as the sex 
differences themselves. Together, the social meanings constitute gender, which refers to 
the “traits and roles that are defined in the social universe as feminine or masculine and 
which are therefore human products deriving from social-cultural definitions and are 
transmitted from one generation to the next through social arrangements.”87 Through this 
socialization process, an individual appropriates not only gender, but also sexual identity. 
This process is shaped by both religious and legal systems, which themselves are framed 
within a greater social context. Because this social context influences the ways in which 
religious and legal systems are perceived, a feminist critique challenges the public-private 
division and its consequences.88
Feminists are divided over the question of whether these consequences would be 
minimized if the public-private distinction were abolished. Some individuals argue that 
the public-private distinction must be eradicated, since the division between the two 
realms is thought to reproduce women’s subordinate status in the private sphere.89 In this 
explanation, in which the public and the private are perceived as completely separate 
domains, the private sphere is thought not to affect that of the public. Others argue that 
the private sphere does in fact offer input to the public sphere.90 The rationale is that
17
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within the private sphere, individuals are raised and socialized by their families. It is 
within the private sphere that individuals learn how to be citizens, taking what they learn 
in the family framework and applying it in the public domain. Conversely, some theorists 
argue for the retention of the public-private division.91 They claim that the private sphere 
is not a prison, but a refuge. Where the public sphere is cold and hostile, the private 
sphere is warm and welcoming. Merging the two spheres would eradicate the autonomy 
the individual has within the private sphere, which would be reflected in the political 
arena.92 Gush Emunim and Hamas women demonstrate that the two spheres are not as 
divisible as social contract theorists suggest.
Mervat Hatem has observed that “political scientists theorized the Middle Eastern 
state in terms of modernity, tradition, and the struggle between the two.”93 Consequently, 
gender-related issues are not addressed directly. The fundamental problem in confronting 
the public-private distinction in a Middle Eastern context is that citizens reside in “several 
layers of private or semi-private spheres.”94 The blurring of the two domains hinges on 
the citizen’s “universality.” In Western discourse, the citizen of social contract theory is 
understood as universal and detached from any community.95 Nevertheless, as Suad 
Joseph explains, “notions of relational or a connective self are particularly common in 
many Middle Eastern countries.”96 Unlike the Western social contract male citizen, the 
Middle Eastern female citizen is not detached from her community.97 To a much lesser 
extent, the male Middle Eastern citizen is also defined by his connection to his 
community. Despite the multitude of contemporary Middle Eastern family patterns, a 
commonality among them is that “the intersection of patriarchy and patrilineality 
increases the range of men with authority over their female counterparts.”98 Thus, the
18
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roots of the woman’s inequality as a citizen must be found in connective, and not
detached, circumstances.
The inequality of the connective citizen can be found in relation to two
institutions: religion and family." Citizenship is shaped by religion, which in the Middle
East carries heavy social, cultural, political and legal implications, as Suad Joseph and
Susan Slymovics explicate:100
With the exception of Tunisia and Turkey, family and religion are legally 
intertwined [in Middle Eastern and North African countries]. Most Arab-Islamic 
countries defer personal status laws (also called family law) to religious institutions, 
as does Israel. Laws concerning marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody 
are under the aegis of the legally recognized religious institutions. There is no civil 
recourse: no civil marriage, divorce, or inheritance rules.101
Consequently, some scholars “include religious affiliation in their general definitions of
nation-states and nationalism in general.”102
Like religion, the family also provides an entrance into the political community.
In Middle Eastern politics, the family, not the individual, is considered by many as the
“basic unity of [political] membership.”103 One’s citizenship depends upon one’s personal
status in the family, as well as the status of the family within society. Because
citizenship is dependent upon the family and not the individual alone, patriarchy plays a
heavier role than in Western societies in reinforcing women’s inequality. Hanita Brand
proposes that
in the cultural discourse, all women in the area, Jewish and Arab alike, were viewed 
as belonging to their national groups via membership in families. . . rather than 
directly, as men were. This in itself opens the possibility o f  discrimination and 
exclusion, suggesting that a woman’s proper place was in the home, not in the 
public sphere.
Conversely, a family’s upper status within Palestinian society could also allow women to 
act within the public domain. For example, many of the female heads of Palestinian non-
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governmental organizations, especially those relating to human rights, come from 
established families whose names lend them enough respectability to allow them the 
political movement denied to women from lesser or non-established families.104 Brand 
perceives that for the majority of women, however, the family is an institution that 
curtails rather than enlarges their political freedom.
In confronting women’s lack of participation in the Middle Eastern public sphere, 
many scholars do not attribute women’s absence to the public-private division. For some 
scholars, the interrelationships among the public domain, the state, and the domestic 
domain are subordinate to the problem of gender hierarchy.105 Focusing on the public- 
private distinction rather than on patriarchy, they argue, slows the process of full 
citizenship for women. These scholars prefer to address the roles of religion and the 
family, although these roles can be heavily influenced by a military milieu.
Consequently, the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict has dramatically affected 
personal status law with regards to women. With religious institutions carrying the sole 
authority over family law, issues that are especially pertinent to women fall under the 
jurisdiction of religious, rather than civil, courts. All clerics are male and many feminists 
deem the religious institution to be a patriarchal hierarchy.106 In the Middle Eastern 
context, therefore, the Western citizen becomes a “connective citizen” or “relational
• • • • •  • . . 107self,” which -  in conjunction with patriarchy -  generates “patriarchal relationality.” 
Because of the family’s embedded position within this patriarchal relationality, women 
are often expected to abandon their individual concerns not only for the welfare of the 
family, but also that of the national community.
20
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In addition to religious institutions, yet another factor that can affect women’s 
citizenship status is a movement’s institutionalization. Because democratization and 
citizenship are narrowly defined in ways that often exclude women, women and gender 
studies have largely been absent from discourses that examine the institutionalization 
process, namely democratization transition and frame alignment theories.108 Issues of 
social or economic equality have traditionally not informed discussions of political 
equality, and this is reflected in the definition of citizenship in purely political terms. 
Consequently, gender and women’s issues are peripheral to the discussion.109 Georgina 
Waylen draws attention to the neglect of gender studies within institutionalization 
discourses:
Until recently the bottom-up focus meant that links between grassroots political 
activity and the wider context, particularly the relationship with political parties and 
the state, were ignored. Second. . . the majority of writers fail to discuss gender 
issues, despite the frequent acknowledgment that the majority of participants in 
popular movements are women. Because women often participate on the basis of 
the social roles associated with their gendered identities (for example, as mothers 
and household providers), the analysis of these movements will be incomplete if 
this is ignored.1 0
To date, women’s political and social participation in the democratization process, often 
allowing women to gain more political and/or social rights, is thought to signal or 
encourage a group’s moderation.111 Nevertheless, their participation does not imply that 
their concern is with promoting a feminist agenda.
The modem or egalitarian understanding of feminism does not take into account 
feminists whose goals are not gender specific. Women who advocate maternal feminism  
seek to infuse the political culture with their own agendas rather than those that 
seemingly affect all women. For example, many maternal movements are founded on
119anti-war platforms pertaining to specific conflicts in which their countries are involved.
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Moreover, women’s involvement in movements that are undergoing institutionalization 
does not guarantee increased rights, for “political cultures intersect with democratic 
institutions to produce different kinds of connections between the state and civil society,
1 n
and these in turn can promote or curtail women’s involvement in politics.” Women’s 
positions along the political spectrum vary, and not all women advance feminist issues, 
while those who do may disagree over which issues have priority and how they are 
defined. Therefore, a sophisticated approach is needed to take into account these 
manifold differences.
A Paradoxical Critique of Gender Discourse
A multiple critique in gender discourse incorporates what a patriarchal framework 
does not, namely, women’s contradictory roles. Religious-nationalist movements recruit 
women, whose maternal roles form the backbone of the “quest to build a moral society 
based on the moral family.”114 Furthermore, women serve as religious role models and 
are often better skilled at recruiting others to the movements.115 For these reasons, social 
and political opportunities arise for women within the religious framework. Conversely, 
women are restricted to a confined space in which they cannot develop alternative 
identities, and are denied opportunities outside the religious movement.116 In most cases, 
even though women may desire to act outside the identity spaces that have been forged 
for them, they are unlikely to do so. Not only is this a matter of religious fidelity, but 
many women “believe in the possibility of creating the conditions in which multiple 
identities, including the religious, can coexist in safety and dignity.”117
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This coexistence occurs when a “subalterized group can assume its essentialized 
representations and use them strategically against those who have ascribed them.” 118 
Women who belong to religious groups that espouse traditional values have, in the past, 
successfully employed this tactic. For instance, Mary Hegland describes how Shi‘a 
women in Pakistan typify paradoxical roles, as skilled political workers on the one hand, 
and submissive, strong and secluded women on the other.119 In actively placing 
themselves in religious communities, while assuming roles of political activism, women 
in fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements demonstrate that their identities are not
1 9 0fixed, but are the creations of “new, contingent subject position[s].” In the case of the
activist Pakistani Shi‘a women, their promotion of their group’s beliefs, which heavily
stress women’s seclusion, also expands their own opportunities usually denied to other
Shi‘a women, such as travelling unaccompanied to other communities.121
Through their work with other women, the activist Shi‘a women’s new
contradictory positions in the communities are contingent on their political roles. As these
women demonstrate, connecting seemingly dichotomous identities can potentially
become a subversive act. Stuart Hall, in discussing how the marginalized place between
identities can become a locus for power, explains that
new subjects, new genders, new ethnicities, new regions, and new communities -  
all hitherto excluded as decentred or subaltern -  have emerged and have acquired 
through struggle, sometimes in very marginalized ways, the means to speak for 
themselves for the first time. And the discourses of power in our society, the 
discourses of the dominant regimes, have been certainly threatened by this
• 199decentred cultural empowerment o f  the marginal and the local.
Like the Shi‘a women, therefore, women in fundamentalist religious-nationalist 
movements can use their religious and nationalist identities to both criticize and 
transform regional gender discourses.
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Miriam Cooke labels this strategy a multiple critique, or “a multilayered discourse 
that allows them to engage with and criticize the various individuals, institutions, and 
systems that limit and oppress them while making sure that they are not caught in their
i
own rhetoric.” Given the above complexities pertaining to women in religious, 
nationalist, fundamentalist, feminist and citizenship discourses, women’s activities within 
Gush Emunim and Hamas are best analysed using the multiple critique framework. The 
following chapters highlight the dual forms of resistance and engagement by women in 
the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The following chapter outlines the ideological origins of the Bloc of the Faithful, 
and the movement’s success in establishing settlements through support by local, regional 
and national administrative bodies. Gush Emunim’s decline in influence and its 
pragmatic adjustments in the 1980s point to a lessening commitment to the movement’s 
original aspirations. This occurred years before some women established the Rachelim 
settlement. These women’s intentions, actions and self-perceptions, as Chapter Three 
illustrates, reveal the contradictions of their prescribed roles.
Turning to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Chapter Four discusses 
Hamas’s ideology and describes its subsequent modifications, largely the result of the 
need to secure approval from the Palestinian population. In comparing the periods before 
and after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the group’s approach to the 
possibility of a long-term ceasefire with, and its use of violence against, Israel 
significantly altered. These changes occurred years before women were actively involved 
in Hamas’s military and political structures, which Chapter Five examines in further 
detail.
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In chronicling each movement’s institutionalization and moderation, this study 
demonstrates that women’s increased political participation is not a moderating force in 
either movement. Governing this work are the questions o f how some women become 
more active in the public realm after their movement’s moderation, why the women’s 
actions appear more extreme than those of their male counterparts and what contradictory 
motives drive these women’s actions. Finally, this study concludes that some women 
become more politically and publicly assertive toward their movements’ original goals 
upon the realization that their male counterparts, as a result of their movements’ 
moderation, have been rendered politically impotent.
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CHAPTER TWO 
GUSH EMUNIM AND THE SETTLEMENT ENTERPRISE
In spite of the Palestinian residents and refugees already living in the territories
that Israel acquired following the 1967 war, Gush Emunim has always harboured the
hope of populating these areas through the creation of settlements like Rachelim. Nira
Yuval-Davis is among those who describe Gush Emunim’s settlement goal as
uncompromising, citing it as
an example of a Zionist fundamentalist group. They initiated a project, which was 
initially illegal, o f Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories, especially near the 
Jewish holy places. In their actions, the settlers, many of whom were the product of 
the Israeli state religious educational system, combined Zionist pioneering myths 
with religious practice, and produced a new mode of Jewish religion in which the 
“Land of Israel” gained a cardinal importance; its control and settlement by Jews 
became a precondition for the arrival of the messiah. Their vision is total, and there 
is no space in it for any recognition of the national aspirations of the Palestinians, 
nor any compromise or negotiated peace with the Arabs. Its most extreme wings, 
however, turned themselves into paramilitary units terrorizing and counter- 
terrorizing the Palestinians, as well as threatening to resist by force any attempt by 
Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories. 24
Nevertheless, this chapter counters the erroneous claims of Gush Emunim’s (GE)
inflexibility by demonstrating that GE moderated as a result of its institutionalization.
This process occurred between its formal establishment in 1974, following the disastrous
1973 Yom Kippur War and GE’s opposition to the National Religious Party’s decision to
participate in the centrist government’s coalition, and the creation of the Rachelim
settlement in late 1991.125
During this period, as some GE men accrued political influence and subsequently 
lost much of it, women were largely absent from formal leadership positions within the 
movement. Although they supported their husbands’ actions throughout GE’s
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institutionalization, the literature on GE women does not point to women’s political 
involvement outside familial roles.126 Only when GE men had lost much of their power 
within the movement did women emerge as the new pioneers of the settlement movement. 
Before discussing women’s avant-garde approach to settlement creation, it is first
• • • • • • 177necessary to detail GE’s institutionalization.
The following pages outline the movement’s ideology, which emphasizes the 
holiness of the Land of Israel. This doctrine explains why, in GE’s view, giving up any 
land, even for the sake of peace, is theoretically impossible. The paper then shifts its 
focus to the movement’s success in establishing settlements in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Parallel to these achievements was the increased institutionalization of the movement 
through the acquisition of support from local, regional and national administrative bodies. 
This institutionalization became more apparent with the movement’s inability to cope 
effectively in times of internal crisis, particularly when a minority of adherents carried 
out actions demonstrating their full commitment to the movement’s original goals, which 
were otherwise met with public disapproval. The discovery of the “Jewish Underground” 
(JU), some of whose members were Gush members or supporters, and GE’s subsequent 
denunciation of the JU’s terrorist activities revealed the movement’s moderation. Further 
demonstrating GE’s moderation, this chapter concludes with a section highlighting the 
movement’s reaction to the land concessions made by the Israeli government.
Membership and Ideology
Gush Emunim’s religious nationalism is an ideology based on traditional 
messianism, which safeguards the Jewish nation and seeks to realize the full biblical
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Zionist dream. Protecting the family and the nation entails military service, a driving 
principle of GE ideology.128 Following their military service, GE men graduate from the 
best universities in Israel, while women attend post-secondary religious seminaries. 
Although no formal membership list exists, studies by David Weisburd and Elin Waring 
in the early 1980s revealed significant information about Gush settlers in Judea and 
Samaria.129 In terms of age, only 10 percent of the settlers were over forty.130 Hardly any 
of the settlers were single, and more than one third of settler couples had four children or 
more.131 GE believers therefore tend to be educated, young and family-oriented. Clearly, 
religious and national importance was and still is placed on the close-knit individual 
family and the obligation to have children. Within these families, as some scholars 
observe, men and women have tended to have complimentary roles: traditionally men 
have been the ‘public’ representative of the family, while women have been that of the 
‘private.’132 A detailed explanation of their roles, as well as of the adherence of men and 
women to these expectations, is discussed in the following chapter.
GE’s structure is a macrocosm of the familial unit, with Rabbi Abraham Yitzchak 
HaCohen Kook and his son Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook acting as the religious and political 
parental authorities of the movement. Grasping GE’s political motivations entails 
examining the ideology of these two rabbis, who were important figures in twentieth 
century religious Zionism and whose beliefs have influenced and transformed the Israeli 
political milieu.133 Gush Emunim adheres not only to Kookist dogma, but also to the 
philosophy of merkaz harav, a close relationship with one’s rabbi.134 In instances where a 
rabbi’s approval can encourage members to break civil or criminal law, potentially 
resulting in civilian death, this close relationship is especially crucial. Neither the
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centrality of merkaz harav nor the exclusivity of the male leadership has ever been a 
source of contention for its young family-oriented followers, even after GE became 
institutionalized in the late 1970s. 135 The importance of a rabbinic authority in 
influencing GE activities reappears in the discussion of the JU, but it must be emphasized 
that the Kook rabbis in particular played a paramount role in determining GE’s course of 
action.
Rabbi A.Y. Kook, or Rav Kook Senior, emphasized “elements of faith, secrecy, 
unearthly intuition, supernatural illumination, mystery and paradox” in his theology.136 
Bom at the end of the nineteenth century, he witnessed pivotal events in Zionist history. 
The Balfour declaration, the aliya or immigration movements to Israel, and the ploughing 
of the land were among the prominent events which led him to proclaim that the era of 
redemption was at hand: “The whole people believes that, following the redemption now 
beginning before our very eyes, there will be no more exile, and this deep faith is itself 
the secret of [our] existence.”137 Like his contemporaries, Kook Sr. believed the messiah 
would be sent by God and would free the Jews from political subjugation. The world 
would recognize the uniqueness of the Jewish people while living in an age of peace.
Although this proclamation angered some of his fellow Orthodox rabbis, who 
were firm believers in Jewish political passivity until the messiah’s arrival, he gained the 
support of the early secular Zionists.138 In need of Orthodox approval to legitimize their 
cause in Europe for an ethnoreligious homeland, the secular Zionists were eager to secure 
the support of Rav Kook Sr. To justify this alliance, Rav Kook Sr. relied upon his 
theoretical teachings about the important role of secular Zionists in ushering in the 
messianic era. The symbiotic relationship persisted until the 1980s, helping GE gain
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support from secular Israelis. Kook Sr.’s teachings, in spite of the support they received, 
were vague and his death in 1935 left many questions about the redemption 
unanswered.139 For example, if the Jews were unique, this alone should have been 
enough to usher in the messianic era, yet Kook Sr. made the timing of the redemption 
conditional on the behaviour and moral improvement of the Jewish people.140 Kook Sr.’s 
followers turned to his son for clarification. His son, however, applied his father’s ideas 
in a more deterministic way.
Rabbi Z.Y. Kook elucidated his father’s theoretical teachings into more pragmatic 
terms for the secular public. He first equated the holiness of the land itself to that of the 
people. According to Rav Kook Junior, the biblical term Am Yisrael, or the nation/people 
of Israel, referred not only to the Jewish people, but to the Land of Israel. Having made 
clear that the two entities were inseparable and equal, he then proclaimed that the 
redemption could only occur in a full Eretz Yisrael. While Rav Kook Jr. did not 
emphasize this aspect initially, it acquired particular significance after 1967, when Israel 
gained control of Arab territory.
Israel’s post-1967 territories, including the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria were 
included in Kook Jr.’s interpretation of the Land of Israel. His biblical reading of Israel’s 
borders also included large parts of Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Unabashedly, he declared that 
“all this land [Greater Israel] is ours, absolutely, belonging to all of us; it is non- 
transferable to others even in part. . . it was promised to us by God, Creator of the 
World.” 141 Unlike his father, Kook Jr. did not make these positive historical events 
contingent on the spiritual transformation of the Jews.142 The significance of Kook Jr.’s
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ideology was an uncompromising stance concerning the Arab territories acquired during 
the 1967 war.
For religious messianists, the 1967 and 1973 wars further strengthened their 
desire to retain the land. The wars, especially the 1973 Yom Kippur War, were not 
viewed as consequences of Israeli military or political strategy; rather, the 1973 war in 
particular was understood as a desperate attempt by non-Jewish nations to prevent the 
redemption.143 The combination of these three convictions, the equivalence of the Jewish 
land with the people, the precondition of a full Israel for redemption, and the intervention 
of non-Jewish nations in Jewish destiny, had implications for personal sacrifice.
For GE members, the acceptance of any land-for-peace proposition was 
impossible, since the land, people and Torah were equally important; one could not be 
sacrificed in place of, nor for the sake of, the other. The equivalence of these three 
constituents alludes to and parallels the concept of pikuach nefesh, in which one must 
channel all efforts into saving the life of another.144 This law also requires a Jew, under 
conditions of duress, to forfeit one’s life rather than kill another Jew. Rather than 
transgress the divine prohibitions against idolatry, incest or murder, a Jew must give up 
his or her life. 145 Kook Jr., however, added yet another instance in which pikuach nefesh 
was applicable. Preventing territorial confiscation by other nations, precluding Israel’s 
relinquishment of acquired territories, and preserving the integrity of Eretz Yisrael now 
became legitimate reasons for endangering one’s life.146 Yet as the evacuation of the 
Sinai settlements reveal, as addressed later in this chapter, the unwillingness of GE 
members to heed to this interpretation of pikuach nefesh indicates an ideological shift 
within the movement. As the next section makes evident, this change in approach
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questions not only the necessity of land settlement in the territories, but the supposition of 
an imminent messianic era.
Land Settlement and Redemption
Gush Emunim’s brand of religious nationalism seeks the realization of a national 
utopia, whose creation is expected during the lifetime of GE members.147 Despite their 
belief that the redemption will be experienced not solely by Israel, but by the entire world, 
GE perceives some nations and individuals as intent on preventing this momentous
1 4 o
event. Those persons and countries apply international pressure on Israel to relinquish 
the territories, thereby jeopardizing Israel’s right to the land and its right to full 
sovereignty. The conflict of interests is understood as a “fierce struggle” and accordingly, 
the desire to retain the acquired territories is immense.149
The liberation of Judea and Samara is integral to the messianic redemptive 
process for several reasons. First, settlement of these territories is believed to hasten 
salvation by ushering in the messianic era.150 In establishing settlements in the Sinai 
Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the heart of the West Bank, GE transformed a political 
undertaking into an instrument of religious salvation.151 Second, the messiah’s arrival 
and subsequent salvation are conditional on “the Jewish people restor[ing] itself 
politically by its own actions.” Political renewal is therefore linked to the creation of 
settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Greater Land of Israel.152 Moreover, control over 
the entire Land of Israel must be taken as an uncompromising ideology. To accept only 
part of the land indicates a lack of understanding of the redemptive process.153 Finally, 
even though the integrity of Israel is but the first step in the redemptive process, it is
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currently the most important goal. As one GE leader said hopefully, upon achieving this 
goal, “the entire Jewish people will constitute Gush Emunim.” 154 Thus, Jewish 
sovereignty over the acquired territories catalyses the messianic process.
The liberation of Judea and Samaria is also vital in the mystical redemptive 
process. First, political sovereignty over the land will affect the spiritual realms. Tikkun, 
the kabbalistic notion of spiritual healing, will occur at the cosmic level.155 These changes 
are universal and in the best interest of all peoples, and are thought to prevent a further 
decline in morality worldwide. Rabbi Moshe Levinger, the movement’s spiritual leader 
since GE’s creation, emphasizes the idea that “enforcing the Israeli national will on the 
Arabs will foster a religious revival among them, eventually to be expressed in their 
spontaneous desire to join the reconstruction of the Third [Jewish] Temple.” 156 In 
addition, there remains another mystical aspect that is more heavily emphasized.
GE ideology includes a belief in reincarnation, a conviction not unusual in 
Judaism, but carrying practical implications. The commandment of settling in the Land of 
Israel was unstressed by previous Orthodox generations, and therefore not observed in the 
past lives of GE members. Consequently, this negligence must now be rectified in order 
for members to take part in the redemption.157 Living in Israel becomes a means of 
attaining the spiritual perfection of one’s past life. It is this spiritual fulfillment of a 
commandment once unobserved that will cause the messiah’s arrival. GE members, 
however, are more concerned with a contemporary threat to the Jewish people: Western 
values.
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The Rejection of Western Values
While GE co-operates with its secular political allies, it follows the trend of some
parallel religious movements, including Hamas, in taking an anti-Western stance.158 Its
members attribute a multitude of social problems, perceived as by-products of Western
values, to secular society. These ills include
reckless radical leftism, permissiveness, drug addiction, teenage prostitution, a 
decline in the work ethic, alienation from one’s country, abetting the enemy, 
emigration, the refusal to do army service in Judea and Samaria, contempt for the 
spirit of Judaism, juvenile delinquency, corruption, violence, murder, 
robbery.. .  .159
Not surprisingly, the movement rejects these values, which are viewed as the product of 
modernity and its emphasis on the individual.160 For GE members, the individual is but a 
conduit to fulfilling the divine commandments, such as raising families and settling the 
land.161 The values of the nation supersede those of the individual and when the two 
differ for women, the movement’s interests must precede women’s own fulfilment. From 
Gush Emunim’s perspective, Western values such as “bra-burning” feminism threaten the 
group’s cohesiveness, which relies upon prescribed roles for men and women that are 
outlined in the following chapter. An emphasis on the unity of the family and the 
movement helps explain why settlers are willing to live in areas that endanger their 
families’ lives, a theme that is further developed below.
Just as Gush Emunim rejects Western values, so too does it shun some aspects of 
the Western concept of democracy. GE’s stance on democracy is conflicted. On the one 
hand, GE accepts the validity of the Israeli parliament, particularly because Rav Kook Jr. 
sanctioned it on Independence Day 1967. To his followers, Kook Jr. called Medinat 
Yisrael (the State of Israel) the “Kingdom of Israel in the Making” and the “Kingdom of
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Israel as the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth.” 162 The legitimacy of the state and its 
institutions hinge on their being manifestations of God’s will. On the other hand, the 
language used to describe the state institutions is monarchical, not democratic.
While Gush Emunim has not articulated an anti-democratic ideology, one cannot
assume that it supports democracy.163 Rav Kook Jr. declared, “We are commanded by
the Bible, not by the government. The Bible overrides the government, it is eternal and
this government is temporary and invalid.”164 In circumstances where settlement in Judea
or Samaria is opposed by the government, GE opinion is that divine will precludes
democracy. Moreover, international politics are morally wrong, since land relinquishment
contradicts divine will. Goldberg and Ben-Zadok explain that
Gush Emunim in effect rejects the view accepted by the large majority of the Israeli 
public that defence and foreign policy is governed, among others, by circumstantial 
considerations, including the constrains of international politics. Gush Emunim 
rejects one of the cornerstones of Israeli foreign policy shared by hawks and doves 
alike since 1950, according to which Israel identifies with the west in the global 
conflict.165
While GE explicitly does not condemn Western democracy, since the movement needs 
secular support, it nonetheless perceives democracy and other Western values as 
detrimental to Jewish morality. As discussed below, Gush Emunim’s decision in the early 
1980s to collectively partake in the institutional processes of democracy therefore 
indicates a growing accommodation to political realities than GE’s rhetoric might 
otherwise suggest.
According to its own theology, GE claims to support the government only when 
the government’s actions accord with the movement’s conception of divine will. 
Similarly, the movement can militarily or politically oppose the government whenever 
government actions, such as the evacuation of settlements in the early 1980s, explicitly
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violate divine law. The movement’s decision to severely restrict its use of violence in the 
face of settlement evacuations is a significant marker of the group’s moderation. 
Nevertheless, the movement in its early stages still required, in addition to the strong 
religious conviction of its members, political support to help implement its settlement 
agenda. As discussed below, the institutionalization of the movement largely contributed 
to Gush Emunim’s moderation.
External Political Involvement and Support
Gush Emunim emerged as an independent religious political entity in February
1974. Founded by Rabbi Chaim Druckman, its political leaders have always been men,
and Avner Yaniv and Yael Yishai’s comment that GE is “joined by women and children”
affirms that men constitute the primary membership.166 GE began its political life as a
faction within Israel’s National Religious Party (NRP), in which most of the movement’s
leaders were still active members of the influential NRP.167 David Schnall observes that
“the NRP has participated in almost all of Israel’s coalition governments, holding a
1 £(»
virtual monopoly on certain ministries and areas of government activity.” Moreover, as 
a result of NRP control over the religious ministries, GE indirectly acquired support from 
other minority parties. In addition to religious messianists, Arab minorities in Israel also 
supported the NRP, in spite of its settlement policy. The Arab minorities, under the 
NRP’s treatment of religious minorities, “fall under the jurisdiction of their own 
respective religious establishments,” instead of under the direct control of the state.169 
The NRP has thus played a vital role in securing direct and indirect support for GE.
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In addition to the NRP, other parties also supported GE. The Labour 
government’s tacit approval of the settlements, or at least its unwillingness to dismantle 
them immediately, was the result of both official and unofficial support by parliament 
members. Likud’s win over Labour in 1977 resulted in further aid for settlement activity. 
In the following few years, two other parties chose to back GE. In the 1981 election, 
Tehiya won three seats and was included in the 1981 government coalition.170 Formed by 
Begin cabinet minister Yuval Neimen and Knesset members Geula Cohen and Moshe 
Shamir, Tehiya sought to represent GE’s settlement agenda in parliament.
Tehiya co-operated with other parties and persons with similar platforms, 
including Chaim Druckman of the NRP.171 The Tehiya platform was clear: dismantling 
Yamit, the largest settlement in Sinai, or returning any parts of Sinai or the West Bank, 
could never be an option. As noted above, GE has always traditionally believed that 
any forfeiture of land reveals an inability to fully comprehend the redemptive process.173 
This hard-line approach to peace negotiations garnered much approval. The newly 
created religious party in 1984 and regurgitated form of Tehiya, Morasha, also supported 
GE policy.174 Thus, many parties that often disagreed with one another’s policies found 
common ground in their support of the settlers.
The parties’ motivations in supporting the settlers, however, greatly varied. For 
the socialist Zionists, the settlement/dismantlement issue carried heavy sociopolitical 
implications. Many Israelis at the time were affected by GE’s use of rhetoric that alluded 
to the early settler years. In its nascent years, GE attempted to “portray itself in 
humanistic terms hearkening back to the binationalism of Socialist Zionist thinking of 
the ’30s and ’40s.”176 This socialist Zionist thinking, then, was not restricted exclusively
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to the importance of tilling the land, but extended to relations with Arabs. Citing 
instances o f hiring Arab contractors to build new homes, the movement emphasized its 
role in promoting interaction with local Arabs in daily life and stimulating market 
economy through job creation for the locals. Despite GE’s militant stance regarding 
settlement, it believed peace necessitated Jews and Arabs living in close proximity.177
This policy of co-operation, in addition to the early settler allusions, swayed many
Labour members and supporters to favour settlement establishment. Goldberg and Ben-
Zadok summarize the settlement appeal to different parties:
The three arguments for the territorial integrity of the land of Israel are rooted in 
three world-views: ‘security hawkishness’, which can be found even within the 
Labour movement; ‘historical hawkishness’, which accepts the need to retain 
extensive territories for security reasons but adds to this the historical tie of the 
Jewish people to those territories which were in the past under Jewish rule, a view 
characteristic of the Herut movement (Likud); ‘religious hawkishness,’ which does 
not deny either of the above arguments but adds to them the idea of the sanctity of 
the land of Israel and the settlement of the land as an element of religious belief and 
observance. The proportion of the Israelis who hold this latter view is very small, 
despite the strengthening of the hawkish ideology in general.178
Despite the small number of religiously motivated supporters, the settlement issue was
nonetheless supported for different reasons by the Labour and Likud parties.
Yet another way in which GE gained support was by manipulating strained 
relationships among Knesset members. For example, GE men exploited tensions between 
Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon, between Yitchak Rabin and Shimon Peres, and among 
Labour party members in general. Meanwhile, the NRP ministers backed and lobbied GE 
activities throughout these political intrigues.179 Add Labour support to that of the NRP, 
Likud and later Tehiya, and GE appeared to have gained the support of a large sector of 
the Israeli public.
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Between the group’s inception and the 1977 win of the Likud government, GE 
acquired public support due to the renewal of nationalism, the unpopularity of Israeli- 
Arab peace talks, the popularization of settlement in the acquired territories and the 
establishment of settlements in these areas. At the outset, settlement activity inspired 
nationalism amongst its supporters. Non-practicing Jews, who constitute the majority of 
Israel’s Jewish population, were among those who were affected by GE. While they may 
not have subscribed to the religious ideology, they nonetheless backed this religious 
group that had assumed a leading role in political life, and had reawakened political
• » » • • isnnationalism among those disenchanted with religion’s role in state affairs.
Furthermore, the wave of nationalist sentiment contributed to public opposition to
the peace talks. In opposing them, the public became a de facto ally of GE. Israeli-
Egyptian and Israeli-Syrian peace talks fuelled protest among GE followers, as was
clearly indicated by the number of public rallies, petitions, traffic blockades and
extensive picketing.181 Protests against the peace talks did not suffice and they were soon
superseded by events intended to promote Israeli acceptance of settlement creation. For
instance, thousands of protesters lit candles in unison and undertook marathons, while GE
members organized the “Movement to Stop the Withdrawal from Sinai.” 182 Women
were presumably continuing to improve settlement conditions, for the organizers were 
1 0 -1
mostly men. These activities were staged in order to attract the public’s attention to the 
need for populating Judea and Samaria for strategic, historical and religious purposes.
Emphasizing the tactical advantage of the territories, GE tapped into a voter pool 
previously foreign to the religious parties: the Jewish laity. By promoting secular 
explanations such as security, instead of religious justifications such as the messianic
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arrival, GE encouraged the growth of public interest in territorial settlement. With the 
assistance of Likud, which assumed power in 1977, the annual average of new settlers in
i  a  a
the territories increased from 300 to 4400. Finally, GE implemented its ideology
alongside its protests by creating settlements whose locations and times of creation were
1 8^determined by GE men. These settlements were often just outside the more populated
1 8AArab urban centres in Judea and Samaria and included Kiryat Arba and Elon Moreh. 
Although the creation of these settlements was illegal, it gained support from the public 
and even Labour members who officially opposed this policy. While the events of the 
peace talks, rallies and settlements themselves increased GE popularity, the role of 
nationalism propelled the movement.
Therefore, the GE transition from an NRP faction to an extra-parliamentary 
movement in the late 1970s was largely a result of its ability to combine “expressibility
187with instrumentality” and “vocal protest with action and building.” GE acquired its 
external political support from a variety of sources. These included the NRP, which 
supported GE’s policy for religious reasons; the Labour party, for its pioneering history; 
and the Likud, for its settlement policy. Founded by GE members, Tehiya naturally 
supported the movement. Finally, the public also backed GE for security reasons and 
nationalist sentiment.
Settlement Success and Political Lobbying
The political success of Gush Emunim depended on the government’s acceptance 
of the settlement policy. In 1968, six years before Gush Emunim’s formal establishment, 
the legality of the acquired territories was still ambiguous. Rather than wait for a formal
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decision to be issued by the government, the movement established its first settlement.
Acting alone under the authority of their spiritual leader Rabbi Moshe Levinger, the
group members rented out rooms in the Park Hotel in Hebron and proclaimed it their new
residence, much to the chagrin of their Arab neighbours. Despite protests from locals, no
military evacuation occurred. The military and settlers eventually reached a compromise
that resulted in the settlement Kiryat Arba, outside of Hebron’s municipal boundaries.188
Eleven years later, the settlers undertook a more ambitious settlement goal and
occupied the Davoya/Beit Haddasah building in Hebron. Twelve women and their
children occupied the hotel for nearly a year, until the government gave permission for
the settlers and additional families to live in Hebron, as a compromise for the Sinai land
1 80concessions m the Begin-Sadat peace treaty. The women, led by Rabbi Levinger’s wife,
acted under the instructions of GE’s male leadership. Miriam Levinger recounts, “I went
to my husband [Rabbi Moshe Levinger] and I said that the women wanted to live in
Hebron. He consulted with others who came to the conclusion that we had a good idea.
They worked out the plan.”190 At the hotel, women reproduced their roles as religious
Jewish homemakers in an attempt to improve their new living conditions.191 They cooked,
they cleaned, and they raised their children as they had done before moving to the
hotel.192 Women’s voice in the settlement negotiation process was absent. Tamara
Neuman concurs that women’s
primary advocates in bureaucratic-administrative circles are men, tactically 
negotiating the public-private divide. Moreover, religious women’s apparent non­
political status strengthens the hands of their male counterparts, who by this 
gendered logic are better able to take up their roles as the “real” political advocates 
and to argue for increased security measures.193
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Thus, in creating the settlements, women neither negotiated with the government, nor did 
they act without the consent of male GE members.
To achieve its goals, Gush Emunim used four operational approaches. The first 
and most effective method that it employed was the creation, on multiple occasions, of a 
fa it accompli. As Ehud Sprinzak summarized, this precedent of creating a settlement by 
a fa it accompli involved four phases. First, religion was used as a pretext in asserting a 
“temporary” presence. Second, religion was cited as a valid excuse for a refusal to leave 
the grounds. Ideally, this refusal would generate an abundant supply of media attention, 
which would portray GE as intent on resolving the tensions between itself and the 
military in a peaceful manner. Third, an agreement would be reached whereupon GE 
would evacuate the land on the conditions that a religious institution be built thereafter on 
that site, or that the settlers be permitted to reside in close vicinity to a military base. The 
last stage would involve the eventual permanent construction of a Jewish settlement. Not 
only was Kiryat Arba established using this method, but so too were many other 
settlements, including Keshet and Ellon Moreh in 1977, and Rachelim in 1991. Thus, the 
tactic of creating settlements through an “overnight surprise presence, creation of new 
facts, and rapid use of new political manoeuvres to sustain the momentum” was both 
consistent and effective.194
The creation of settlements could not have occurred without tacit approval at the 
administrative level of the government. Gush Emunim’s supporters targeted different 
bodies in their lobbying efforts to permit settlement creation. Ministry officials were 
recruited, including those in the Ministry of Agriculture and particularly in ministries that 
involved religious matters and were headed by the NRP.195 Individual members of
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kibbutzim and moshavim, as well as the Ein Vered group, which had acquired political 
influence, also supported G E.196 In addition, military officers and various officials 
throughout the military administration were enlisted to the settlement cause.197 In 
recruiting the above supporters, GE selected its lobbyists and its rhetoric carefully. Using 
its soft-spoken male members to advocate advancing its settlement cause, GE presented 
their cause to the Israeli public as one resembling the early secular Zionist pioneers rather 
than the messianic scripture. Overall, finding supporters in the administration, be they 
ministerial or military, was initially not a challenge for GE.
The most effective lobbying was targeted at the highest political stratum. Potential 
recruits included Knessnet members. Without their co-operation, settlement in the 
occupied territories would not be possible, and GE leaders recognized at the outset the 
need for these alliances. They used their connections in the NRP to oppose the Allon plan, 
which called for military control of the territories without Jewish settlement.198 Moreover, 
GE welcomed Shimon Peres’s tacit approval of the settlers’ surprise settlement in the 
Ba’al Hazor military base.199 The election of the pro-settlement Likud government in 
1977 eradicated the need to increase contacts within the government, or justify Jewish 
settlement in the occupied territories. Consequently, the GE secretariat dissolved. Since 
the movement’s leaders had met regularly to discuss the settlements’ oversight 
administrations, Amana and Yesha, the need for a specific GE ruling body was never 
formally articulated.200
Nonetheless, GE members needed to reinforce their rights to the land to a 
government that might succumb to international pressure to relinquish the territories; this 
involved persuading the head of parliament himself.201 By reminding Prime Minister
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Begin of his commitment to the Land of Israel, GE leaders were able to secure their right 
to establish new settlements. Thus, by using their connections in the NRP and forcing an 
already pro-settlement government to recall its commitment to them, GE members 
obtained temporary support for their settlements’ establishment.
Political and Policy Impact
Both Labour and Likud regimes felt the tremors of GE’s political impact. Under 
the Labour regime, GE lobbied for support in the government and the military, causing a 
transformation in the territories’ status. GE’s vision of a greater Israel began to eclipse 
the idea of the territories serving as mere bargaining chips in peace talks with Arab 
neighbours. Moreover, the GE settlements allowed the Labour government to pursue its 
policy concerning the territories without open involvement. Labour’s uncertainty 
regarding the creation of Jewish settlements, along with the overnight presence of GE 
settlements, provided the government with an opportunity to postpone the questions of 
territorial surrender and Palestinian autonomy. This hesitancy is exactly what GE 
anticipated; members hoped that the creation of new settlements in the territories would 
make it more difficult for the government to relinquish them in peace talks. Labour was 
therefore complicit in settlement creation. The public did not allow Labour much time to 
mull over the settlement issue, however, for Likud’s ascension to power carried a promise 
of creating settlements throughout the West Bank. While Likud actively promoted 
settlement and Labour did not, both parties were sympathetic to the young settlers.
Gush Emunim also significantly affected the ways in which the Likud government 
implemented its settlement plans. Upon gaining power, Likud immediately outlined a
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plan to erect administrative buildings, create a judicial subsystem to oversee the 
territories, and fulfill the promise of settling 100 000 Israelis in the West Bank within 
three years. Consequently, Likud channelled millions of dollars into creating suburban 
housing complexes that were not fashioned in the Israeli style, but in the American way. 
Since GE had a network of programs aimed at enticing Westerners to immigrate, 
emulating American housing encouraged immigration.
In addition, Likud provided various funding opportunities for families who took 
part in the “Build Your Own Home” programme. These incentives were particularly 
lucrative for families, due to the horrendous inflation and a near-stagnant economic 
period.202 GE supporter Yuval Neiman represented Tehiya in its 1982 coalition with the 
government, and consequently, more money was allocated to immigration recruitment 
campaigns and advancing the religious-nationalist ideology. 203 Furthermore, as David 
Schnall aptly writes, “no matter what the [Labour or Likud] position on the wisdom of 
settlement, few Israelis can accept the idea that it is illegal for a Jew to reside anywhere 
he chooses, most especially on land with historic Jewish links. Thus, strategy has been 
traded for legitimacy.”204 GE was clearly successful in securing acquiring support for 
immigration campaigns and the creation of settlements from the Likud government.
Settlement activity in the territories not only altered the role the occupied land 
would play in bargaining, it transformed the very way the religious parties behaved 
politically. First, it forced the religious parties to have stances on secular issues. 
Traditionally, religious parties were solely concerned with the dominating facets of 
Israeli society that concerned personal religious matters. Since they maintained power 
because of their small but vital role in coalition governments, issues such as security,
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foreign policy and economics were usually shunted to the Labour party.205 GE, under the 
influence of Rabbi Kook Jr., altered its role: religious parties now held positions on issues 
other than what had concerned them in the past. These issues included the rights and 
status of non-Jews in the state of Israel, the lawfulness of occupying the territories, and 
the conditions that would justify conceding land won in war.
Second, as a result of the religious parties’ concern with these issues, a revival of 
medieval rabbinic sources occurred in the political sphere, in the NRP and smaller 
parties.207 As a result of GE’s success and the subsequent revival of religious parties, 
many of them, particularly the NRP, migrated to the right of the political spectrum. They 
adopted a more militant attitude when it came to the issue of the territories and 
Palestinian autonomy. Finally, the movement renewed interest in religion and religious 
issues among the non-Orthodox communities. Unlike the NRP, GE was not perceived as 
having a stale institutionalized religious platform; rather its “activist and emotional” 
agenda and its unwavering loyalty to the creation of settlements drew support from across 
the spectrum.209
Thus, GE was successful in implementing its policy, even with a change of 
government. Exploiting Labour’s uncertainty regarding the occupied territories and its 
willingness to ignore the issue, the settlers created permanent settlements that were later 
sanctioned by the Likud government. Moreover, GE policy affected religious parties, 
policies, and their alignment on the political spectrum. Yet over the following decade, GE 
lost much of its influence and consequently, the movement began to make pragmatic 
adjustments.
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The Decline in Influence and Commitment
Gush Emunim’s political failure in the 1980s can largely be attributed to its 
external political activities. While its leaders decided not to align the movement officially 
with any one party, GE policies were nonetheless woven into the political fabrics of both 
the NRP and Tehiya. In both instances, the association between the movement and the 
party eventually caused a decline in GE’s influence. Two issues in particular encouraged 
GE members to seek an alternative party for promoting their concerns. First, the increase 
in secularization caused support for the NRP to wane, dropping five percentage points to 
24.7 percent support among students.210 When GE declared itself a formal movement in 
the 1970s, many of its members were actively involved with or supported the NRP. Thus, 
GE members were concerned that a decline in NRP support would be reflected in a 
decline in GE support.
Second, the territorial issue, which renewed interest in the NRP, now challenged
the party’s unity. The newer NRP, with its large GE membership, strove to persuade the
NRP leadership to form a coalition with Likud, a party unlikely to give up the territories.
In light of weakening support for the Labour party following the Yom Kippur War, the
long history of settler affiliation with the Labour party was hampering the settlers’ 
211primary aims. These attempts were to no avail and the NRP’s decision to join the 
Labour coalition compelled the GE to sever its ties to the party in 1974. Thus, in order to 
maintain or increase popularity, GE needed to isolate itself officially from the NRP.
The creation of Tehiya in 1979 had the potential to increase Gush Emunim’s 
support. Ardent settlers, with members from GE, the secular Land of Israel movement, as 
well as secular nationalists who opposed the Begin-Sadat peace treaty, supported GE. In
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1981, the party had three members elected to the Knesset, including GE member Hanan 
Porat. In 1984, under a different name and with a coalition, Tehiya was -  with 5 out of 
120 seats — the third largest party in Israel. Despite its initial success, Tehiya’s close 
unofficial affiliation with GE encountered several challenges.
First, as Ehud Sprinzak succinctly explains, GE is a “homogeneous revitalization 
movement whose main concern is the settlement of the West Bank. . . all members of the 
GE agree on fundamental principles and live within the same exclusive 
Weltanschauung.”212 Tehiya, however, had leaders representing the military, journalists, 
the business sector, settlers and scientists. An issue-oriented movement such as GE 
cannot have a party representing it on issues for which the movement has little or no 
concern. Not surprisingly, GE’s decision to present an electoral list of candidates was met 
with resistance within the party. The creation of a political party was “seen as 
motivated as much from a desire for personal gain as from the best interests of the 
movement.”214 Thus, many GE members thought that the movement’s non-partisanship 
was intrinsic to their identity, and that its motivated issue-based voting would fulfil their 
aims without explicit party affiliation.
Second, this concern became concrete with Tehiya’s lack of success in the
elections. Three seats alone were far below what party hopefuls had expected. Schnall
attributes GE’s disappointing results to
partisan ties [that] run deep in Israel: most voters retain their political affiliations 
over time and pass them along to their children. Aside from political ideology and 
policy stance, the parties provide numerous social and welfare benefits, pension 
programmes, and the like; these benefits tend to shore up voter loyalty (as does the 
threat of their loss). For Tehiya to expect that large numbers of voters would spring 
to answer its essentially ideological call was ill-advised and albeit naive; even its 
supporters generally returned to their electoral moorings within the Likud bloc or 
the NRP 215
48
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
GE’s creation was initially a response to diminishing NRP political support and 
‘routinized’ religious institutionalization; ironically, the movement was now undergoing 
the same institutionalization process against which it had once rebelled.
Likud’s control over the territories also contributed to the decline in Gush 
Emunim’s popularity. After winning a second term in office in 1981, Likud’s 
organizations replaced GE as the driving force of settlement establishment in the 
occupied territories. As the number of settlements increased under the Likud government, 
so too did the need for an administrative body to govern them. As a result, GE lost its 
best leadership with the creation of a specialized administration to govern the territories. 
For instance, in 1976 the settlement movement institution Amana was established to
7 1 f\govern settlement affairs and was fully staffed with GE members.
While Amana governed settlement activities, Yesha, or the Council of Jewish 
Settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, oversaw administrative functions. These 
successful GE advocates were chosen from the original GE leadership “to take over the
•  “517most organized and orderly institution of the movement.” The establishment of 
settlements involved creating an administrative infrastructure to act as a liaison between 
the local settlement administration and the Israeli government. Yesha’s formation 
involved hiring staff, all of whom belonged to GE, as well as regional representatives. 
Women were intentionally excluded from sitting on settlement councils, and in some 
cases, they were not allowed to vote.218 Some women stated that they “don’t mind that it 
should be all men deciding. . . the rabbis aren’t all unsympathetic to [women], either.”219 
Regardless, women had little formal influence in the settlements’ administration.
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The creation of Amana and Yesha were examples of what Myron Aranoff 
characterizes as the “routinization, bureaucratisation, and diversification of Gush 
Emunim’s activities [that have] lead to the specialization of its leaders in different 
organization spheres.”220 Consequently, in focusing on regional concerns, less attention 
was devoted to promoting the movement at the national level. The integration of GE into 
a political establishment, some could argue, demonstrates that it was indeed a strong 
political movement. Aranoff, however, contends that since its organizational power had 
been overtaken by the national level, and redirected to the regional level, “Gush Emunim
remains as only a symbol, the crown on the one-time joint activities of a number of
0 0  1different groups.” Amana evolved into a “very professional settlement organization,” 
while the Yesha Council represented the needs of the Gaza, West Bank and East 
Jerusalem settlements. This transfer of power, however, is typical when movements adopt 
more pragmatic policies222
The very success of Gush Emunim’s operative aims undermined its need to exist. 
In some respects, GE gained more support under the Labour party from 1974 to 1977. 
During these years, the movement primarily served as a protest outlet for young Israelis 
opposed to the Labour party’s settlement policy.223 While Labour preferred not to
0 0  Aevacuate the new settlements, it still considered them illegal. At the outset, GE was 
reactionary and its organizational basis was weak, if non-existent. Even though it was 
considered renegade, GE nonetheless received much sympathy.
Likud’s victory over Labour, however, resulted in GE activities becoming 
habitual, expected and even ignored, since the new pro-settlement government took 
control over GE’s settlement ambitions. Likud had such a sympathetic approach to
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Jewish settlement that GE squattings became the routine method in creating new 
settlements. In the first month of its rule, Likud legalized three GE settlements and 
approved the construction of three more. As a result of Likud’s rule, GE had no 
significant contributions to politics. On the one hand, because of internal divisions on 
numerous issues other than settlement, the movement was unable to take a stance that 
would meet the approval of most of its members. On the other, the very issue that unified 
the movement, that of territorial settlement, was relinquished to the government’s control. 
Paradoxically, “the very success of Gush Emunim in achieving its operative goals was 
the major cause of its decline as a distinct political organization.” Nevertheless, only 
men’s political power declined throughout this process, since women had not yet played a 
significant role in the political negotiations between the movement and the government.
Thus, Gush Emunim encountered various failures that emerged as it 
institutionalized. The divisiveness of GE support toward Tehiya, the public’s perception 
of the party as GE’s manifestation of a religious party like any other, the lack of success 
in the elections, and the Likud government’s lead role in establishing settlements were all 
issues that relegated GE from an avant-garde movement to a mere symbol. These 
combined factors contributed to GE’s decline in popularity. More detrimental than a loss 
of electoral support was the loss of its leaders: the NRP, Tehiya, and Morasha attracted 
the leading GE activists, leaving the movement’s secondary and less experienced leaders 
in power.226
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The Jewish Underground
The 1984 discovery of the “Jewish Underground” (JU), whose existence was 
unknown to GE leaders, exposed internal divisions within Gush Emunim.227 The JU plots 
were isolated incidents and involved different individuals who were members or 
supporters of GE. Twenty-seven members were arrested, all of whom were men.228 With 
the exception of the Temple Mount plot, their acts of terror occurred under a rabbi’s 
authority. JU individuals conspired to severely maim five Arab mayors, in response to the 
murder of yeshiva students in Hebron by Arab residents; level the Dome of Rock; attack 
a Muslim college in Hebron; and blow up five Arab buses in retaliation for the bombing 
of a bus full of Jewish passengers earlier that month. These events demonstrate that GE 
members’ violent and even homicidal actions could be justified religiously.
Upon the discovery of the Underground, and in particular the Temple Mount plot, 
the movement’s popularity suffered greatly. Initially, GE members denied the possibility 
that anybody from their movement could have been involved, accusing left-wing parties 
of fabricating the stories in an attempt to discredit them. Many Gush members were 
extremely disturbed by the JU’s existence.229 The discovery of the existence of the 
Underground immediately exposed the weakness of GE leadership. When it became 
apparent that the Underground not only existed, but was composed of GE members, GE 
leaders found themselves in the position of having to defend their movement while 
simultaneously trying to absorb a flood of incriminating evidence against them. This 
demonstrated their lack of control over their own members’ activities, but more 
importantly, it revealed that only a minority of members had participated in the JU’s plots.
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The exposure of the Underground created an internal crisis between moderates and 
hard-liners within the movement. First, the movement’s spiritual leader refused to 
comment. Although more hard-line members did not mind Levinger’s refusal to condemn 
the Underground’s activities, many moderate GE loyalists were perturbed by the apparent 
silence of their “most respected and influential leader.”230 Second, there were rumours 
that Levinger himself had been well-connected to the organization’s activities. These 
rumours were partially validated by the Underground’s “commander” Menachem Livni, 
who admitted to state officials that Levinger was indeed a member. Despite being 
detained for two weeks, the rabbi was not charged. The information that leaked and 
circulated among GE members, however, was that Levinger had indeed approved of
9 - 3  1
many of the terrorist activities.
Hanan Porat and numerous other members were particularly disturbed by 
Levinger’s affiliation for two reasons: his serving as the rabbinic authority supporting the 
Underground discredited the function of the rabbinic authority entirely; and his 
involvement broke an agreement among GE leaders to steer clear of the Underground 
activities. Consequently, many GE members for the first time began to distrust their 
spiritual leader. Bearing in mind that GE members have a merkaz harav approach to life, 
a fundamental difference such as the one presented here could make room in the future 
for members to act independently of what their spiritual leader might promote or sanction. 
The willingness to deviate from their spiritual leader’s position was already a sign of 
moderation. Moreover, Underground members themselves “made it clear that they 
believed they were acting in the name of the entire settler community. . . argu[ing] that 
under different circumstances other settlers would have done the same”; they did not,
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however, articulate under which circumstances.232 The Underground thus created a rift in 
the GE community between those who were “in the know” of the Underground’s 
activities and those who were not, and between those who [decreasingly] supported 
Levinger and the terrorists, and those who did not.
Militancy and Violence
The Begin-Sadat Tand-for-peace’ treaty, in which Begin promised to return the 
Sinai Peninsula in exchange for peace, jeopardized GE’s dream of a Greater Israel. The 
movement’s emphasis on land settlement as the most important contemporary religious 
obligation, and the doctrinal contradiction of accepting the pre-1967 borders, forced the 
movement to choose one of three options in the wake of the evacuation of the Sinai 
settlements.
First, GE could abandon the core of its doctrine. Settlement in Israel would be 
seen as a necessity in the renewed kingdom, but it would cause neither the messiah’s 
arrival nor the subsequent spiritual salvation. In the second scenario, GE could reconsider 
which religious values it would emphasize. Rather than stressing the importance of 
settlement, the movement could devote more doctrinal attention to Judaism’s universal 
ethics. Ironically, this could also be interpreted as the movement’s adoption of Western 
values. These include the ethics of occupying an alien community, such as the 
Palestinians, and the need for adhering to human rights.
Both of these instances are long-term solutions, where salvation is an event that is 
relegated to the distant future, thereby undermining GE’s doctrine of imminent salvation. 
This raises the question of whether GE could be able to retain the doctrine at all. For
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instance, what if the number of settlements required for salvation were to be reduced? 
The potential for further expansion would be postponed for the future. If expansion is 
deferred to the future, then so too is salvation, thereby invalidating the imminence of the 
messianic area, which is the essence of GE ideology.
Moreover, once the imminence of salvation ceased to exist in GE doctrine, then 
the validity of the entire settlement project in the Greater Land of Israel would be 
debatable. Considering that GE had declared land settlement to be above Israeli secular 
law, doctrinally relegating salvation to the future would make land settlement subject to 
Israeli law. Hence, were the Israeli government to declare certain settlements illegal, GE 
would have no religious basis to violate civil law. Finally, if Israel’s expansion to a 
Greater Israel were to be excluded from the preconditions for salvation, then the entire 
religious need for settlements would dissolve. Thus, if the armistice borders of Israel 
sufficed to make salvation imminent, the entire settlement project, along with the 
movement’s ideology, would die. Neither of the above options appears to be a potentially 
explosive situation. Nevertheless, GE could reject entirely the idea of land concessions, 
along with the legitimacy of the government. Given GE’s accumulation of weaponry, the 
potential for a violent confrontation would then seem inevitable.
An understanding of GE’s military power can be found in explaining the outcome 
of the 1967 war. Israel’s occupation of the West Bank marked the onset of an array of 
security problems, such as guerrilla attacks and Palestinian anti-Jewish mobs. The 
creation of settlements only aggravated these problems, and the military found itself in 
need of greater security measures. Among these additional measures was giving settlers, 
who themselves were either active or reserve soldiers, the right to defend themselves.233
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Thus, military responsibility -  the permissibility to use violent forms of resistance ~  was 
transferred directly from the army to the settlers.
If parts of Judea or Samaria were relinquished, therefore, a minority of Gush 
Emunim members could likely turn to armed resistance to prevent their land from being
O'iAconfiscated. Consequently, a conflict of interest between the government and GE could 
result in a quasi-independent armed force. Moreover, the movement still had the 
capabilities to do so; advanced weapons and military equipment were provided for 
defensive purposes to GE members. How much weaponry, however, is unknown, for 
“according to unconfirmed but persistent rumours, none of the responsible officers of the 
Israeli army knows exactly how many arms are stored in the settlements caches, and no 
one dares check.”
Despite GE’s potential for violence, there was little fighting on the part of the
0'X(\settlers in the evacuations. The vast majority of the Yamit residents, as well as those
from the thirteen other settlements in the Sinai, preferred to follow the Israel Defense
Forces soldiers than to be physically evicted by them from their homes. Some of the five
thousand settlers of Yamit in the Sinai were dragged out of their homes by unarmed
soldiers.237 Even the most militant of these settlers only resorted to throwing debris out
of their windows or from rooftops, often purposefully aiming away from Israel Defense
Forces soldiers.238 Jerusalem Post correspondent Abraham Rabinovitch described how
the militants had thrown burning tires, bucketfuls of sand and other objects at the 
soldiers on the scaling ladders and tried to hold them off with staves. But after two 
days of skirmishing, there was not a single injury of any consequence. The militants 
had not tried to overturn the ladders and the Molotov cocktails had not been thrown 
to hit. The soldiers had used force when necessary, but in measured doses.. . .
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More surprisingly for many, the defenders of Yamit had proved rational idealists, 
not fanatics. I was far from sharing the militants’ worldview, but I could not help 
admiring their dedication. And, in the end, their restraint.
Recalling that control over the Land of Israel was as important to GE as the Torah,
requiring one to defend the land to the death if necessary, regardless of land-for-peace
agreements; and bearing in mind that control over the entire Eretz Yisrael was an
uncompromising ideology, the peaceful evacuation of the Sinai settlements in 1982 was a
clear indication of the movement’s pragmatic moderation. More significantly, the
evacuation o f the Sinai settlements occurred nearly a decade before a few dozen GE
women established Rachelim.
Conclusion
Gush Emunim had become more moderate in its practices as a result of its 
institutionalization long before Rachelim’s creation in 1991. Adopting its territorial 
expansionist ideology from that of the Rav Kook Jr., who elucidated and expanded his 
father’s ideology, the movement stressed the retention of the territories occupied during 
the war. This was of paramount religious importance, especially in light of their belief in 
an imminent redemption.
Despite the political support GE received, particularly after the right-wing Likud 
party won the 1977 elections, its influence began to wane by the early 1980s. By using 
outside political parties, such as the NRP and Tehiya, to conduct its political affairs, GE 
lost its influence among its members and the electorate who were unable to unite around 
issues other than that of settlement. Its supporters shunned the newly created religious 
parties as unwanted forms of state-controlled religious institutions. Meanwhile, the
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creation of Amana and Yesha left an inexperienced leadership in control of Gush 
Emunim.
The weakness of the movement’s leadership, as a result of its institutionalization, 
revealed that many Gush members had changed their views regarding two issues of 
intrinsic importance to the ideology. First, the diminished support for anti-Arab attacks 
weakened the belief in merkaz harav. The refusal of GE’s spiritual leader to condemn the 
activities of the Underground encouraged many GE members to question the authority of 
their leader and his role in the political decision-making. GE’s response to the discovery 
of the Jewish Underground also demonstrated the unwillingness of many GE members, in 
spite of their conviction that the land was their entitlement, to violently antagonize their 
Arab neighbours, who nonetheless maintained the same land claims. Second, the refusal 
of GE members to risk their lives by fighting to preserve the integrity of the Land of 
Israel also revealed the movement’s moderation. These instances point to a similar trend 
discerned by Aviezer Ravitzky: “Since the evacuation of Yamit, there has been a marked 
tendency in this [redemptionist] camp to moderate its political and even its theological 
determinism.”240
The movement’s institutionalization and the decline of men’s political power 
within the movement created the political space for the group’s increased moderation. 
The responses of the Sinai settlers additionally demonstrated a more moderate approach 
to the issue of settlement in the Greater Land of Israel than otherwise formulated by the 
movement’s founders. As repeatedly iterated throughout the chapter, however, it was the 
GE men who occupied the leadership roles outside the familial structure. The 
movement’s institutionalization and subsequent decline in political influence coincided
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with its moderation. As the next chapter argues, when some of the Gush Emunim women 
realized that the wellspring of their husbands’ political power had run dry, they became 
more politically assertive over the settlement issue.
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CHAPTER THREE 
RACHELIM: THE ‘MOURNING-AFTER’ SETTLEMENT
To recall from the previous chapter, between 1974 and 1991, Gush Emunim’s 
institutionalization indefinitely postponed its ambitious territorial expansionist goals. 
Gush Emunim emerged in the 1970s as the settler movement par excellence, whose 
political goal of broadening the boundaries of the Israeli state, a “positive religious act,” 
required creating illegal settlements in Israel’s post-1967 acquired territories.241 In the 
early 1990s, after GE had adopted more pragmatic policies, approximately 5,000 
nationalist-religious settlers lived in 144 settlements.242 The smaller settlements, scattered 
across the hilltops of the West Bank, were and still are considered “the moral backbone 
and political stronghold of Gush Emunim.”243 One settlement, however, differs from all 
others: it was founded solely by women.
Unarguably, the creation of a settlement by women indicates their involvement in
furthering GE’s settlement dream. Yet Tami Amanda Jacoby argues that religious-
nationalist women are not active participants in the military struggle. She asserts that
“although [religious-nationalist] women were considered integral to this nationalist vision,
in their domain as keepers of home, culture, and children, they did not have a clearly
defined role in military conflict.”244 She also observes that
women often encounter structures of patriarchal authority -  in the national 
movement, the military, the private sphere, and through the discourses and practices 
of dominant belief systems. In these structures, women are either domesticated or 
rendered subordinate to men.245
Yet women’s establishment of the Rachelim settlement appears to counter Jacoby’s
claims of women’s domestication within Gush Emunim.
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This chapter argues that in the context of the creation of Rachelim, some 
religious-nationalist women have occupied a significant military role in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, within the confines of their domestic roles. While GE women used 
matemalism to champion recognition of their illegal settlement, reminiscent of men’s 
actions in the movement’s early days, they simultaneously challenged the very gender 
ideals that their movement valorized. Unlike Hamas, Gush Emunim does not detail its 
conception of gender roles in any charter. Therefore, in order to understand GE’s 
normative role of women, religious, nationalist and settler discourses must be examined.
Gush Emunim’s Gender Ideology
The Orthodox Jewish community, regardless of denomination, considers 
orthodoxy to refer to “Jews who observe all the religious commandments, and interpret 
those commandments to require a traditional life strictly attached to religious ritual.”246 
They regard “gender categorization as manifest, ongoing, and explicitly significant for 
the course of life.”247 Within each community, opinions over women’s role differ, 
depending on how laws and customs are interpreted.248 Nira Yuval-Davis notes that “the 
emphasis in Jewish fundamentalist movements is on the ‘natural’ differences between 
men and women. . . that women were created differently and thus have different religious 
duties and life careers.”249
This essentialism is also found within the secular stream. Frances Raday finds 
Israel “striking” due to the endurance of the patriarchal religious familial structure within 
a state that has made great efforts to ensure women’s legal, social and economic rights. 
Similarly, Ruth Halperin-Kaddari observes that personal aspects of religious law are “still
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considered a basic tenet in the Israeli polity in general and in the delicate construction of 
Jewish identity in particular”251 The emphasis on essentialist roles in both secular and 
religious streams implies that it, too, exists within Gush Emunim culture. Nevertheless, 
essentialism does not necessarily imply male superiority.
Within some religious communities, there has been considerable effort to
demonstrate that women’s roles, though different from those of men, are not inferior.
Adrienne Baker perceives that Orthodox women
in their homes, in the domain over which they preside and in which they transmit to 
their children the essence of Judaism -  and in their study groups -  convey a dignity 
of spirit which is very different from any suggestion of their feeling second best252
Currents within the religious feminist movement have raised awareness over women’s
position in Judaism. Yuval-Davis ascertains that “since the rise of the feminist movement,
a lot of energy has had to be spent to show that the Jewish woman’s position is ‘really’
even more important and powerful than the man’s,” although she is sceptical of these
arguments, “given the overall approach of the movement toward women.”253 Thus, one
might expect Gush Emunim women to feel empowered by their roles within the
movement. This can dictate a course of action, however, that departs from the original
rationale behind the empowerment.
Women’s empowerment of traditional roles, as Yuval-Davis iterates, is 
problematic for Jewish religious fundamentalist movements.254 While the feminist 
movement “resolved any problematic aspect of women claiming power” by 
distinguishing ‘power o f  from ‘power over,’ this difference could not be applied to the 
private realm. 255 In the context of Gush Emunim, as well as in other Jewish 
fundamentalist movements, women’s political involvement within the private sphere
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must be recognized because “the reproduction of the Jewish fundamentalist system 
depends on women, their co-operation, and their hard work.” Moreover, women’s 
confinement to the home “domesticates” their men, who are then responsible for 
generating an income for a growing family.257 Therefore, women can function as political 
actors within their roles in the private sphere.
Perhaps the most important of these roles, and one which is both idealized and
held as normative by the community, is motherhood. Within the religion, explains Baker,
“the married woman, especially the mother, is the paradigm idealized in Judaism. . . as
the ‘normative experience.’”258 Baker compares the biblical and modem ideal woman:
The proverbial ‘Woman of Worth’ freed her husband and sons from day-to-day 
economic responsibilities so that they could pursue sacred tasks; her modem 
counterpart still sees her family’s needs as her highest priority, and arranges her life 
to fulfill them 259
Rachel, the historic wife of the martyred Rabbi Akiva, is idealized in the religious Jewish 
tradition for her altruistic support of her husband. Recognizing his fine qualities, 
Rachel marries the destitute Akiva on the condition that he intensively study Torah. Upon 
hearing of their marriage, Rachel’s father vows not to support her financially and she is 
left poor and alone. The challenge of supporting Akiva’s decades of Torah study away 
from home forces Rachel to cut and sell her hair. After 12 years away, Akiva returns with 
12 000 students, but overhears Rachel telling her neighbour that she would have him 
study yet another 12 years. Without seeing his wife, Akiva leaves and returns another 12 
years later with double the students.
Rachel rushes to greet her husband, but is shoved aside by his students, who see 
instead a poor beggar trying to touch their beloved master. Only Akiva recognizes Rachel 
in her impoverished condition, and explains to his students, “That which is mine and
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which is yours is really hers.” According to Aviva Cantor, Rachel is “held up as a role 
model of what the Jewish woman should be -  devoted, appreciative of her husband’s 
intellectual possibilities and (later) his accomplishments, and provider of support in his 
academic endeavours to the point of self-sacrifice.” These historic examples indicate 
that the idealization of women’s self-sacrifice, as wives or mothers, is entrenched in the 
religious tradition.262
Anthropologist Tamar El-Or’s research affirms that the identities of religious- 
nationalist women cannot be divorced from their roles as mothers. In spite of the gender 
role challenges confronting these women, both in status and in literacy of oral law, El-Or 
observes how motherhood is the “single station that is known from the start.”263 In a 
study of 185 subjects at an academic religious seminary, she found that all the women 
united around their maternal roles.264 Within this role, religious-nationalist women have 
attempted to locate “femininity as an area of power” for both religious and political 
purposes.265 For example, through the study of ‘male’ texts, women have begun to 
destabilize the definition of motherhood, calling into question its singularity.266 Forming 
alternative identities, women oscillate between motherhood as ‘natural’ and as ‘work.’267 
In viewing motherhood as work, women make motherhood a job transferable to others, 
resulting in a shift in household responsibility for many married couples.268 In spite of 
the debate over the definition of motherhood, the women still identify with this 
prescribed role.269 This power is not only harnessed in their roles as mothers, but home­
builders.
Gush Emunim women also play an essential role in building the home. The 
importance of the home in Judaism is undisputed, for the “family has always been the
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unit of Jewish existence.” 270 Moshe Meiselman claims that “the centre of Jewish life has 
been, and will always be, the home,” while Baker recounts the apologetic argument that 
the “home is central and that in this sphere the woman’s role is respected and all- 
important.”271 Defining a woman’s role as “the creator, moulder, and guardian of the 
Jewish home,” Meiselman asserts that while “the man has always been the family’s 
public representative, the woman has been its soul.”272 Women’s familial role is therefore 
a private one, but one that is greatly respected by the community.
Women’s ultimate task within the home is not performing domestic duties, but
serving as the religious foundation for the family.273 She is allotted the responsibility of
guiding the family in a positive religious direction.274 In this role, Meiselman argues,
women express their individuality:
The Jewish woman is the soul and inspiration of the Jewish home. Through 
building this home she achieves her ultimate Jewish self-definition, and the stamp
77Sshe leaves on the home expresses her own uniqueness and individuality.
The home is not only an outlet for individuality, but a source of autonomy and economic 
benefit. Raday discerns that “women’s status in the home plays an important role in 
determining the extent of their autonomy and of their equality of opportunity in 
socioeconomic terms, too.”276 Women’s link to the public arises through their roles as 
mothers and as wives of husbands who study religious texts.277 The public, in this context, 
refers to social rather than economic spheres, as Jewish women historically have heavily 
participated in the public economic arena. In many Jewish fundamentalist families, 
women are responsible for generating an income while their husbands pursue full-time 
religious study, although this is more common among the ultra-Orthodox than among the
770religious nationalists.
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The home plays a central role as the normative experience not only for religious 
families, but for all Israeli families. Halperin-Kaddari explains that “Israel is a family- 
oriented society. Familism, the normative family’s centrality in the lives of the individual 
and the collective, is one of the central characteristics of Israeli society.”280 The emphasis 
on the home, and on sacrificial motherhood for the Zionist cause, can be traced 
historically to the state’s inception. Motherhood and sacrifice were interwoven as 
children grew into soldiers who gave their lives to the nation.281
Zionist motherhood demands that a mother be “be willing to sacrifice her son on 
behalf of his homeland (motherland).”282 States and regions engaged in conflict demand 
that women ‘offer’ their children to the cause. Yet Israel’s case is unique, argues Sachlav 
Stoler-Liss:
The Zionist case is remarkable, not because it stressed the woman’s role in bearing 
and raising children, but because it expanded the national boundaries of 
motherhood to include the period before birth and the entire span of time between 
birth and the child’s enlistment in the army.
Although women are conscripted, the military still regards them as [potential] mothers
and wives. Consequently, they are easily exempted from military service. Their twenty-
one-month obligation falls more than one year short of men’s three-year requirement and
requires them to perform different tasks from that of men. In the mid-1990s, more than 70
percent of female soldiers occupied “traditional military roles”: they typed, cooked,
cleaned, folded, and entertained for the benefit of the troops.284 The division of roles in
the nationalist cause, women as nurturers and men as soldiers, is perceived as an issue o f
national security. Simona Sharoni maintains that
the Israeli state’s doctrine of ‘national security’ depends both upon men who are 
ready to serve as soldiers, as fighters on the battlefield, and upon women who are 
ready to adjust to the needs of the Israeli collective experience. On one hand,
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women are socialized into the roles of unconditional supporters, exceptional 
caretakers, and keepers of the home front; on the other hand, they are expected to 
remain vulnerable and in need of protection.285
Through either the religious or nationalist ethos, all Israeli women are socialized in an
environment where motherhood is held as the normative experience. Any attempt to
divorce women from this fundamental role, as feminism seeks to do, is thus “conceived
as morally wrong for both religious and nationalistic reasons, presenting the divine order
and national virility with a challenge.”286
The normative experience of motherhood, however, is composed of two
contradictory expectations. In times of peace, women are expected to be the altruistic
nurturers. In this position, they are perceived as vulnerable. The ideal Israeli man, the
‘sabra,’ was not only limited to strengthening the enfeebled Jewish diaspora, but also
fighting for and protecting the defenceless mothers and mothers-to-be. 287 With reference
to the sabra, Sharoni succinctly states that “in the terms of this gendered juxtaposition,
men must be offensive on the battlefield in order to protect vulnerable women on the
home front.”288 Conversely, women are also expected to embody the sabra ideal in times
of war;
on the one hand, when Israeli men are on the home front, women are relegated to 
conventionally gendered roles: they have to be inside, soft, tender and sweet. On the 
other hand, during wartime when men are on the battlefield, women are expected to 
step out of their traditional roles and to enter, if only temporarily, the public 
political arena. During such periods pragmatic, assertive, and tough behaviour on 
the part of women is praised as a significant contribution to the collective national 
effort.289
Yet in a country that has been in a state of conflict since its founding, the dichotomy 
between the vulnerable versus the aggressive female has often been blurred.
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Consequently, it is not apparent whether settler women, who live in direct zones
of conflict, are expected to embody the traditional and domestic position articulated in
religious expectations, or the temporary aggressive role defined by the nationalist
discourse. Michael Feige hypothesizes that like their nationalist counterparts,
fundamentalist men active in liberation movements expect the women fighting side- 
by-side with them to return to the traditional lifestyle after the battle is won, while 
women find it difficult to retain the achievements of their emancipation. . . [this 
motif is] concordant with the concepts of femininity in the settlers’ movement Gush 
Emunim and the national-religious women’s camp in general.290
Given their perceived expected role of domesticity, and their absence from the top
political leadership of the movement, women’s role in Gush Emunim has largely been
neglected in favour of a focus on the male political leadership of the movement. Feige
relates that “within the Gush Emunim camp, political leadership of the early days was
uniformly male and the religious authority of rabbis. . . was an exclusively male
■yQ')
prerogative.”
El-Or concurs that “these dimensions of matemalism and the centrality of women 
and children in settlement expansion have been largely ignored in favour of more male- 
centred explanations of militancy.”293 One might even be tempted to think, given the 
emphasis of the latter, that women have in no way influenced any of the political 
decisions of the movement. The movement’s women, however, do not perceive this to be 
the case. They understand their roles to be no less important than those of men in formal 
leadership positions, who determine when and where settlements will be established. 
More importantly, they attest that without the “real leaders,” the Gush Emunim women, 
the settlements could not exist.294
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Both GE women and men are highly aware of the importance of women within 
the movement. First, women’s embrace of motherhood is considered vital to the strength 
of Gush Emunim. In El-Or’s study, one prominent teacher explained to her students that 
motherhood
is natural for women, and giving birth is an experience they all share. This is their 
purpose in this world, and it is their merit for the next world. To be a mother is to be 
yourself, and therefore it is a task of endless happiness. Motherhood is the source of 
moral judgment and national strength, which the national religious community is in 
need of. . . Motherhood is an identity that embraces everything. It accompanies the 
woman-mother wherever she goes and is present in every other facet of her identity. 
This is gender-conditioned motherhood, carried out by women only.295
Motherhood is not only needed to fortify Gush Emunim, but the entire national religious
community. Jacoby observes that the immense respect conferred to Gush Emunim
women, who are viewed as equal to men in their spiritual devotion to the movement’s
goal,
may arise partly from women’s necessary role in raising large families, which [are] 
necessary for fulfilling the commandment to settle the land. Indeed, Jewish settlers 
tend to have high birthrates. The large settler family is highly politicized and 
mobilized as a means of fighting the “demographic struggle” . . .  ,296
Second, within this struggle, women often decide where the family is going to 
live.297 Moreover, they help their families cope with the difficult living conditions of the 
settlements in the initial stages and the perceived constant threat of terrorist attacks.298 
Commenting on women’s role in maintaining the integrity of the settlements, one settler 
explained that it is a “very natural thing that the women are actually in the everyday life 
those who hold the settlements together because they hold the family together in the 
settlements, despite difficulties that may come.” 299 Through their roles as mothers, 
therefore, Gush Emunim women play an extremely significant role in preserving the 
cohesiveness of the family unit and the settlement community.
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Rachelim’s Establishment
GE’s leadership, as mentioned in the previous chapter, considered Palestinian 
attacks or killings of Jews, regardless of whether the latter were civilians or soldiers, as 
valid grounds for creating settlements. In October 1991, in what settlers then “considered 
the most severe attack,” bus driver Yitzhak Rofeh and settler mother of seven Rachel 
Druk were shot and killed by a Palestinian near the Shiloh settlement in the West 
Bank.300 The GE’s proclamation of the 1991 attack as the “most severe” should have 
further impelled them than in previous cases to push for a new settlement’s creation. In 
contrast to this expectation and yet another indication of their moderation, however, GE 
men did not participate from the outset, and intentionally avoided any confrontation with 
the military or government.301
The establishment of Rachelim by GE women was in large part a consequence of 
their husbands’ political impotence. Even after women had established themselves at the 
site, their husbands lacked any desire to confront the military. Justifying male inaction, 
one female settler explained that the men “were used to working with the official 
authorities.” Since the government at the time was officially pro-settlement, rather than 
risk acting against it, the men preferred to wait until they had received its permission.304 
The women, however, “couldn’t just stay home after Rachel was murdered on that 
road.”305 Instead, they chose to pursue an “irrational” act, which, according to the settlers, 
had
become a necessary and logical strategy: women can bring off what the dominant 
but immobilized men cannot permit themselves [because the men] work to further 
their objectives through accepted conventional channels, while the women do not 
feel constrained by the establishment and are free to act as “madwomen.”306
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Through the creation of Rachelim, therefore, Gush Emunim women eclipsed their 
husbands as the new pioneers of the settlement movement.
Immediately after the funeral, female settlers “staked a claim” near the site of 
Druk’s murder and refused to leave. 307 With their children and small babies 
accompanying them, the women remained overnight to demonstrate their refusal to allow 
anybody to shoot them “on their own land.”308 They were all mothers and therefore 
considered their actions to be a “natural reaction” to the death of a fellow settler 
mother.309 These few dozen Gush Emunim women decided that the creation of a 
settlement, named Rachelim (“Rachels”) primarily after Rachel Druk, but also after 
Rachel Weiss, killed three years earlier, and the Biblical matriarch Rachel, would be a 
proper way to commemorate the women.310
Rachelim became the first instance in which women fully undertook the initiative
11 I
of creating a settlement, thereby marking a milestone in settlement history. Future 
settlements, such as Nofei Nehemia, replicated the justifications and tactics used at 
Rachelim.312 The 25 Rachelim founders were all between the ages of 35 and 45, and 
affiliated with Gush Emunim.313 All were married with children, and employed.314 In 
addition to these founders, 200 women from across the West Bank descended on 
Rachelim in the early stages, in order to spend a few hours, a day or a night in support of 
Rachelim. Men also assisted the women at night and Rachelim quickly developed into 
“the social, political and ritualistic centre for the West Bank Jewish settlers’ 
community.”316
Due to the illegality of the settlement under Israeli law, the women were not
T1 7permitted to establish a permanent presence. This deterrence proved unsuccessful and
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the women were able to justify staying the night, then shiva (week of mourning) and then 
shloshim (month of mourning).318 After a few weeks of dispute between the Rachelim 
women and the military, the latter agreed to establish a military outpost and memorial 
vigil near the spot where the killings occurred. 319 Within a few months, Amana 
nominated a woman, Orit Rapaport, to be officially in charge of the settlement. One 
year later, the government gave permission for people to live permanently at the military 
settlement.321 In 1999, the Israeli government recognized Rachelim as a legal civilian 
settlement.322
During the initial period of the settlement’s creation, women obeyed the 
government’s prohibition against the building of permanent structures. Instead, they used 
two tents as temporary dwellings: one for the kitchen, a study room and a “makeshift 
synagogue,” and the other for lodging. While women were at the site, their husbands 
“stayed at home to attend to the household chores and cater to the women.”324 The 
women, meanwhile, studied religious texts, cared for their children and entertained 
visitors.
In the early days of the settlement, the women’s actions outwardly contradicted 
the strong tendency among politically right-wing Israeli women to be more militant than 
their husbands. Regarding the presence of children at the settlement, Tamara Neuman 
remarks that “the sheer numbers of children at play, tended by religious mothers in flow 
skirts and stylish hats, is a panoply of nature and nurture that disrupts one’s 
preconceptions of how militant communities are constituted.” Although the Rachelim 
women understood their act as a peaceful response to a violent action, settler presence is 
often perceived by Palestinians as more threatening than uniformed soldiers, since the
72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
duration of the settlements is intended to long surpass that of the Israel Defense Forces in 
the territories. If the Rachelim women are indeed “enthusiastic participants in the Gush 
Emunim project, impelling their husbands towards greater radicalism,” then there is much 
justification in the Palestinian perception. In this view, the matemalism that drove 
Rachelim’s creation is a more destructive force than overt military action alone.
The Gush Emunim women’s spontaneous creation of Rachelim mirrored and 
defied their movement’s gender expectations. Their ability to employ matemalism as a 
mechanism for settlement gain relied on the perceived public-private division of the 
settlers, the expansion of their home-building role, and their conscious use of gender as a 
tool to confront the Israeli military. In each of these instances, women superficially 
conformed to gender expectations.
The public-private division found in religious-nationalist discourse, as explained
above, suggests that Gush Emunim men work primarily within the public realm, while
women reign over the private. In the case of Rachelim, one may argue that such a
division was constantly maintained. First, although women’s actions occurred under the
public eye, the women followed the well-established male settlement script. Sharing this
sentiment, Michael Feige suggests that
the acts of conquest by Gush Emunim, the penetration into hostile social 
environments and erecting settlements, are inherently masculine, and the women of 
Rehelim suggested no reinterpretation or subversive perspective on the all- 
important practice of settlement, occupation, let alone the rights of the occupied 
Palestinian Arabs.330
He notes further that the women “merely performed according to the script they had 
received,” implying that their actions were in no way subversive toward the movement’s
• 3 31 • •gender expectations. Their decision to create a settlement in response to a murdered
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Israeli was “a standardized and ritualized practice” of the movement.332 He concludes 
that the very creation of Rachelim was a metaphor for the Gush Emunim movement, and 
that in following this narrative, women were acting in accordance with previously 
established gender expectations.
Second, the women’s actions demonstrated a full commitment to both the gender 
expectations and founding nationalist aspirations of their movement. On the one hand, 
women’s role in Rachelim was an expansion of their settlement responsibilities and a 
continuation of
a project of private and national home building. The struggle for a national home is 
conducted through the creation of private homes, and the private homes receive 
their unique value from their being contributions to the establishment of a national 
home.333
Because of “the presumed exceptionalism of [religious] mothers in the political arena,” 
the military had difficulty opposing them.334 Soldiers fulfilled women’s domestic 
requests, allowing them to improve the decrepit settlement conditions in which they lived. 
Despite the government’s edict that only tents could be erected, the military permitted the 
women to build brick walls on the outside of the tents in order to keep warm in the winter. 
Women’s requests, therefore, addressed the needs of the home, rather than Israel’s need 
for greater security measures.
Similarly, whenever an illegal settlement had been established in the past, Gush 
Emunim men successfully lobbied for its legalization on both ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ 
grounds. As men, they argued for security considerations, but they deplored the women’s 
appalling living conditions on behalf of their wives and mothers.335 Rachelim women 
continued GE’s sexual division of requests, basing their own needs on their maternal 
roles as homemakers, leaving the men once again to detail security measures. As one
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female settler stated, “We, more than others, determine the nation’s policy by giving our 
support behind the scenes to those around us, to grow, develop, contribute and build.”336
In acting like concerned, fully-committed mothers, the women ensured better 
treatment by the Israel Defense Forces. The Israeli military treats women differently than 
men because women’s primary supportive role is regarded as “behind the scenes,” 
implying a greater vulnerability, since they are not the primary fighters and are therefore 
in need of protection. Since their support of their husbands’ and sons’ military 
participation is crucial to the maintenance of the nationalist vision, women must be 
approached with increased sensitivity.337 This differential treatment is based on several 
considerations, the first of which is the military’s function to protect the family unit, 
seeing “itself as a guardian of Jewish civilian life, rather than as a force to be used against 
its own women and children.” Consequently, soldiers would have greater difficulty in 
removing female settlers, a detail on which the settlers capitalized by establishing a 
dominant female and child presence at Rachelim.339 The presence of mothers and 
children on the settlement site demonstrated “how rooted they [were] in their newly 
established homes,” augmenting the challenge to the soldiers to uproot them.340
Nevertheless, female settlers counter the claims of having used women 
strategically at Rachelim.341 They argue that the Israel Defense Forces is fully capable of 
removing women. Shortly after midnight on the first night, a truck full of female soldiers 
who were prepared to remove the women were brought onto the site.342 Although the 
female Israel Defense Forces soldiers “almost managed to do so,” like their male 
counterparts, they were reluctant to physically drag the women away.343 The female 
soldiers were apparently as affected as the male soldiers by the presence of mothers and
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children at the newly-formed settlement. The Rachelim women negotiated with the [male] 
commander, who permitted them to stay.344
Not only were all the settlers mothers, but they acted according to a ‘female’
social script. For example, in welcoming an array of visitors, the women received their
guests in “traditionally feminine ways.”345 Tamar El-Or and Gideon Aran observed that
the women “played the role of gracious hostess, and offered food and drink and warmth
by the stove,” while they cared for the multitude of children they had brought with
them.346 They were also attentive to the needs of the soldiers. Emuna Elon, one of the
founding women, lamented that
these poor men had to stand there in the biting cold. But the women went up to 
them and offered them homemade cakes sent by their families. They invited them to 
warm themselves by the small heater.
Women embodied the role of the traditional mother for the soldiers and devoted
substantial amounts of time toward preparing meals, cleaning and taking care of the
children.347
Their discussions at the site primarily revolved around motherhood issues such as 
feeding, child-rearing, cleaning, education and kitchen duties.348 Settlement and security 
concerns were not addressed.349 Not only were they concerned about ‘female’ issues, they 
also worried about their physical appearance. In the words of one settler, they considered 
it important to appear “pretty and feminine,” rather than risk looking like “Amazons on 
the mount.” 350 One of the women, writing for the settler newsletter, observed that 
“anyone passing by would probably have been surprised to see a group of tired, eccentric 
women dressed in long, full skirts and head scarves, sitting around a rabbi and listening to
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a lesson.”351 The goal was, as Rachelim settler Geula Tzroia aptly stated, to demonstrate 
that their strength was “quiet, beautiful, and positive.”352
In apparent contrast to this desire to exhibit strength, Rachelim women also 
utilized their perceived vulnerability, thereby fostering public empathy. The women
OCT
feared for their children’s safety, as well as that of other settlers. “Unafraid of being
accused of melodramatics,” the settlers described to visitors various instances in which
they had been the victims of Palestinian attacks.354 Their visible commitment to
motherhood and safeguarding their children was a response to “the threat not only to
physical existence, but to the ability to maintain a viable image and identity of
responsible parenthood as well.” Their articulation of fear was a ‘feminine’ reaction to
an outsiders’ attack, which threatened their public image as conscientious mothers who
ensured the safety of the settlement communities.
From their standpoint, the women’s reaction was both spontaneous and emotional,
“motivated by a bundle of feminine (motherly) actions.” A circulating pamphlet during
the settlement’s establishment described how “what started as a spontaneous vigil
following the murder of Rachel Druk and Yitzhak Rofeh, turned into a fact in the
settlement landscape of the Land of Israel.”357 Their spontaneity translated into a decisive
political action that was made possible by rallying around their identity as individual
mothers, and as the collective mother of the settlement project. Naomi Sapir, a Rachelim
co-founder, explained:
By remaining here we express the idea that life for us in Judea and Samaria is not a 
political demonstration, but a simple and day-to-day wish to live. We state that life 
goes on and that our answer to death is -  life! We organized on a feminine basis 
because the women provide the emotional organic justification for the entire idea o f  
settling [italics mine]. As to the political authorities, some of us are of the opinion 
that we should make do with exerting influence on the decision-makers, while
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others think that we should actually be in there [in parliament]. Either way, we’ve 
wasted a lot of time and there’s a lot to do.358
Feige clarifies that women were drawn to the site “spontaneously and unpremeditatively
simply by virtue of their feminine essence,” assuming that “women had a certain intuitive
understanding and reaction to the dangers threatening the safety of their families.”359
Thus, their spontaneity and emotional response were channelled into an attempt to not
only protect their own families, but also to defend the national Jewish community as a
whole.360
Finally, the women did not superficially subvert gender expectations because they 
did not intend to define their action as ‘feminist.’ The women were always careful to 
define their primary task as protecting their families, “which they regarded as the 
quintessential role of women,” rather than promoting a feminist political agenda.361 
Recall that the religious-nationalist community considers feminism a destabilizing force 
that threatens the structure of the traditional family. Not surprisingly, the Rachelim 
women associated feminism with “negative attitudes and destructive goals,” while they 
considered their actions to be motivated by “positive attitudes and creative goals.”362 
Even if the women did not intend to subvert the normative patriarchal order, however, the 
possibility remains that their actions did indeed deviate from the normative female settler 
narrative.
HaKol HaNashi or the Feminine Voice
In many respects, Rachelim’s creation marked a stark departure by Gush 
Emunim women from the traditional GE narrative of settlement establishment. First, 
women were eager to respond in a peaceful manner, for they disliked the violent
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aspects typically associated with the male settlers.363 Feige points to studies that 
demonstrate how the hostile and violent aspects of Gush Emunim ideology negatively 
influence the family.364 The women’s preference for peaceful alternatives surfaced in 
their diction. El-Or and Aran detect sex-differences in the settlers’ language: men 
spoke o f “seizing, struggling, constructing and resisting,” while women referred to 
“creating, giving birth, continuity and education.” 365 Second, in what El-Or and Aran 
refer to as a “form of feminine radicalism,” women’s primary roles transformed from 
supporters of men to initiators of settlements, thereby eclipsing their husbands’ 
roles 366 This is evidenced by the women’s decision to act on their accord rather than 
ceding to the male leadership’s desires. Not only did the military and other 
administrative bodies oppose the women’s actions, encouraging them to “go home,”
'if.’?
but the women’s husbands were also never consulted.
Third, the Rachelim women used their positions as mothers to speak with a 
legitimate political voice. Neuman has observed a similar trend in the past, whereby “in 
settlement expansion, women mask the political content of their actions by recasting them 
as part o f the private sphere.”368 Neither the military nor the government, in allowing the 
women to remain at the mourning site on the grounds of protecting their children, viewed 
the women’s actions as political. Instead, they cast women as “non-political advocates of 
children,” whose perceived maternal protective response was “natural.” 369 Contrary to 
previous instances of settlement establishment, the Rachelim mothers were not auxiliaries 
in their husbands’ settlement tactics, but innovators of a “novel strategy based on novel
T70arguments.” Their unique strategy used matemalism and “routine practices of care,” 
rather than sole obstinate refusals to leave, in order to normalize an otherwise illegal
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settlement.371 These routine practices, which include protecting, nurturing and
homemaking, were previously manipulated by GE women to advocate more deliberate
political undertakings, for
the significance of the quotidian in this case lies in the fact that politics is infused in 
everyday practices and these practices serve as the foundation for more overtly 
political acts, such as takeovers, protests, and political rallies.372
In willingly bringing along their children into a potentially life-threatening situation from
the outset, the Rachelim women forged a relationship between the memorial piece of land
and its female defenders that could not easily be severed by the military, the government
or even their spouses.
Moreover, their “commitment to retain childrearing routines in the face of
considerable conflict” was also imbued with political significance.374 The mother-child
bond is perceived to be “natural,” thereby lending women “the character of morally
sanctioned actions.”375 The maternal ethos, therefore, carries the moral authority. To
question women’s primacy in this instance would be to jeopardize a foundation that has
- in /
served not only the interests of the settlements, but the state as a whole. More public
support was given to the women for their maternal motivations, which they frequently
expressed in actions and in words. In response to questions requiring ideological
explanations, they reiterated what their male counterparts professed:
Israelis are duty bound to occupy and hold all parts of the historical land of Israel, 
that living in the territories was a risk to be taken today in the interest of securing 
complete safety in the future.377
Thus, women’s use of matemalism enabled them to be political actors who did not need
to account for overt political actions.
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The Gush Emunim women repeatedly justified their paradoxical decision to 
protect their children in a way that many Israelis would consider even more life- 
threatening.378 For the sake of national security, the women endangered their own 
families, although they disagree with this assessment. One could argue, as El-Or and 
Aran do, that had they truly desired to protect their children, they would not be living in 
the settlements:
The full realization of the experience of motherhood would mean evacuation of the 
territories, or at least an acknowledgement of the contradiction between the wish to 
ensure the safety of one’s children and the national conflict. . . If this mother does 
not believe in a totally national narrative, she may experience the contradiction 
between her two tasks and acknowledge the fact that her life in Israel poses a 
continuous threat to herself and her children, as well as a threat to the 
Palestinians.379
Israeli society has often criticized settler parents, who are sometimes regarded as “being 
ready to sacrifice their children in the name of faith and ideology.” Assuming El-Or 
and Aran’s argument is true, this is a legitimate criticism. Settlement evacuation, or 
recognition by the women that settlement life is more dangerous than life outside the 
settlements, severely undermines Gush Emunim’s vision of a Greater Land of Israel. 
Therefore, the Rachelim women cannot fully be committed to the safety of their own 
families, as this would threaten their movement’s settlement goals.
Although their actions were ostensibly for their own families’ safety, the women 
ultimately endangered their families’ lives for the sake of the nation.381 They argued that 
it was their responsibility to the country and the nation to ensure that Rachelim and other 
settlements remain, regardless of whatever events transpire. This responsibility, in turn, 
helped the women endure the difficulties of the founding days of Rachelim, knowing that
‘l O ' J
“in spite of everything that’s happening, [this] is saving the state, the whole state.”
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Alongside saving the state, however, comes a greater personal risk, one that settlers are 
not to eager to admit.
Yaron Ezrhahi attributes this risk to the settlers’ inability to divorce themselves 
from the children:
These parents see the children as an extension of themselves. This attitude 
contradicts the liberal approach that views children as independent entities. They 
don’t understand the autonomy of the child. In Western society, which has 
assimilated liberal principles, life is endangered only in order to defend life itself. 
The settlers are ready to sacrifice themselves and their children for the meaning of 
life.384
Settler Emuna Elon, aware that people may regard her as an “irresponsible mother,” does
not deny the risk for her children, but affirms that “it’s not a matter of ideology. It’s
simply the most logical life I can live in this country.” 385 She attests that she “couldn’t
think of any place where the children would be perfectly safe, since an Israeli child is not
safe when traveling on a bus or on an outing to Dizengoff Center.”386 On the other hand,
she also claims that the settlements themselves pose little risk:
I really don’t think the danger here is much greater. If I were to come to this 
conclusion, I would really have a problem. I don’t believe that there is even one 
parent who thinks that he is endangering his children for the sake of his ideology. 
This includes even the most extreme right-wingers — and I regard the Hebron 
settlers in the same way that you regard me. People view life here as a logical 
reality, not only according to their ideology, but also according to their intellect.387
Settlers argue that there is no truly safe place in Israel whenever they are challenged on
the issue of their children’s safety. They assert that Israel is dangerous everywhere, and
that people endanger themselves whenever they go out onto the streets.388 One settler
explained, “I don’t know where there is a safer place for them [children]” to justify her
family’s decision for living in the settlement.389 Either of the two arguments put forth,
that the risk of living in the settlement is no greater than living anywhere else and/or that
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this decision is based on “logic” and not “ideology,” indicate that women are sensitive to 
the potential risks to their children. Nevertheless, settlers are aware that “nothing arouses 
sympathy for the settlers more than an injury to a child.” 390 Thus, the increased risk to 
children’s lives is politically advantageous for the movement’s ambition.
Given their assertiveness, it is nonetheless remarkable, considering the negative 
connotations of feminism -  “childless” and “bra-burning” -- within the religious-
1 Q I
nationalist camp, that the Rachelim women came to regard their actions as feminist. 
Within one month after the murder, the “Feminist Manifesto” was published in a settler 
newsletter. It read:
We the women of Judea, Samaria and Gaza have established a memorial vigil. 
We demand we be allowed to found the settlement of Rachelim at this spot, on this 
hill, where the murderers lay in ambush. There are sufficient government lands for 
the establishment of a permanent settlement. We remain at this site demanding to 
found a settlement, for this is the only Zionist response to this criminal murder, we 
hold vigil at this place, and we will persevere in the hope that the Government of 
Israel will decide to found a civilian settlement at the spot from which the shots 
were fired. This will be the way to prove to those who would uproot us that they 
will never achieve their goal. Not only will we not be uprooted, our roots will only 
grow deeper. We call upon every woman and mother in the settlements and every 
woman and mother in Israel to stand up and be counted with us at this memorial 
vigil. And, of course, men too, husbands and sons, are invited. Let us find comfort 
in the building of the land.392
The call to establish Rachelim, therefore, was issued by women, for women. Although
men were “invited,” this invitation appears to be more of a formality than the heartfelt
plea targeted at the female settlement community at large. The women’s lack of
concerted effort to recruit men may be, as noted above, due to men’s political
immobilization. Furthermore, the men were not wanted at the settlement. One founding
settler, Naomi Sapir, stated:
The men need to undergo a process to make them understand that we are equal 
partners. Fifty percent of the settlers are women. How can anyone come and tell me
83
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to stay home? That’s absurd. The women can go out and make their own livings 
and ensure their own security. We came out of the kitchen long ago.
One settler emphasized that there is “no need to fight men when you’re a feminist” and
what the Rachelim did was a “feminist act. . . but it [was] done in a gentle and different
way than some other feminists choose to act.”394 Thus, the women’s descriptions of their
renegade actions allude to the ‘separate-but-equaT arguments used to religiously justify
their ‘public’ political inaction.
Conclusion
The Gush Emunim women, in advancing the fundamental ideological tenet of 
their movement, did not depart from their traditional gender roles during the settlement’s 
creation. Nevertheless, the Rachelim women undertook a feminist action that greatly 
departed from their movement’s expectations: they founded a settlement solely for 
women; innovatively used motherhood and the need to protect children as a political 
platform; understood the death of Rachel Druk as particularly problematic and 
threatening for women and children alike; treated the vigil as a way of uniting all 
settlement women; and finally, criticized their male counterparts as politically paralyzed. 
Demonstrating their utter commitment to their movement’s original ideological goals, at 
a time when the movement had moderated and the movement’s men could no longer 
oppose the very authorities against which they had rebelled more than a decade earlier, 
allowed the women to expand their ‘private’ roles to act on the movement’s behalf. The 
following two chapters demonstrate that this phenomenon is also visible among the 
women whose movement holds the same territorial goal as Gush Emunim: Hamas.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HAMAS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MANDATORY PALESTINE
As discussed above, Gush Emunim’s ideological campaign for settlement creation,
accelerated by the events of the 1973 war, stagnated in the following years due to
institutional factors. Consequently, women eclipsed their husbands’ functions as primary
settlers and political negotiators in their creation of Rachelim. During these years, a
strengthening parallel movement in the Palestinian territories encountered similar
ideological and institutional challenges, the latter of which motivated women’s increased
political participation. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela describe the phenomenon:
The turn to Islam in the West Bank was probably also boosted by the ascendancy to 
power in 1977 of a nationalist-religious coalition in Israel. The new right-wing 
government embarked on a large-scale Jewish settlement effort in the West Bank, in 
which Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), a religious-nationalist messianic group, 
played a central role.395
Yet Israeli measures, as Khaled Hroub counters, were not solely responsible for the
popularity of Islamist movements:
Rather than perceiving the rise of Palestinian Islamism as a reaction to 
developments within the Israeli domestic arena and their consequences for 
Palestinians, this movement’s rise should be viewed as an outcome of two long, 
intertwined processes: a) the internal struggle of Palestinian politics as they 
developed in light of the struggle against Israel and the position of the Islamists 
within this dynamism; and b) the phenomenon of political Islam, which swept the 
region by the late 1970s and remained at the heart of sociopolitical change and 
tension, Palestinian Islamism being the local manifestation of a much wider tide.396
Clearly, there are multiple causes for what led to the popularity of Islamist groups among
Palestinians.
Because of its use of suicide bombings, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas 
or “zeal”) has been called the “antithesis” to the ineffective, once Fatah-dominated
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Palestinian Authority.397 Since the movement’s victory in the 2006 Palestinian national 
elections, the first Islamist party to win elections in the Middle East, many academics and 
analysts are debating the significance of an Islamist-led government vis-a-vis political 
moderation. Peace-building theorists John Darby and Marie-Joelle Zahhar argue that 
Hamas is incapable of compromising its ideology.398 Others point to the incongruence of 
expecting a Palestinian democracy to exclude Islamists.399 In both cases, however, it is 
Hamas’s “Islamist vision, combined with its nationalist claims and militancy toward 
Israel, that accounts for the prevailing image of Hamas as a rigid movement, ready to 
pursue its goals at any costs, with no limits or constraints.”400 Hamas’s involvement and 
institutionalization within Palestinian society has caused it to become more pragmatic 
than its Charter indicates. Nevertheless, Hamas’s moderation, relative to its Charter’s 
objectives, occurred more than a decade before its electoral victory, and nearly a decade 
before women’s overt military and political involvement.
This chapter examines the historic role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine 
and provides a discussion of Hamas’s religious ideology. The movement’s evolution in 
pragmatism is described in two stages, pre-Oslo and post-Oslo, the latter focusing on 
policies vis-a-vis political participation, restrained violence and acceptance of ceasefires. 
Over time, Hamas has demonstrated doctrinal flexibility and an ability to adapt its 
practices to changing political circumstances. Under its exclusively male leadership, 
Hamas barred women from the formal decision-making processes that resulted in the 
movement’s pragmatism.
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History of the Muslim Brotherhood
In 1928, Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt.401 
His brother, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, left Egypt in 1935 to establish contacts in 
Palestine and ten years later, the MB opened an official Palestinian branch.402 Through 
education, charity and social services that reflected Islamic values, this exclusively male 
movement aspired to reform secular society. 403 Although al-Banna considered 
nationalism to be a “secular, exclusivist and selfish value,” it nonetheless played an 
important role in how the MB developed in Palestine.404
In the aftermath of the 1948 war, Egypt and Jordan gained administration and 
control respectively over the Palestinian territories. Consequently, the MB in these 
territories reflected the corresponding countries’ political attitudes vis-a-vis the 
Palestinian issue.405 The countries’ stances on the MB also played a role in how the MB 
developed. The Brotherhoods of Transjordan and the West Bank merged and devoted 
much of their energy toward education and politics. The Jordanian regime considered the 
MB as a ‘loyal opposition’; the movement was allowed to participate politically, thereby 
countering the popularity of the leftist and secularist opposition groups, but never gained, 
or was granted, enough political power to threaten the status quo.406
The MB’s relationship with Egypt, however, was much more turbulent. When 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared the MB to be an illegal movement, 
many of its active Egyptian members fled to the Gaza Strip to avoid the vigilant gaze of 
the government.407 Egypt nevertheless implemented repressive measures on Brotherhood 
activity in the Gaza Strip. Unlike their Jordanian counterparts, Gazan MB members 
focused on revolutionary and militant tactics, forming secret military cells in the
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1950s.408 After Israel gained control over the territories in 1967 and communication 
between both territories was permitted, the Gaza MB was able to share its clandestine 
skills with its West Bank counterpart409
Despite the latter’s moderation, however, the entire MB viewed the loss of 
Palestinian land as “a major symptom of the broader malaise o f the Muslim world.”410 
This spiritual ailment needed alleviation through greater social reform. For decades, an 
emphasis on reforming society eclipsed the need to violently resist the occupation of the 
land. Aside from 1968 until 1970, when the Palestinian MB, under pressure from the 
wider Arab MB headquarters, collaborated with Fatah in military attacks against Israel, 
the Palestinian MB otherwise refrained from participating in military operations 411
The policy of abstention from active resistance did not sit well with many MB 
members. As early as 1957, Khalil al-Wazir had advised the Gazan MB to create a 
separate organization whose sole task would be armed struggle and whose justification 
would be entirely divorced from Islamic reasoning.412 His advice was ignored. 
Consequently, some members broke away and formed Fatah, attracting the support of 
many secular Palestinians. Fatah became the dominant group in the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, whose legitimacy “as the embodiment of the Palestinian national will” the 
MB rejected.413 Following Fatah’s example, disgruntled Gazan Brothers formed the 
militant group Islamic Jihad in the early 1980s.414 During this time, the spiritual leader of 
the Palestinian MB, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, began hoarding weapons. The weapons were 
intended to be used upon the Brotherhood’s eventual entrance on the political stage, and 
would serve two purposes: punishing Palestinian collaborators with Israel and acquiring 
the support of militant MB members who might otherwise transfer their loyalty to Islamic
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Jihad.415 Describing the multiple interests with which Hamas was faced, author Husam 
al-Nasir expounds:
In the second half of the 1980s the Brotherhood had acquired the organizational 
capacity and sufficient following to engage in jihad. The theoretical perspective on 
the long-ranging debate concerning the priority to be accorded to the armed struggle 
versus the social change thesis had arrived at an organic synthesis of the two. The 
Brotherhood tried to resolve the conflict between the two priorities by arguing that 
it was possible and necessary to try to achieve them simultaneously, and not to 
delay one for the sake of the other.41
Therefore, the mid-1980s were years devoted to increasing the arms supply while
reconciling the divergent attitudes toward participation in the active resistance.
When Hamas emerged as an independent organization in 1987/88, the Palestinian 
MB had already created extensive social networks that affected education, medical care, 
food, daycare and an array of other services. Hamas was able to capitalize on this social 
infrastructure, attaining the support of individuals who might not have agreed with the 
movement ideologically. For example, in the late 1990s, the social institutions created by 
the MB and Hamas supported 275 000 people, not all of whom were Hamas ideologues; 
this number has increased exponentially since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada.417 
Despite women’s institutional absence in the 1990s from the exclusively male 
organizational structure of the MB and Hamas, women worked in Islamist women’s 
charitable societies, although these did not fall under Hamas’s direct auspices.418 In 
interviews between Islah Jad and Islamist women, the latter denied any involvement in 
Hamas or any role in organizing women’s programmes. 419 Nevertheless, among 
Palestinian women and men, the MB/Hamas has a well-established history as a credible 
social movement.
Ideology of Hamas
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In order to understand why Hamas is perceived as rigidly uncompromising, it is 
crucial to examine its religious ideology on several matters. First and foremost is the role 
of Islam. The motto of Hamas, found in Article 8 of its Charter, is that “Allah is its goal, 
the Prophet is its model, the Qur’an is its constitution, Jihad is its path, and death for the 
sake of Allah is its most coveted desire.” 420 By employing this religious language, 
identifying nationalism as “part and parcel of its religious creed,” and using significant 
historical figures in Islam to support its cause, Hamas uses Islam as the basis in 
constructing Palestinian national identity.421 The movement aspires to create a religious 
state, “for the Islamic nature of Palestine is part of [its] religion, and anyone who neglects
AO'yhis religion is bound to lose.” Religious and political goals are inseparable, since 
nationalism is part of religion. This inseparability is especially relevant when discussing 
the issue of Palestine.
The significance of Hamas’s view of Palestine as waqf or “endowed” land for 
Muslims for time immemorial, is clear: giving up any part of Palestine within the borders 
defined by the British mandate is tantamount to forfeiting part of Islam, for “renouncing 
any part of Palestine means renouncing part of the religion; the nationalism of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement is part of its faith.” 423 Accepting a Palestinian state in Gaza and 
the West Bank is “sinful if it entails conceding the rest of Palestine to Israel, an 
illegitimate entity.”424 For Hamas, as for Gush Emunim, any land-for-peace agreements 
are meaningless. Article 13 states that “[peace] initiatives, the so-called peaceful 
solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all 
contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement.” The conferences are later
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described in the Article as a “waste of time.” Accordingly, Hamas has traditionally called 
for the Palestinian withdrawal from peace negotiations with Israel.425
Before the twentieth century, Palestinian land had no special status. Faced with 
the loss of land to Zionists, Hajj Amin al-Husseini issued a fatwa in 1935 that declared 
Palestine a “trust” for Palestinian Muslims, as granted by Allah and Muslims worldwide. 
In a similar vein, confronted with the Israeli settlement projects and possible Palestinian 
land concessions for peace, Hamas raised the “trust” status of Palestinian land to waqf,426 
It justified this action religiously by viewing Abraham not as the first monotheist, but as a 
“full-fledged Muslim,” whose construction of the al-Aqsa mosque henceforth made the 
land Islamic 427 Waqf is considered an invention of tradition, since its legal status does 
not exist in Shari’ah; no Muslim country today has the legal status of waqf. Regardless 
of its legitimacy, Palestine’s status as waqf compels Hamas adherents to ‘regain’ control 
of Palestine through jihad .429
Jihad is the holy war against the enemy and is intrinsic to Hamas’s brand of 
Palestinian nationalism.430 According to Article 7, Hamas views itself as “one of the 
links in the Chain of Jihad in the confrontation with the Zionist invasion.” Other links in 
this chain include the Muslim Brothers who participated in the 1948 and 1967 wars, as 
well as the man after whom the militant division of Hamas is named, Izz a-din al- 
Qassam.431 Jihad involves “confronting him [the enemy] when he sets foot on the land of 
the Muslims.”432
Hamas diverged from the traditional understanding of jihad  as a collective 
responsibility {fard kifaya), and proclaimed it to be an individual duty (fard ‘airi), 
incumbent on every man and woman. On the one hand, the emphasis on this external
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form of jihad  encourages the movement to glorify ‘suicide bombings’ or ‘martyrdom 
operations,’ where an “act of martyrdom [is] actually the betrothal marriage of the martyr 
with the land of Palestine.” 434 Here, the individual fulfills his/her obligation toward 
religion and nationalism. The call for jihad  is intended not only for Palestinian Muslims 
but for Muslims worldwide, to liberate both Palestine and Jerusalem, a city that is highly 
symbolic in Arab political mythology.435 On the other hand, jihad  for Hamas is also 
defined as an internal war, a war against secularism and immorality, and indirectly, the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization. Thus, in either scenario, to call off or lose the fight 
for jihad  would be considered demoralizing for Hamas and Muslims, a concession of 
victory not only in terms of contested territory, but also contested worldviews.
Liberating Palestine requires that the State of Israel be destroyed through an
armed struggle, though Hamas also emphasizes “the eschatological significance. . . [of]
the eventual extermination of the Jews in addition to the glorification of martyrdom
among its won fighters [sic].”436 The Charter’s introduction states that Hamas’s “struggle
against the Jews is extremely wide-ranging and grave,” while Article 28 declares that
“Israel, by virtue of its being Jewish and of having a Jewish population, defies Islam and
Muslims.” Unlike the PLO, which tried to distinguish Zionists from Jews, Hamas uses
the terms interchangeably. Meir Litvak assesses that
the portrayal of the Jews as powerful arch-enemies and conspirators against Islam 
departs from traditional Islamic depictions of the Jews that are associated with 
cowardice, degradation and wretchedness. It has become a central element in 
Hamas’ ideology and an important theme in the writings of all Islamist movements 
in the Middle East as part of a broader need to explain the current crisis of the 
Muslim world. It is particularly difficult within this context to explain Jewish or 
Zionist success vis-a-vis the Muslims since, according to Islamic tradition, the Jews 
were destined to humiliation and subjugation to Muslims after they had rejected the 
message of the Prophet. . . The only way to explain this cognitive dissonance is to
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magnify the power and evil of the Jews, and thereby help to explain Muslim 
weakness.437
Israel represents both a state and people that must be conquered for Hamas’s vision to be 
realized.
In this struggle, Hamas cautiously allies itself with nationalist Palestinian
movements, provided “they do not give their allegiance to the Communist East or the
Crusading West.”438 Hamas emphasizes its aversion to dividing the nationalist struggle,
maintaining that “it is there to bring to bring together and not to divide, to preserve and
not to squander, to unify and not to throw asunder.”439 Viewing the Palestinian Liberation
Organization as “the closest to the heart of the Islamic Resistance Movement,” Hamas
carefully praises and criticizes the PLO’s vision.440 Attributing perceived weaknesses of
the PLO to its upbringing in a deficient political environment, the Charter explains:
Because of the situations surrounding the formation of the Organization, of the 
ideological confusion prevailing in the Arab world as a result of the ideological 
invasion under whose influence the Arab world has fallen since the defeat of the 
Crusaders and which was, and still is, intensified through orientalists, missionaries 
and imperialists, the Organization adopted the idea of the secular state. And that it 
how we view it.441
Hamas acknowledges the PLO’s important role, but nonetheless identifies the PLO with 
secularism, which “completely contradicts religious ideology.”442 Even before the Oslo 
accords were signed,
Hamas sharply criticize[d] the PLO’s secular discourse and its leadership, as well as 
its political program calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state that would 
coexist with the State of Israel. Hamas had already condemned the PLO’s 
recognition of the State of Israel and its acceptance of UN Security Resolutions 242 
and 338.443
93
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Oslo peace accords, however, confronted Hamas with the challenge of undermining 
its staunchest political opponent without losing the mass support it had acquired before 
the agreement.
Pre-Declaration of Principles
The political evolution of Hamas can be divided in the pre-Oslo (1987/88 -  1993) 
and post-Oslo (1993 -  present) eras, with the Declaration of Principles being the crucial 
event in which Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization formally recognized 
each other and made a pledge for peace. In each of these time periods, Hamas’s actions 
were governed by both political and military considerations. When Hamas published its 
Charter in December 1987, its ultimate aim was to preserve the Islamic core of society. 
King Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank created space for the Palestinians to 
declare statehood, an action that Hamas co-founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin opposed, for 
fear it would divide the Palestinian population along religious and geographic lines.444 
Nevertheless, people became divided over the question of whether religion should 
precede nationalism in the struggle for Palestinian independence. In this debate, Hamas 
“represented a shift of emphasis in the Islamic movement’s strategy, from reformist and 
communal to political, and from the spiritual life of the individual to national action,” 
thereby appealing to more nationalist-minded individuals.445 This need to appeal to a 
broader base caused Hamas to adhere less strictly to its religious doctrine.
During the initial phase of the movement, a number of factors reveal that the 
creation of Hamas was clearly a deliberate political decision. First, its founding was the 
result of a compromise within the movement. Throughout the 1980s, the leadership of the
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Mujamma, the MB-affiliated Islamic Centre founded by Yassin, had opted for a passive 
approach to the occupation, an approach scorned by secular nationalists. When the 
Intifada erupted, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was viewed as politically 
inept and militarily deficient, which created an opportune political space in which the 
Mujamma leadership could participate.
More importantly, the MB was compelled to forfeit its previous passive policy, 
since “non-engagement would mean losing the respect of, and political influence over, its 
young activists.”446 The possibility of the Intifada failing, or the Mujamma drawing 
Israeli reprisal for Intifada activities, were also risks to be considered. Hamas’s creation 
as a distinct movement from the Brotherhood was therefore supported both by MB 
members who favoured active resistance, namely the younger and more militant members, 
and by those who opposed the Brotherhood’s direct involvement, since their own MB 
participation and membership would remain unaffected. In the event of the failure of 
Hamas or the Intifada, the MB could not be held entirely responsible.
When Hamas emerged, its political and military leadership were initially unified 
in their strategies vis-a-vis Israel. Iyad Barghouti remarked in 1993, before the accords 
were made public, that there was “not really [much discrepancy between what is 
preached and what is practiced]” concerning Hamas’s military aims and its opposition to 
peace negotiations.447 The independence from the MB and its perceived rigid religiosity 
encouraged many individuals who had not been involved in Mujamma activities to join 
Hamas and participate in its armed operations. Israeli reprisals to Hamas attacks often 
encouraged more individuals to join. In response to three separate attacks carried out by 
Hamas on Israelis, over the span of one week in December 1992, Israel expelled 400
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Palestinian Islamists, many of whom were affiliated with Hamas.448 “Israel,” concludes 
Wendy Kristianasen, “could not have dreamed up a better way of transforming the 
movement it feared into collective martyrs.”449
While the number of younger, more violent and less religious Hamas members 
grew, Hamas’s full commitment to its Charter’s objectives began to wane as the new 
generation was incorporated into positions of leadership.450 Within two years of the 
Charter’s publication, for example, there were already changing perceptions of the Jews. 
While the Charter attributes world power, wealth, influence and control to the Jews, the 
prevailing notion of global Jewish domination began to diminish. For instance, in internal 
memos circulated among Hamas leaders, the enemy came to be primarily identified as 
Zionists, rather than as Jews.451 It was not until after the Oslo accords were signed, 
however, that discrepancies could clearly be identified between Hamas’s stated objectives 
and its actual practices.
Post-Declaration of Principles
The Oslo peace accords incorporated Palestinian recognition of Israel and 
received massive support across Palestinian society. Consequently, Hamas, which had at 
this point acquired large popular support from disenchanted PLO supporters for its 
violent campaign, was faced with the dilemma of jeopardizing its reputation for doctrinal 
adherence. Frame alignment theory proposes that “movements whose power is largely 
dependent on securing popular support may engage in a process of ideological alignment 
to maximize ideological resonance with potential constituencies, their life experiences 
and existing world perspectives”; that is, if the overwhelming majority of Palestinians
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favoured peace, Hamas would somehow need to incorporate this preference into its 
ideology if  it hoped to maintain support.452
When the Oslo accords were made public, the PLO recovered much of its old 
popularity, thereby eclipsing support for Hamas. The Islamist movement’s reaction, 
however, was not quite as zealous as might have been anticipated. Hroub makes clear that 
“the strongest language used by Hamas to describe the subsequent security accords with 
Israel was ‘treasonous agreements,’ but it avoided naming individuals or leaders who 
negotiated those pacts.” 453 In their public statements, Hamas leaders employed “non­
inflammatory” language 454 Considering that the Hamas Charter describes “leaving the 
circle o f conflict with Israel” as a “major act of treason” that will “bring curse [sic] on its 
perpetrators,” Hamas’s under-reaction appears astonishing. Nevertheless, democratic 
transition theory posits:455
Participation in a politically competitive environment typically leads to the gradual 
internalization of the underlying values of power-sharing and compromise. The 
increasing manifestation of a consequentialist, rather than an absolutist logic is 
likewise to be expected.456
Because of the reinvigoration of the PLO-Hamas competition, and the new authority
given to the PLO as the Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas would gradually be forced to
compromise if it hoped to secure any power.
Although Hamas rejected the validity of the accords, it did modify several of its 
political stances over time, even though the political situation, that is the PLO/PA’s 
recognition of Israel, remained unchanged.457 This was largely due to Hamas’s policy of 
shura, in which power is not monopolized by the external leadership, but shared with the 
internal leadership. Consequently, the internal leadership did wield power and caused the 
group’s overall approaches to moderate, since “decisions, when taken by outside political
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leadership, do not involve them in a direct clash with the PA, as opposed to the inside 
leaders who must cope with the movement’s day-to-day affairs.”458 Signs of pragmatism 
found expression in political participation and coexistence with the PLO/PA, restrained 
violence, the use of ceasefires and the normalization of the two-state solution as a 
reference point.
Political Participation
The creation of the PA generated a series of political hurdles for Hamas. First, as 
a consequence of the PA’s recognition of Israel, Hamas entirely rejected the PA’s 
authority. Second, its demand of 40 percent of the Palestinian National Council seats had 
not been accepted in the past and was unlikely to be accepted at the present moment459 
Third, the Fatah-dominated PA actively marginalized Hamas as a political group: its 
leadership was frequently arrested, detained, harassed and excluded from civil and 
governmental bodies.460 The antagonism between the political rivals further aggravated 
Hamas’s position regarding Israel.
Initially, Hamas opposed the entire Palestinian electoral process. Like Gush 
Emunim, Palestinian Islamist groups in general were apathetic in their attitudes toward 
democracy, viewing it as a “secular, Western concept” inferior to the Qur’anic -  and 
therefore ideal -  model of shura (consultation) councils.461 Theoretically, in an Islamic 
state, non-Islamic parties would be banned, “but before the establishment of Islamic rule, 
democracy is preferred to dictatorship as more hospitable to the flourishing of Islam.”462 
Yet an aversion to democracy was not the primary reason for Hamas’s electoral reticence. 
Hamas’s official electoral and party boycott of the 1996 elections is often attributed to the
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movement’s refusal to recognize Israel, since “from an Islamist’s point of view, 
participation in self-rule gives legitimacy to the peace process.”463 Lending credit to this 
argument is the movement’s published statements in its nascent years with the heading 
“No Elections Except After the Expulsion of the Occupier.”464
The debate over political participation nevertheless grew, especially after the 
formation of the PA. Given the popularity of the peace process at the time, had a 
Hamas-backed party won, Hamas would have been forced to recognize the Oslo accords 
regardless of its ideological objection; even a refusal to denounce the elections could 
imply Israel’s recognition in the public eye. Moreover, some of the Hamas leadership 
regarded the elections as an Israeli attempt to cripple the movement. Explains Mahmoud 
al-Zahhar:
Israel wants to use these [1996] elections to lure us into the trap of the political 
game. Just as it succeeded in luring the PLO in the 1970s. . . Israel says it is ready 
to recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people if the 
PLO will accept Israel and the two-state solution. The rest is known. The PLO, 
made vulnerable thus, was weakened even before the opening of the negotiations. 
Hamas will not fall into this trap.465
Contrary to al-Zahhar’s assertion, Hamas’s stance on electoral participation had clearly
shifted from rejection to consideration toward the end of 1994, pointing to new
approaches to the Oslo accords.466 Palestinian scholar Ziad Abu-Amr elaborated in 1994:
While Hamas publicly oppose [d] a peaceful settlement with Israel on principle, the 
movement’s actual position regarding an interim solution remain[ed] ambiguous, as 
illustrated in recent Hamas statements that leave participation in the elections for 
the Palestinian Council open.467
In spite of its secular basis, however, democracy enlarged Hamas’s room for political
manoeuvring. Hamas’s failure to label the elections as haram, or religiously forbidden,
largely made this possible 468
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In contrast to the group’s principles, Hamas members like Ismail Haniyeh pushed
for the group’s political participation, citing a number of persuasive reasons to gain
political power.469 In October and December 1995, he and three other moderates met with
the external Hamas leadership, but a consensus on Hamas’s political participation could
not be achieved.470 Although the movement had often been labelled idealist, unable to
address the “facts-on-the-ground,” its leaders also preferred not to situate the group in a
politically isolated environment. Khaled Masha’al, head of Hamas’s political bureau
based in Damascus, asserted that members of the movement
are not advocates of isolationism from reality.. . That does not mean, however, that 
[they] are going to be preoccupied by any fait accompli manufactured by others; nor 
are [they] going to follow in their footsteps wherever they may lead, not deviating 
from their path while forgetting the true path to [their] goal. Excessive 
preoccupation with realism has led the Palestinian cause to where it is now. On the 
other hand, idealism may not advance [them] a single step toward the liberation of 
Palestine. . . .This does not mean that [they] should become mired in reality or that 
[their] vision should become so myopic that [they] are unable to see beyond [their] 
feet. [They] should keep a foot in reality to launch [them] selves toward [their] 
strategic objective with firm steps.471
Originally, Hamas had intended to participate in the elections and had even created a
political party, Hizb al-Khalas al-Watani al-Islami (National Islamic Salvation Party), for
that purpose.472
Unlike the secular parties, however, Hamas did not attempt to attract female
voters, nor did they recruit women for the party’s electoral list. Islah Jad explains that
the Salvation Party has no bodies parallel to those in Gaza or in the West Bank, nor 
any mobilizing and organizing structures for other social groups, such as students 
and workers. While party members were seen in the different activities of the 
intifada (strikes, funeral processions, confrontations with the Israeli army, and so 
on), female Hamas members at the time were not visible as participants. . . the 
reason for this absence could be explained by the fact that Islamist organizations 
target males. . . in answer to why the Islamists did not seek to organize female 
students in their mainstream political parties, whether under the name of the 
Muslim Brothers, Hamas, or the Salvation Party, it must be acknowledged that
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these institutions carried the imprint of the conservative gender ideology of the 
movement from its inception.473
Yet even male Hamas members were officially denied their voting privileges: when they
discovered that Arafat’s win was ‘pre-arranged,’ Hamas leaders withdrew from national
electoral participation and called for a boycott of the elections.474 Their withdrawal,
however, was last-minute. In spite of the boycott, Hamas is credited with supporting the
Hamas-affiliated candidates who nevertheless ran, seven of whom won seats on the
Palestinian Council.475 The boycott was evidently not observed by Hamas followers:
between 60 and 70 percent of Hamas supporters voted, reflecting “the deep divisions
within the movement over the issue of participation in the elections.”476
Although it refrained from running in the national elections, Hamas still
demonstrated an ability to work not just within a secular political system, but with secular
parties. In joining the Palestinian Forces Alliance, a group of ten Palestinian
organizations that rejected the Declaration of Principles, Hamas demonstrated its
flexibility in working alongside non-Islamic, even communist, parties when necessary, in
spite of the Charter’s prohibition of forming communist alliances.477 Despite its absence
from the 1996 elections, Hamas’s willingness to participate begs the question of how it
approached the issue of coexistence with its primary adversaries, the former PLO and the
PA.
The political and violent conflict between Fatah/PLO and the MB/Hamas (the 
former often offensively labelled the other as “collaborators”) increased in intensity 
throughout the 1980s. The Declaration of Principles in 1993, the first instance in which 
Israel and the PLO officially recognized each other, further widened the ideological gulf 
between both camps. In spite of its refusal to recognize Israel, however, Hamas used
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pragmatic justifications in its initial willingness to run as a party in the elections that 
arose from the DOP framework, even urging its members to vote. Women did not 
actively campaign for the party, although this has been attributed to their “dependence]
d . 7 8  •on the goodwill of their husbands, not on the commitment of the party.” While the 
public gradually expected Hamas to engage politically with the PLO/PA through dialogue 
and co-operation, the Hamas leadership realized that there was a diminished risk of 
Hamas members charging its leadership with ideological betrayal; such a challenge 
would inevitably cause an organizational implosion.479
The PLO was the sole established international voice for the Palestinians and 
despite Hamas’s resentment, any legitimacy they could hope to acquire would demand 
working with a PLO-based institution.480 Furthermore, Hamas was cognizant that the 
PLO’s adoption of more pragmatic policies after 1973 met with strong public approval. 
By intending to vote in the 1996 elections, an action the public perceived as its partial 
acceptance of the PA, Hamas demonstrated a sense of political pragmatism. This 
adjustment helped prevent the marginalization of the movement and accusations that it
A O  I
held “unshakable fundamentalist interests.”
Hamas’s need to compete with the secular parties prompted the movement to 
consider women as potential recruits. In 1997, the Islamic Salvation Party published a 
pamphlet entitled “Palestinian Woman [sic]. . . Where Next?” and distributed it at a
AQ')
conference at which male and female Hamas members spoke about women and Islam.
In late 2003, Hamas’s leaders allowed women, for the first time in MB/Hamas’s history, 
to join the mainstream Islamist movement.483 This decision was not a result of the 
movement’s changing gender attitudes, but the result of two calculated decisions.
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First, the women whom Hamas promoted and continues to promote are the wives 
of popular Hamas leaders who have either been assassinated or imprisoned.484 The 
women, therefore, represent their husbands’ legacies more than they represent themselves. 
Unlike their husbands, these female Hamas electoral candidates were and still are 
unlikely to be arrested, which would allow them to campaign openly without fear of 
detainment.485 Second, there was an ardent need for Hamas to incorporate the increasing 
numbers of educated Islamist women who desired an intellectual outlet after graduating
A Q Cfrom university. In spite of the women’s hope to be more involved, Hamas’s 2006 
election platform called for women’s “social leadership,” the “insistence] on their purity, 
shyness and moral obligation” and the reactivation of “women [sic] voluntary 
organizations.” The platform did not encourage women’s political involvement in the 
movement’s leadership. While Hamas’s moderation vis-a-vis national political 
participation occurred in the mid-1990s, it only adjusted its policies toward women’s 
involvement within the movement in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, the next 
chapter makes clear that its female candidates deviated from their platform’s insistence 
on shyness and similar ‘virtues.’487
Restrained Violence
Mishal and Sela claim that “a prolonged adoption of strategies of political 
adjustment could lead to greater institutionalization and routinization at the expense of 
revolutionary fervour and political and military activism.”488 On the one hand, Hamas 
leaders have never relinquished their right to use violence, a right that was, until recently, 
solely reserved for men. Commenting on the Oslo accords, Mussa Abu Marzuq, head of
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Hamas’s political bureau at the time, stated that “military activity is a permanent strategy 
that will not change. The modus operandi, the tactics, means and timing are conditional 
on their benefit. They will change from time to time in order to inflict the heaviest 
damage on the occupation.”489 Moreover, as Hamas leader Khaled Masha’al believes, 
“negotiating without resistance leads to surrender but negotiating with resistance leads to 
real peace.” 490 Whereas Marzuq’s use of violence is a means unto itself, that is, 
destructive, Masha’al regards violence as part of a constructive process, leading to “real 
peace.” In either case, destructive or constructive, the use of violence is so deeply 
ingrained that it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which it might be compromised.
On the other hand, despite its opposition to Oslo, Hamas did not accuse any 
Palestinians of being collaborators, nor did it attempt to kill those who participated in the 
accords’ creation, nor did it send its thousands of supporters flooding the streets 
protesting against the PLO, as some expected.491 Moreover, as a result of Oslo, Hamas’s 
use of violence became more strategic. For instance, many of the violent acts committed 
against Israel were intended to disrupt the evolution of the peace process. 492 
Paradoxically, the attacks were also used to strengthen the position of the Palestinians in 
the negotiations. Jamal Mansour, a Nablus-based Hamas leader, stated in 1997 that 
military operations were intended to demonstrate that Palestinians were not without 
means, likening Israeli planes to Palestinian bomb-makers 493 The peace process was not 
only viewed by Hamas as an attempt to make peace with Israel, but as a mechanism for 
preventing a Palestinian counter-elite from gaining power. Therefore, military operations 
were carried out for the purposes of undermining the peace process and the hegemony of 
Fatah and the PLO, and strengthening the Palestinian position in peace negotiations 494
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In the post-Oslo years, it became apparent that Hamas was not a homogeneous 
movement, despite Hamas leader Jamil Hamami’s assertion in 1988 that “no matter who 
is in control of our military wing, they are subject to political decisions.” 495 Because of 
the arrests and imprisonments of the leaders in the early 1990s, the movement 
compartmentalized its structure according to function.496 Military operations, political 
activities, internal security and da'wa (Islamic preaching and social services) became 
fully autonomous units.497 Consequently, while there may have been some overlap 
between the political and military wings, each could be identified as unique. Moreover, 
only a minority of political leaders has been involved in the military wing 498 By the mid- 
1990s, the military wing therefore had ceased to reflect the entirety of the movement.
The actions by the military and political wings have since become informed by 
different interests. For the military wing, clandestine behaviour and efficiency are its 
primary concerns. The political wing, however, seeks to secure popular support, appear 
legitimate and maintain public visibility. It even sought credit right after the Oslo accords 
for the PA’s “liberalization of the dress code” that allowed women to discard their hijab 
outside of mosques and meetings.499 By the mid-1990s, the Gaza leadership was more 
concerned with building civil infrastructure, retaining Hamas’s political achievements, 
and controlling the religious and educational institutions, than it was with military 
jihad.500 The leaders later observed a limited “halt to military action in and from the 
autonomous areas as a basis for establishing a modus vivendi with the PA,” although 
“such an undertaking could not become part of its official agenda.” 501 While the actions 
of the military wing often bolstered the status of the political wing, they also undermined 
it on numerous occasions. Jeroen Gunning observes that “at times, it is precisely the
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continuation of unpopular military operations that undermines Hamas’s political 
popularity (as it did towards the end of the 1990s).”502
The military wing has even transgressed policies implemented by Hamas’s
c a i
official leadership. The reason for this, mentioned earlier in the chapter, was due to the 
discrepancy in ages and socioeconomic backgrounds between the militants and the 
political leadership, the former being less experienced but having a proportionately 
greater amount of power within the military wing.504 Although the political wing of 
Hamas is the core and “not a mere ‘front,’ in the sense of being a creation of the armed 
organization and subservient to it,” it has required the co-operation of the military wing to 
act.505
Yet the military wing has proved its capability for restraint. Israel’s assassination 
of Islamic Jihad head Fathi Shiqaqi on 26 October 1995 and of Hamas’s chief 
bombmaker Yahya Ayyash on 5 January 1996 did not prompt Hamas to renege on its 
promise to the PA in September 1995 to refrain from military action. 506 None of the four 
retaliatory suicide bombings that followed in February and March 1996 was directly 
carried out by Hamas. Following these bombings, Hamas’s military wing circulated 
pamphlets in Gaza and the West Bank that commanded its armed members to 
“immediately and absolutely obey the central decisions taken by the Qassam leadership 
to halt martyrdom attacks against the Jews.” 507
In the aftermath of the attacks and this statement, rumours circulated that Hamas 
was partly to blame. Meetings of prominent figures confirmed the leadership divisions 
within Hamas: Gazan versus the external, and political versus military. 508 Although the 
PA punished Hamas for the bombings, and its supposed violation of the moratorium on
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violence, Mishal and Sela explain that “it still remained unclear whether the suicide
bombings had been specifically ordered by the Political Bureau or were the result of local
initiative and operational availability.”509 Contrary to the Charter’s insistence on constant
armed struggle against Israel, Hamas’s newspaper editor Ghazi Hamad stated frankly:
Continuous military operations do not help Hamas: in fact they have a grave and 
damaging effect on the movement. We don’t want the Palestinians to blame Hamas 
for their suffering, nor are we looking for a confrontation with the Palestinian 
Authority. We’re ready to talk to them. The cessation of our armed actions will be 
part of an overall agreement with the Authority. And as soon as we get travel 
permits, we’ll be ready to go and discuss the matter with the outside leadership in 
Amman.510
Although it is not always clear which wing obeys the other, the separation of the political 
and military wings and the former’s greater concern for political actions and tolerance of 
the PLO indicate pragmatic adjustments within Hamas.
The Possibility of a Ceasefire with Israel
Hamas’s ultimate goal of creating a Palestinian state that incorporates all of 
present-day Israel begs the question of how Sheikh Yassin could justify a ceasefire less 
than two months after Oslo, or how Marzuq could trade withdrawal from the occupied 
territories for a “truce to give the enemy government an opportunity to get out of the 
deadlock.”511 More “opportunities” followed: since the Oslo accords, Hamas has offered 
Israel a ceasefire on ten occasions.512 To illustrate how Hamas’s position on a ceasefire 
with Israel evolved from utter rejection to ambiguity and finally to desirability, one must 
first understand how Hamas defines ceasefire with respect to military, political and 
doctrinal considerations.
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The term “ceasefire” can be translated into Arabic to refer to either a short-term or 
a long-term agreement. A short-term “period of calm,” or tahdiya, is what Palestinian 
factions signed on 17 March 2005 in Egypt, a temporary break from inter-factional 
fighting.513 Yet in relation to Israel, the word Hamas used throughout the 1990s -  and 
continues to use today — is hudna, which is understood as a long-term truce. Hassan 
Youssef, a West Bank Hamas leader, defines hudna as “two warring parties liv[ing] side 
by side in peace and security for a certain period and this period is eligible for 
renewal. . . .That means Hamas accepts that the other party will live in security and 
peace,” provided conditions by the other side are met.
Even if  a hudna were in effect, Hamas in no way would officially abandon its 
right to use violence, since resistance is intrinsic to its ideology.514 Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi 
said that if  Hamas abandoned jihad , it would lose its identity.515 Whether the movement 
would employ this right of violent resistance, however, would be determined by the 
conditions of the hudna. Leading Hamas figure Mahmoud al-Zahhar articulated this 
difference: “We must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we 
can fulfill our goals without violence, we will do so. . .  We will never recognize Israel but 
it might be possible that a truce would prevail between us for days, months or 
years. . . .”516 In 1997, Hamas sent a message through Jordan’s King Hussein to Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, suggesting an “indirect dialogue with the Israeli 
government, to be mediated by the king, toward achieving a cessation of violence, as well
r  1 7
as a ‘discussion of other matters.’” Clearly, the very act of discussing the possibility of 
a hudna with Israel, let alone initiating peace negotiations, demonstrates that the idea 
itself has escaped the realm of the impossible for Hamas ideologues.
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Although Hamas does not totally reject the idea of peace with Israel, it does not 
accept it either. Instead, a middle-ground ambiguity exists in which three approaches to 
the hudna are taken. First, the formation of a Palestinian state from the West Bank and 
Gaza becomes a legitimate consideration, though not an end goal in itself, in a peace 
settlement with Israel. Second, were Israel to withdraw from the territories, the borders 
could be temporarily supervised by international observers. Third, peace talks could only 
occur after the end of the occupation.518 These approaches, which are not mutually 
exclusive, cause the same outcome: temporary tolerance of the other side.
In private, Hamas leaders admitted in 1998 that the younger generation of 
Palestinians could be socialized into regarding temporary peace as the status quo. 
Therefore, it would be possible and easier for the younger Palestinians to take the 
ideological leap necessary to accept peace.519 Given that making a long-term peace 
settlement with the Jewish state is considered a crime, the recognition by Hamas leaders 
that peace with Israel could become a normalized idea among the youth demonstrates a 
moderated shift in thinking.520 While one might expect more moderation, were political 
and economic conditions to improve, Hamas would need to maintain enough ambiguity 
so as not to appear in full contradiction to its doctrine, in order to retain the support of its 
stronger ideologically committed members.
Although Hamas’s consideration of a long-term truce is ideologically significant, 
it is also important for Hamas militarily. Hudnas have often been a preferred option when 
Hamas was ill-equipped with arms. Some argue, for example, that all of the hudnas 
Hamas offered to Israel occurred under conditions of military weakness or pressure from
• o  1the PA, such as in 1995. The hudna allowed Hamas time to rebuild and reorganize its
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fighters.522 Hamas’s cited examples of hudnas implemented throughout Islamic history 
and used to justify hudnas in contemporary times were all ones in which fighting resumed 
once the Muslim community gained the advantage.523 Following the example of 
Muhammed’s ten-year hudna with the Meccans at Hudaybiya in 628 CE, Yassin stated 
that a hudna with Israel should not exceed ten years. Nevertheless, some militants-tumed- 
moderates have pushed for twenty years.524
Even on the eve of the transfer of control over Gaza and Jericho from Israel to the
PA in the mid-nineties, then-head of Hamas’s political bureau, Musa Abu Marzuq,
offered Israel a truce if it
withdrew to its 1967 borders, disarmed all settlers as a prelude to dismantling all 
settlements, released Palestinian prisoners, and permitted elections to a ‘sovereign’ 
body that would represent all Palestinians and possess the authority to ‘define 
Palestinian self-determination. ’525
In 1997, Yassin once again broached the possibility of a ceasefire: “If a Palestinian state
[in Gaza and the West Bank] is established, our violence will end.” Once foreign
concepts to Hamas, ceasefires and hudnas with Israel have been justified for both
political and military reasons, and have even become a normative model for peace.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Hamas’s mention of 1967 borders and settlements as the
normative reference point not only eclipsed its original aim of a Mandatory Islamic
Palestine, but “suggested a de facto recognition of Israel, and so placed it in the
mainstream of contemporary Palestinian nationalism.”527 More importantly, the gradual
acceptance of the idea of a ceasefire, a sure sign of Hamas’s moderation, occurred well
before Hamas women became visibly active in the public domain.
The concept of a two-state solution with a long-term truce, as iterated by Yassin 
and Youssef, also became normative for Hamas in the late 1990s.528 One Hamas official
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even asserted that there is “only one taboo and that is recognition of Israel. . . anything
else is permissible.”529 In Hamas’s first year of existence, however, the movement fully
rejected any land concessions to Israel. For example, in 1988 one leaflet asserted that “the
Muslims have had a full -  not a partial -  right to Palestine for generations. . . No
Palestinian generation has the right to concede the land, seeped in martyrs’ blood.”530
Another leaflet declared that they were strongly “against conceding so much as an inch of
[their] land.”531 Palestinian leaders who might have been tempted that year to make land
concessions to Israel risked losing body parts: “Let any hand be cut off that signs [away]
a grain of sand in Palestine in favour of the enemies of God.”532
The ushering in of the Oslo era forced Hamas to reorient its nationalist goal, as
one leading Islamist explained in 1994:
The Islamist tendency has reached the conclusion that it is no longer possible to halt 
the [Declaration of Principles] negotiations, since the U.S., which rules our region, 
is pushing towards [their] completion. But the negotiation with Israel must grant the 
Palestinians minimal rights, such as the 1967 borders, and at this time they will be 
satisfied with that. The continuation of the solution of the Palestinian problem willMO A
be in the hands of future generations.
The 1967 borders therefore replaced the borders of the British Mandate as the “minimal
rights.” One could argue that Hamas’s short-term goals do not contradict its long-term
aspirations, but at least one Hamas leader implied that Hamas would no longer continue
its armed struggle if a Palestinian state along 1967 borders were created. Speaking in
1998, leader Ismail Abu Shanab was quite blunt:
What is the point in speaking rhetoric? Let’s be frank, we cannot destroy Israel. The 
practical solution is for us to have a state alongside Israel. . . When we build a 
Palestinian state, we will not need these militias; all the needs for attack will stop. 
Everything will change into a civil life.534
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In accepting and referring to a Palestinian state along the pre-1967 borders, Hamas 
“achieved political flexibility without forsaking its ideological credibility” by the mid- 
1990s, years before women were actively involved in either elections or armed
535resistance.
Conclusion
Since its inception, Hamas has demonstrated pragmatism and flexibility, in spite
of banning women from participating in Hamas’s military wing and from running as
candidates in the Salvation Party. Once unheard of, Hamas’s political participation, its
employment o f ceasefires and its implicit and explicit references to a two-state solution
became increasingly normative as the movement became institutionalized. Much of
Hamas’s popularity, argues Abdel Sattar Qasem, was acquired through domestic violent
and political opposition to Fatah and the PA, rather than to Israel:
Hamas’s doctrinal discourse has diminished in intensity since the mid-1990s, and 
references to its Charter by its leaders have been made rarely, if at all. The literature, 
statements, and symbols used by Hamas have come to focus more and more on the 
idea that the core problem is the multi-dimensional issue of usurpation of 
Palestinian land, and the basic question is how to end the occupation. The notion of 
liberating Palestine has assumed greater importance than the general Islamic 
concept. 36
Thus, because Hamas’s popularity is derived from its admirable social movement aspects, 
the group has not taken an “all or nothing” approach to many aspects of its doctrine, 
unless the public has desired it. Having demonstrated that Hamas moderated before 
women overtly became militarily and politically involved in the movement, the next 
chapter explores how these women’s actions have challenged the normative role for 
Hamas women.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHALLENGING ‘TRADITION,’ REINFORCING RELIGION: 
THE WOMEN OF HAMAS
While Hamas excluded women from its military operations and its lists of 
potential party candidates throughout its moderation process, women’s eagerness to 
become more involved forced the movement to overturn these restrictive policies. In the 
years following Hamas’s pragmatic adjustments in the mid-1990s, therefore, women’s 
involvement in the movement became visibly apparent, particularly as campaigners and 
candidates in the 2006 Palestinian national elections, and as fighters in the movement’s 
armed operations. Yet this begs the question of how women became more involved and 
why they have chosen to do so.
Women’s prescribed role is encapsulated on Hamas’s English website in a cartoon. 
Two hands representing the United States extend from the right, one holding a bowl of 
soup labelled “compromises” and the other offering a loaf of bread labelled 
“submission.” 537 The woman whose baby is sticking its tongue out at the person offering 
the food says, “A free woman goes hungry but does not submit.” The free woman here is 
one who is not forced to compromise, who is able to assert her independence and who 
submits only to Allah. Alternatively, some might look at the depiction of this woman and 
argue that even in hunger, she is neither free nor independent, forced to submit not to the 
deity only but also to the religious and political ideologies of her milieu. This chapter 
argues that following Hamas’s moderation, in spite of the women’s full commitment to 
the movement’s original political goals, some women have subverted aspects of Hamas’s
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gender ideology, thereby enabling them to occupy a more prominent role in the public 
arena.
Hamas’s Gender Ideology
Hamas’s Charter outlines the role of women and states that Muslim men and
women have an equal individual obligation with men to fight the enemy who occupies
their land. 538 For this task, a woman needs neither the permission of her husband nor that
of her male relatives.539 Nevertheless, the primary ways in which women may fight the
enemy differ from those of men. Article 17 of the Charter states that
the Moslem woman has a role no less important than that of the Moslem man in the 
battle of liberation. She is the maker of men. Her role in guiding and educating the 
new generations is great. The enemies have realised the importance of her role. 
They consider that if they are able to direct and bring her up the way they wish, far 
from Islam, they would have won the battle. That is why you find them giving these 
attempts constant attention through information campaigns, films, and the school 
curriculum, using for that purpose their lackeys who are infiltrated through Zionist 
organizations under various names and shapes, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, 
espionage groups and others, which are all nothing more than cells of subversion 
and saboteurs. . . The Islamic peoples should perform their role in confronting the 
conspiracies of these saboteurs.540
Women’s primary responsibilities, therefore, are to produce male children and
educate them, while “the Islamic peoples” are responsible for protecting Muslim
Palestinian women from the corruptive forces of the enemies. Women maintain
responsibility for the preservation and transmission of Islamic culture. Consequently,
they are the cultural locus of the battle between secularism and religious conservatism.
Women’s domestic role within the family is further stressed in Article 18:
Woman in the home of the fighting family, whether she is a mother or a sister, plays 
the most important role in looking after the family, rearing the children and imbuing 
them with moral values and thoughts derived from Islam. She has to teach them to 
perform the religious duties in preparation for the role of fighting awaiting them.
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That is why it is necessary to pay great attention to schools and the curriculum 
followed in educating Moslem girls, so that they would grow up to be good mothers, 
aware of their role in the battle of liberation.
She has to be of sufficient knowledge and understanding where the performance of 
housekeeping matters are concerned, because economy and avoidance of waste o f 
the family budget, is one of the requirements for the ability to continue moving 
forward in the difficult conditions surrounding us. She should put before her eyes 
the fact that the money available to her is just like blood which should never flow 
except through the veins so that both children and grown-ups could continue to live.
“Verily, the Moslems of either sex, and the true believers of either sex, and the 
devout men, and the devout women, and the men of veracity, and the women of 
veracity, and the patient men, and the patient women, and the humble men, and the 
humble women, and the alms-givers of either sex who remember Allah frequently; 
for them hath Allah prepared forgiveness and a great reward” (The Confederates - 
verse 25).541
Once again, the emphasis is placed on childbearing, education and proficient 
housekeeping. Women educate their children in a jihad  ethos: boys become fighters and 
girls support fighters. Islah Jad observes that “women were thus advised to give to their 
family and nation instead of taking, a notion that Hamas stresses to differentiate Islamist 
women from secular activists. In this vision, women are portrayed as dependent on men, 
confined to their homes, and segregated from public space.”542 As indicated in the last 
verse of Article 18, women will receive the same reward as men for fulfilling their 
parental and domestic duties.
In the Palestinian national struggle, the sacrifice required of women is often 
highlighted in the context of martyrdom. Ibrahim Z’arour, a professor at Damascus 
University, observes that “the mother in our Arab and Islamic history has always 
sacrificed her children and prepared them for martyrdom. This is rooted in our religion, 
our culture, in our values, and our upbringing.”543 If sacrifice is rooted in cultural history,
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one may assume that the struggle for national independence has exerted even greater
pressure on women to conform to these precedents. Z’arour further explains that
the mother is the school that prepares the children and sends them to martyrdom in 
defense of the homeland. This culture is within all of us. I always see mothers who 
utter cries of joy when they learn that their sons were martyred in battles in 
Palestine, in the Golan Heights, or Iraq.544
Thus, Z’arour’s observation of the joy of the mother who sends her son to ‘battles in
Palestine’ is both descriptive and prescriptive.
Sacrificing their sons in this way is also what enables women to achieve, before 
that of their children or homeland, their own freedom. Adnan Kanafani asserts that “the 
mother knows perfectly well that if she does not sacrifice her son, she will never be 
liberated, or her son’s sons, or the homeland, will never be liberated.” As a result of this 
sacrifice, however, a woman “may weep a lot, but she will not weep over the martyrdom 
of her son, because she believes that he has ascended to a better world, leaving a mark of 
pride on her forehead.”545 Women have nonetheless wept over the martyrdom of their 
sons; Kanafani’s statements only reinforce the notion that it is not socially acceptable to 
do so.
These attitudes concerning motherhood, sacrifice and jihad  embody both political 
and religious beliefs. Although there are no official statistics that identify how many 
women belong to or identify with Hamas, this number is likely significant. First, Hamas 
is the largest religious group in the Palestinian territories, and its only serious political 
rival is the secular group Fatah.546 Hamas’s predecessor, the Muslim Brotherhood, was 
well-established in Palestine for decades.547 Second, throughout the 1990s, Hamas gained 
popularity in the territories because of the perceived political failure of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization/Palestinian Authority and the success of Hamas’s social
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institutions.548 The rise in popularity, however, was accompanied by restrictions on
public behaviour. Ray Huntington and his colleagues describe how
one manifestation of this revival [of Islamic fundamentalism] during the intifada 
was the intense pressure put on women to wear the hijab as a sign of their 
commitment to Islamic orthodoxy. Further, the Islamic revival may have also 
pressured women to drop out of the labour force, curtail their education, and retreat 
back into the private sphere of the home. Indeed, supporters of Hamas openly 
express their desires for a Palestinian state governed by strict Islamic law.549
Thus, the rise in popularity of Hamas was associated with increasing curtailment of
women’s freedoms. This finding alone, however, does not explain why significantly more
women than men support Hamas, with at least one poll pointing to a 14 percent gap.550
Women’s support for Hamas involves two interlocking factors: poverty and 
religion. Households with women as the primary breadwinner tend to be poorer and 
therefore more reliant on religious institutions for financial and social support. 551 
Hamas’s vast charitable institutions cater more to these women than men. Moreover, 
women are not only likely to identify with Hamas because of social support, but also 
because of religious affiliation. Palestinian women tend to be more religious than 
Palestinian men.552 Only 6 percent of Palestinian women say they are not religious.553 
Even these women, however, cannot escape the Islamic influence due to the overlap of 
religious and cultural expectations. Both secular and religious women often attend sex- 
segregated schools and regardless of religious observance, similar familial roles are 
taught in the schools.554 This is due to Hamas’s control of a multitude of educational 
institutions, where Islamic/Hamas political and gender attitudes are reinforced.555
Hamas’s greater popularity among women than men is surprising given 
Forskningsstiftelsen Fafo findings that “men [tend to be] more religiously activist 
[Islamist] than women (24 percent versus 12 percent).”556 Asked to choose among Islam,
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democracy, Arabism or Socialism as the principle attribute in a future Palestinian state,
three times as many respondents favoured Islam over democracy, with women primarily
supporting the former and men the latter.557 This suggests that women would be more
supportive of Hamas and its importance on implementing religious law than would men.
Forskningsstiftelsen Fafo accounts for this phenomenon as follows:
With regard to Islam’s support among women, two aspects need to be mentioned. 
First, Islam can be understood in at least two different ways. It can be understood as 
a religious belief and practice, primarily a matter of scripture. It can also be 
understood as a political framework, primarily a matter of law, government and 
society. Survey results suggest that women tend to see Islam more in terms of 
religious orthodoxy than of political activism. Second, in comparison to men, 
women seem less politicized and consequently their understanding of various 
political options tends to be more restricted. Therefore, there are indications that to 
some extent women overwhelmingly have chosen Islam because this is the attribute 
with which they are most familiar.5 8
Nearly 60 percent of Palestinian male Islamists, not all of whom are necessarily affiliated
with Hamas, believe that that “women should stay at home, take care of their children and
not indulge in money generating activities of any sort.”559 Women are more likely than
men to “make the ultimate sacrifice” for their families and the Palestinian people than are
men, but are less inclined to do so for the Islamic nation.560 Nevertheless, many women
still turn to religion for support.
Nearly four out of every five Palestinian women use religious beliefs as a way of 
coping with the occupation.561 Statistics indicate that many women practice their beliefs, 
with 30 percent of women following any four out of five of these practices: fasting during 
Ramadan, celebrating Eid al-Adha, attending Friday services at the mosque, abstaining 
from alcohol and making the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca).562 Ten percent have made the 
relatively expensive trip to Saudi Arabia to perform hajj, a large number considering the
C / 'T
many women who live in poverty. The majority of women identify themselves as
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moderately religious because they believe that “only religious leaders or scholars, who 
devote their life to the study of the Koran, the hadiths of the prophet Muhammed, and the 
Sharia could be considered extremely religious.”564
The most revealing statistic is that 31 per cent of Palestinian women regularly 
attend mosque, despite the absence of any religious or cultural obligation to do so.565 This 
is significant not only because it demonstrates their voluntary religiosity, but because the 
mosques have traditionally fallen under the control of Hamas. The messages, the beliefs 
and the practices to which women adhere originate from the mosque and hence reflect the 
tenets of Hamas’s ideology.566 Not surprisingly, Ray Huntington and his colleagues 
discovered that “those women who pray in the mosque on Fridays, celebrate the feast of 
Eid al-Adha, fast during Ramadan, and who refrain from alcohol, practice more 
traditional family roles than do less religious involved women.”567 Thus, Islam, and by 
extension nationalist groups that preach an Islamic message, are contributing factors to 
the maintenance of traditional female roles.
The emphasis on traditional roles and women’s place in the home, however, does 
not appear to discourage women’s involvement in the resistance. Huntington et al. were 
surprised to learn that women’s “extensive political involvement was not related to less 
traditional family roles or to greater family power for wives.”568 During the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada, women were heavily involved in the resistance. In a survey of 5,600 Palestinian 
women, each woman performed any combination of the following activities an average of 
ten times: protecting Palestinians from the Israeli authorities (44 percent of women did 
this); protesting in demonstrations or marches against the occupation (38 percent); 
distributing pamphlets for the uprising (9 percent); and throwing stones at the police or
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Israel Defense Forces (28 percent).569 Women’s performance of these particular activities 
was not unique to the second intifada; many women had participated in these very same 
forms of resistance in the beginning stages of the first intifada.570 What characterizes 
women’s unique involvement in the second intifada, however, is their participation in 
suicide missions.
Female Suicide Bombers
Suicide bombing is defined by the Institute for Counter-Terrorism as an 
“operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the 
perpetrator. The terrorist is fully aware that if she/he does not kill her/himself, the 
planned attack will not be implemented.”571 Although suicide terrorism has existed for a 
millennium, the first female suicide attack occurred relatively recently, in Lebanon in 
1985.572 Beginning in 1994, Palestinian groups began to employ suicide attacks.573 Until 
2002, however, all suicide attacks were carried out by men.574 The second intifada 
marked the first time in history when Palestinian women participated as suicide 
bombers.575 Traditionally, women who participated in the revolutionary cause did so by 
relaying messages among male militants, supporting male relatives involved in the cause 
and sacrificing their children. Terri Toles Patkin notes that “historically, Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad were adamant that women should not participate in violent demonstrations 
but rather remain at home in their established roles as mothers and homemakers, donning
enn
traditional dress and head coverings.” Regardless of their political or religious 
affiliation, Hamas venerates the “female martyrs in the Al-Aqsa Intifada”: those who 
helped implant and transport explosive objects, assisted others in militant operations,
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high-jacked airplanes and “hundreds of women who participated in some of the heroic
r * 7 0
operations of the Palestinian revolution.”
Thus far, there have been 11 successful female Palestinian suicide bombers, only 
one of which has died in a suicide mission carried out by Hamas. Nevertheless, several of 
the other successful women were Islamist, in spite of their being sent by the more secular 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.579 Hamas glorified all of these women, regardless of the 
group that organized their missions. Notwithstanding the relative lack of women who 
have participated in operations under the movement’s banner, Hamas now strongly 
supports women’s roles in suicide operations. As noted above, however, the Hamas 
Charter identifies women’s primary function as producing men for jihad. While men and 
women are equally obligated to participate in jihad, women’s participation comes in the 
form of having children and of providing them with a religious upbringing that will 
eventually prepare them for the day when they, too, must fight.
An understanding of these differences explains why just as male martyrs are 
glorified, women whose sons are martyrs are also highly honoured. In particular, Mariam 
Farahat or Um Nidal, has received much international press coverage as the 
contemporary Khansa’a of Palestine, a historical figure in early Islam who rejoiced in her 
four sons’ deaths for the sake of defending Islam.580 Um Nidal is well known for 
encouraging her son Muhammed to “become a martyr,” telling him to return from his 
mission only as a shahid, and celebrating his then-upcoming mission with him in his 
testimonial video.581 Rasha al-Rantisi, the widow of Hamas co-founder Abdel Aziz al- 
Rantisi, has also heavily stressed in public the importance of educating male children on
CO-}
martyrdom. Moreover, a multitude of interviews are available in Palestinian media that
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glorify mothers who rejoice in their children’s choice of martyrdom. Women have 
therefore been encouraged to be a “symbol of a tender mother who gives the blood of her 
her children.” 584 Nevertheless, some women have chosen to give their own blood in 
jihad  operations, rather than, or in addition to, that of their offspring.
Women’s participation in militant operations not only endangers their lives, but it 
threatens the roles defined for them in the Hamas Charter. On the one hand, they are 
encouraged to produce soldiers for the struggle and to keep active their warrior wombs. 
On the other, Hamas believes that “it is the duty of every Muslim to struggle for an 
Islamic state.” If women are killed, however, they are unable to produce the fighters 
necessary for the greater struggle. These two notions must be harmonized for both to be 
simultaneously accepted by Hamas. Consequently, the religious basis for allowing 
women to participate in militant jihad  is ambiguous. Commenting on women’s 
participation in jihad, David Cook observed that “according to the usual interpretation, 
women are not permitted to fight in jihad, but were told that their jihad  was a righteous 
pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj),” since the trip itself was once extremely dangerous.586 He 
goes on to demonstrate that the historical instances in which women did participate in 
jihad  were when they played auxiliary roles in assisting or encouraging men.587
With the rise of Islamic feminism in the last few decades, the discourse over 
women’s participation in jihad  has greatly expanded. Muhammed Khayr Haykal’s three- 
volume work on jihad  explains that it is obligatory for Muslim, adult, sane, free, male and 
able-bodied individuals.588 Women’s participation is optional in fa rd  kifaya (community), 
but mandatory for fa rd  ‘ayn (individual). Although many scholars state that women’s
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participation in the most extreme cases remains optional, Haykal argues that women must
be trained for armed operations:
From this we believe that it is incumbent upon the Islamic state to prepare training 
centres for women so that they can learn the use of arms and methods of fighting in 
them. This is because as long as it is possible that jihad  could become fard 'ayn 
upon the woman, it is incumbent to train her for this eventuality so that she will be 
prepared to fulfill this obligation.589
Cook is critical of Haykal’s use of sources: “It is interesting to realize to what extent a
writer such as Haykal -whose command of the legal and historical literature is near total
-  is willing to disregard it and make the exception the rule.”590
Haykal, however, is not the only religious scholar making this exception. Syrian
Nawaf al-Takruri raised the issue of female fighters in the fourth edition of his work
Martyrdom Operations in the Legal Balance.591 Al-Takruri does not permit jihad  in
situations that involve contradicting some aspects of Islamic law. For instance, a woman
cannot attain permission to fight jihad  if it involves her limbs being naked.592 In his book,
al-Takruri points to six fatwas that have been issued allowing women to participate in
jihad: “Yusuf al-Qaradawi, (the famous TV and radio personality), three faculty at al-
Azhar University in Egypt, Faysal al-Mawlawi of the European Council of Research and
Legal Opinion (based in Dublin), and Nizar ‘Abd al-Qadir Riyyan of the Islamic
University of Gaza (Palestine).”593 Nevertheless, these six fatwas are associated with
Egyptian and Palestinian cultures, considered the most liberal in the Arab world.
The absence of fatwas from conservative countries like Saudi Arabia indicates a
lack of consensus over women’s role in jihad. When compared to the corpus of literature
that either ignores the issue or prohibits women’s participation, the Palestinians’
inclusion of women in jihad  suggests that the use of women as fighters has arisen out of
123
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
necessity. David Cook concludes that women’s participation in jihad  is “seen as a radical 
change in Islam and has been treated with suspicion by Muslim conservatives. It is also 
clear, however, that the radicals have been able to establish a fairly strong intellectual and 
religious case for women fighting.”594
Only after the first female Palestinian suicide bomber blew herself up in 2002, 
with crowds flooding the streets of Gaza and the West Bank in support of her action, did 
Hamas condone the use of female fighters.595 Three years earlier, a Hamas leader had 
rejected Dareen Abu Aisha’s request to participate in the military wing, saying, “When 
we finish with men we will ask women to come in.”596 Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi affirmed 
women’s right to participate half a year earlier, stating that “there is no reason that the 
perpetration of suicide attacks should be monopolized by men,” but others were not 
convinced.597
The spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, maintained several 
reservations. First, immediately after the first female suicide bombing, he argued that 
recruiting women would break Islamic law, since the recruiter would be “taking the girl 
or woman without the permission of her father, brother, or husband, and therefore the 
family of the girl confronts an even greater problem since the man has the biggest power 
over her, choosing the day that she will give her life back to Allah.”598 Second, he stated 
that women undertaking martyrdom operations needed to be accompanied by a male 
chaperone.599 Thus, the spiritual leader of the movement was more reticent than other 
Hamas leaders in accepting women’s new role in jihad.
One month after the bombing, Yassin denied the necessity of women’s 
involvement:
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At the present stage, we do not need women to bear this burden of Jihad and 
martyrdom. The Islamic Movement cannot take all the Palestinian males demanding 
to participate in Jihad and in martyrdom operations, because they are so numerous. 
Our means are limited, and we cannot absorb all those who desire to confront the 
Israeli enemy. But the days of decisive conflict with the Israeli occupation will 
come, and then men, women, the elderly, and children will participate in Jihad, in 
the crucial battle for the liberation of Palestine, Allah willing. We have entered a 
new phase of history, in which Palestinian women are willing to fight and to die a 
martyr’s death as the men and youths do. This is from the grace of Allah. But, 
meanwhile, women have no military organization in the framework of the [Islamic] 
movement. When such an organization arises, it will be possible to discuss wide- 
scale recruitment of women.60
Less than half a year later, however, Yassin was more confident about women’s military
role:
We are men of principle and according to our religion, a Muslim woman is 
permitted to wage jihad  and struggle against the enemy who invades holy land. The 
Prophet would draw lots among the women who wanted to go out with him to make 
Jihad. The Prophet always emphasized the woman’s right to wage jihad.601
Gazan Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab clarified that “Islam has never differentiated
f.(yy
between men and women on the battlefield.” Expressing concern that Hamas’s change
in attitude appeared to be based on popularity rather than religion, West Bank Hamas
leader Sheikh Hassan Yussef iterated:
We [Hamas] do not act according to the opinion of the street or of society. We are 
men [italics mine] of principle. . . [and act] according to what our religion dictates. 
A Muslim woman is permitted to wage Jihad and struggle against the occupation. 
The Prophet [Muhammad] would draw lots among the women who wanted to go 
out to wage Jihad with him. The Prophet always emphasized the woman’s right to 
wage Jihad.603
Thus, as a result of the popularity of female suicide bombers, Hamas’s official stance 
shifted from refusal to ambiguity to acceptance of female fighters.
Hamas women appeared to make this transition faster than their male counterparts. 
The women’s branch of Hamas was not as concerned with issues of modesty in the 
course of jihad  as the male leadership. Contradicting al-Takruri’s assertion that women
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cannot undertake jihad  if it involves a breach of modesty, and brushing aside Yassin’s 
concern of women being unaccompanied, widow of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Jamila Shanti, 
clarified:
The issue of martyrdom [operations] has gained much popularity in Palestinian 
society. There is no difference between the martyrdom of sisters and the martyrdom 
of brothers, because the enemy does not differentiate between firing on men and 
firing on women. . . Islam does not prohibit a woman from sacrificing herself to 
defend her land and her honour. It is she who was attacked, and she has the right to 
defend herself in any way. It is not puzzling that Muslim sisters have been carrying 
out heroic operations within Palestine since 1948. On the contrary: It would be 
strange if the Palestinian woman had not done so, as Jihad is a personal imperative 
for her and no one can prevent her from waging it, provided. . . she avoids fitna [in 
this case: inappropriate behaviour] -  which is not on the agenda in martyrdom 
operations because she is going to her death. Perhaps these activities require the 
woman to wear a particular garment in order to mislead the enemy, and therefore 
she may have to relinquish part of her veil when she goes to martyrdom. But there 
is nothing wrong with this, because the clerics are in consensus that martyrdom 
operations are the highest level of martyrdom.604
According to Shanti, women are equal to men in the struggle and may even partly
unveil in the course of action, provided they avoid “inappropriate behaviour.”605
Unveiling is not always an option but a command, and Patkin recounts that at least
one potential female recruit “rejected her orders to dress in modem clothing.”606
While opinions differ as to whether concerns over modesty can be overridden by the
imperative for jihad, the statements made by each personality mentioned thus far have
emphasized women’s right, equal to that of men, to fight in jihad.
Reaffirming the movement’s commitment to women’s equal participation in jihad, 
the military wing of Hamas created a women’s unit. The separation of this unit from the 
male unit is consistent with Hamas’s conservative approach to the interaction between the 
sexes. In an interview with the weekly Al-Risala, the leader of the women’s unit 
explained the rationale for joining the ‘Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades.607 On the one
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hand, the initial explanations the leader offered as to why women joined the brigades
indicated that women had the same motivations as men. For instance, women joined the
military wing because “the Al-Qassam Brigades are considered the standard-bearers and
the pioneers of jihad .”608 They joined the group fully of their own volition, from their
“[love of] jihad  and its path.”609 Although they secured the permission of their husbands
to join the group, the Hamas Charter indicates that women do not require permission
from spouses or male relatives to bear arms. The women’s aim, like that of their male
counterparts, is to liberate the land of Palestine through resistance and jihad. Raphael
Israel explains that “Palestinian clerics are unified by the theme of what they perceive as
a concrete, daily and all-persuasive national struggle to which they provide theological
responses. And once they sanctified Islamikaze as a legitimate form of struggle, indeed
encouraged it, they could not exclude women and children from it.”610
Hamas’s use of women has also been justified for tactical reasons. First, women
are recruited because they attract less attention from the Israel Defense Forces than do
men. For instance, Hamas has disguised female militants as pregnant women, “assuming
correctly that they would not be frisked or subjected to intense scrutiny.”611 Hussein al-
Sheikh, a West Bank Fatah commander, reaffirms Hamas’s supposition:
The tight Israeli security measures and the strict searches of young men by the
occupation forces drove the Palestinian organizations to incorporate women. Girls
and women were not subjected to strict Israeli security measures, and it was easier
for them to reach a certain place and carry out a mission than it was for young 
612men.
Concurring with al-Sheikh, Sami Abu Zuhri elaborates:
The Palestinian resistance, at times, purposely uses women in some operations that 
men cannot carry out, especially in high security areas, which male Palestinian 
Mujaheedin cannot easily reach. This is why the Palestinian woman has an
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important role in the Palestinian resistance, and at times she may even have roles 
that the young male Palestinian Mujaheed cannot fulfill.
In the case of al-Riyashi’s operation Col. Yoav Mordechai, in charge of Erez crossing’s
District Coordinating Office, affirmed that al-Riyashi “took advantage of her gender,
knowing that she would not be asked to lift her clothes as the males are to ensure they
have no explosives strapped to their bodies. She also took advantage of her medical
situation.”614 Because of their apparent modesty and their ability to use pregnancy as a
disguise, Hamas women possess ‘natural’ military tactical advantages that have
successfully been exploited.
Women’s ‘innocence’ has also been instrumental in the success of their operations. 
Patkin observes that Israel Security Services are reluctant to search women who appear 
Western in appearance or who don maternity clothing, effectively exploiting “the 
presumption of innocence.”615 For example, “the perception that women are less prone to 
violence, the Islamic dress code and the reluctance to carry out body searches on Muslim 
women made them the ‘perfect demographic.’”616 Viewed by the public as a suicidal 
ingenue, the female suicide bomber generates more sympathy from the public than does 
her male counterpart. Journalists Alexis B. Delaney and Peter R. Neumann write that 
women’s participation in suicide missions contradicts a familiar notion upheld by many: 
women are the preservers of life, not its destroyers.617 Thus, the female suicide bomber is 
viewed as both a perpetrator and a victim.
In justifying the tactical need for women’s military participation initially, Hamas 
attempted to minimize the potential shock value of women’s incorporation into the 
militant fold. The movement expected that after female suicide bombings would 
repeatedly occur, “it [would] become routine and no one [would] talk about it any
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more.” Nevertheless, the very participation of women has encouraged more men and
women to join in jihad. Women, especially young women, are given role models to
emulate. Since becoming the first shahida, Wafa Idris “has become a source of pride.
Many girls, for various reasons, wanted to play the same role,” explains al-Sheikh.619
Women’s motivation has translated into increased numbers of women seeking suicide
operations. According to Zuhri,
there are hundreds of female martyrdom bombers, who stream en masse and insist 
on participating in martyrdom operations. This is a unique phenomenon, reflecting 
the live spirit of Jihad among this people. . . We see this stream of young men and 
of women seeking martyrdom. This people [sic] emphasizes its adherence to the 
option of martyrdom, especially, in light of the models of female martyrdom 
bombers.620
Between January 2002 and January 2003, at least 38 women attempted suicide 
operations. Between the onset of the second intifada and 2003, more than 250 women 
were either involved in or attempted suicide attacks.622
In addition to the tactical advantages, the growing number of women willing to 
participate in these missions also carries economic benefits for Hamas. The families of 
female bombers are paid half as much in compensation as those of male bombers. 
Furthermore, where men require months of preparation, women only need two to eight 
weeks of training because they “require less persuasion (they are considerably less 
inclined to be swayed by promises of virgins in paradise).. . women have already made a 
long ideological journey before they set foot in the door of the terrorist organization; they 
arrive ready to take that final step.”623 The use of female bombers, therefore, is the 
cheaper option between the two sexes.
Women’s recruitment not only causes an increase in the number of female recruits, 
but also the number of males, as Mia Bloom observes:
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The recruitment of women by insurgent organizations can mobilize greater numbers 
of operatives by shaming men into participating. . . this point is underscored by the 
bombers themselves. . . Before Ayat Akras blew herself up in Israel in April 2002, 
she taped her martyrdom video and stated, “I am going to fight instead of the 
sleeping Arab armies who are watching Palestinian girls fight alone.”624
Akhras added that “now even women are martyring themselves for the Palestinian
cause,” questioning where “the Arab leaders [are].”625 Her last words are not merely an
observation, but a negative judgement on the Arab political leadership and military.
Akhras’s challenge to the “Arab armies” alludes to sharaf, a notion of male honour that is
upheld or denigrated through a man’s actions and public image. Raphael Israel writes that
the man’s honour
is redeemable if he only applies himself to maintain it, shelter it and retrieve it when 
lost. The woman’s honour, by contrast, refers to her intimacy, modesty and decency 
in dress, the preservation of virginity until marriage, gentle behaviour and keeping 
aloof from male society, which is corrupt by definition. If she should fail in one of 
those categories, her honour is lost forever.6 6
In the instance of a woman fighting jihad, her honour is not lost provided she upholds
expectations of modesty throughout the battle. Nevertheless, jihad  is still viewed as more
of a man’s obligation. Women’s participation, therefore, may be perceived as challenging
men’s role by demonstrating that men are no longer capable of fighting. This idea was
reaffirmed in an article published by the Egyptian Islamist newspaper Al-Sha ’ab. Entitled
“It’s a Woman!,” the editorial proclaims:
It is a woman, a woman, a woman who is a source of pride for the women of this 
nation and a source of honour that shames the submissive men with a shame that 
cannot be washed away except by blood.. . It is a woman in the spring of her youth 
who swore in the name of her God, with every drop of her blood, with every limb of 
her body, and with every one of her cells that turned into coals that burned the 
hearts of the enemy with the fire of fear, loss, and pain. . . 627
Women’s actions therefore shame and challenge men who are not fighting in jihad.
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Women’s participation in military operations, however, conflicts with their 
prescribed roles, as outlined in the Hamas Charter. First, women’s participation alongside 
men undermines the belief in a complementary familial role structure. Some argue that 
women use violence as an empowerment tool to challenge the “norms [that] have dictated 
the separation of the sexes and prescribed that women restrict themselves to the private 
space of the home.”628 Members of the female military of wing of Hamas have expressed 
their desire to “become like [Reem al-Riyashi] at once,” a “crown on [their] heads and a 
pioneer of the resistance.”629 Al-Rantisi observed that “those Palestinian women who 
dared to risk their lives by committing acts of jihad fardi were determined to continue to 
struggle against the occupation on an equal basis with the men.” What al-Rantisi 
neglects to say, however, is that his movement forbade women from participating 
alongside men in jihad fardi operations during the first intifada.631 Therefore, female 
martyrdom in the second intifada is, for the first time, upheld as a religious and 
nationalist ideal for women.
Conversely, when asked, “What do women like you tell your children,” the head 
of the women’s military unit emphasized teaching the importance of jihad  to children.632 
Commenting on women’s role in the intifada, after having exemplified Al-Riyashi’s role 
and sacrifice, the head asserted that women’s “role is very important and is no less 
important than that of the man. The woman is the fighter’s wife and sister. She carries the 
difficult burden of making a living and educating the children to jihad.,,m  Similarly, she 
added:
It’s all one path. We raise our children and perform our domestic duties, the duty of 
encouraging devotion to religion, as well as the other everyday duties, and the 
epitome of them is jihad  for the sake of Allah. Jihad is a duty that every Muslim is
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required to fulfill if he can. Our joining the military organization is one of the 
essential everyday tasks.634
Nevertheless, the “essential everyday” task of being part of a military organization
demands time that might otherwise be devoted to caring for one’s family. The female
military head adheres to the Charter’s primary expectations of women, that is, supporting
male fighters and educating children. She simultaneously advances women’s right to
fight in jihad, thereby challenging Hamas’s prescribed gender roles.
By participating in militant jihad, Hamas women challenge their movement’s
notions of familial structure and motherhood. Referring to actions undertaken by
Palestinian women in the first intifada, Julie Peteet observed that
when they engaged in defense of their communities as mothers they acted in 
reference to culturally dominant and highly charged symbols of maternal sentiment 
and behaviour. Yet a transformation in meaning was occasioned by a praxis that, 
while culturally sanctioned, subverted the space and meaning traditionally 
associated with maternal practice.635
Simply, the private sphere was politicized and motherhood became a platform on which
political objectives could be achieved. The Palestinian political leadership exalted the
‘fertile mother’ of Palestinian society, whose reproductive capabilities would enable the
demographic triumph over Israel.636 For this reason, “motherhood has been exalted both
in the political and cultural texts, but only the right kind of mother is socially and
nationally validated -  the mother who can bear sons for the revolution.”637 In choosing or
being encouraged to participate in suicide or martyrdom operations, Hamas women
threaten their future status as emblematic icons of normative motherhood.
The tension between women’s duty toward militant jihad  and motherhood is 
clearly discemable. Hamas’s decision to send Reem al-Riyashi, the 21/22 year-old 
mother of two, on a suicide mission that left four dead at the Erez Gaza border crossing,
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was highly controversial.638 Numerous Palestinian writers have debated whether Reem al-
Riysahi should have been dispatched. The editor of the Palestinian Authority’s daily Al-
Hayat Al-Jadida wrote that it is their
right to wonder about what made Hamas urge a mother of two to carry out the 
operation, even though Hamas is not the first [movement] to do so. But the other 
factions stopped pressuring women into carrying out operations of this kind because 
they are likely to increase the abuse of women by the occupation.639
Not only is Hamas implicated in using coercive measures, the mother-bomber issue is
perceived as furthering women’s oppression.
Other writers emphasize the need for mothers to choose motherhood over
militancy. Hassan al-Battal, a writer for Al-Ayyam, implored in an article: “The women’s
organizations must not stop with copious sentiments for the two orphans [left by Reem
Al-Riyashi], but must raise their voices and declare that the obligation of motherhood and
breastfeeding comes before the obligation of fighting.”640 Writing in the Gaza-based
paper Al-Karam, Ziyad Abu al-Hijja questioned how
a 22-year-old mother of two children, one an infant boy and the other a girl, carried 
out a martyrdom operation. Who issued a Fatwa taking an infant’s mother from him? 
Who decided to add two more orphans to the list of Palestine’s orphans? On the 
basis of which Qur'an verses and Hadiths does a young mother leave her true place 
of Jihad, which is raising the two children, one of whom needs her milk? By what 
right do they present us to the world as lacking the most basic of human 
emotions?641
The sentiment condemning al-Riyashi’s action forced al-Rantisi to modify the fatwa 
permitting women to participate in suicide operations: female recruits were now required 
to produce one male and one female child before they could pursue suicide operations.642 
Al-Battal and al-Hijaa also expressed concern that sending mothers on suicide missions, 
or what he euphemistically referred to as a “sacrifice [of] our humanity,” would discredit 
the nationalist movement on the world stage.643
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Others are less clear in their condemnation of Al-Riyashi’s decision. For example,
‘Adnan Kanafani stresses that
the Palestinian mother, or the Arab mother in general, is the most compassionate 
mother on the face of the earth, because she is dedicated to the upbringing of her 
children, and would rather eat dirt than refrain from breastfeeding. This is a well 
known fact about the Arab woman, in complete contrast to the other women.644
If this is indeed the case, then the mother’s suicide operation must be harmonized with
her sense of compassion. Adli Sadeq, former PA Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,
suggested that perhaps Al-Riyashi foresaw her own death and chose to die in a
“meaningful” way.645 He understands her choice as one of “two options for her children:
between the tragic loss of a peace-seeking mother, or the painful loss of a warrior-
mother,” in which al-Riyashi chose the latter.646 Regarding her controversial decision,
Sadeq is adamant that no woman “has the right to claim that her own maternal sentiments
are stronger than Reem’s.”647 Clearly, Hamas’s use of mothers in suicide operations
generated much debate, both condemnatory and apologetic, over normative motherhood.
From the evidence cited above, mothers who choose to fight in jihad  are rebelling against
Hamas’s expectation that their roles be primarily restricted to childrearing.
Women’s participation in Hamas’s jihad  operations not only challenges
conceptions of motherhood but also notions of male authority. First, female martyrs are
perceived to occupy a higher rung on the sacrificial ladder than are mothers of martyrs.
The Egyptian government-backed Al-Akhbar published an article in which Dr. Samiya
Sa’ad Al-Din professed that
Palestinian women have tom the gender classification out of their birth certificates, 
declaring that sacrifice for the Palestinian homeland would not be for men alone; on 
the contrary, all Palestinian women will write the history of the liberation with their 
blood, and will become time bombs in the face of the Israeli enemy. They will not(LAQ
settle for being mothers of martyrs.. . .
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Mothers of martyrs, therefore, are not viewed as contributing equally to the struggle as 
male fighters; rather, female fighters are women who refuse to “settle,” whose 
participation assures them an equal place in history.
Clara Beyer argues that “when women become human bombs, their intent is to 
make a statement not only in the name of a country, a religion, a leader, but also in the 
name of their gender.”649 These women’s actions help their spouses and male relatives 
recover some of their “lost manhood” that results from men’s insufficient military 
participation, thereby restoring their families’ reputations.650 Furthermore, as Islah Jad 
argues, “their acts do not seek a total equality with Arab men, let alone Hamas men, but 
aim to supersede men to activate their lost role as their women’s protectors. . . ris[ing] 
above the male order and gain[ing] power over all structures of power, whether 
patriarchy, despotism, or Occupation.”651 Thus, women who carry out suicide operations 
are both asserting their prescribed protective roles and revealing the failure of their men 
to fulfill their own masculine roles.
Women’s rebuke of male authority is not only expressed by carrying out public 
acts without the permission of their husbands or close male relatives, but also in 
challenging the authority of the political leadership of Hamas itself. These women 
directly undermined the attitudes of the spiritual head of Hamas. Initially, Sheikh Yassin 
deplored the use of women as suicide bombers.652 After the first female Palestinian blew 
herself up, he modified his position, iterating that women’s participation was unnecessary 
given the influx of male volunteers. He changed his position yet again after al-Riyashi’s 
operation:
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The fact that a woman took part for the first time in a Hamas operation marks a 
significant evolution for the Iz a Din al-Kassam brigades. The male fighters face 
many obstacles on their way to operations, and this is a new development in our 
fight against the enemy. The holy war is an imperative for all Muslim men and 
women; and this operation proves that the armed resistance will continue until the 
enemy is driven from our land. This is revenge for all the fatalities sustained by the 
armed resistance.653
Yet he still harboured reservations concerning female militants’ preservation of modesty.
Yassin initially made female participation conditional on women having male 
chaperones on their missions.654 He modified his position several days later, clarifying 
that a chaperone was unnecessary provided the woman was not alone longer than one day 
and one night.655 Since the chaperone must either be a spouse or male relative, Yassin’s 
amendment and restriction fully contradicts the Charter’s stipulation that women be 
allowed to wage jihad  without male permission. Especially because the end itself is 
considered most virtuous, attempted female suicide bombers have ridiculed Hamas’s 
demand that a male chaperone accompany the prospective female martyr.656 Ironically, 
the very modesty that Hamas can exploit and Yassin seeks to preserve in women ceases 
to be a military advantage due to the chaperone’s presence.
Crucial to understanding the ‘significant evolution’ of which Yassin speaks is 
women’s forefront position in his decision-making process. Only after women have 
carried out actions that are fully compliant with the movement’s goal —  ceaseless 
fighting until Palestine is restored — but contradict the opinions of the male leadership, 
do leaders such as Yassin modify their positions, sanctioning the women’s actions post 
facto. Women have thus expanded their roles as protectors and destabilized men’s roles 
as defenders, while challenging the authority of the Hamas leadership.
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Participation in National Elections
Unlike the issue of female suicide bombers, women’s electoral participation as 
both voters and candidates did not conflict with the decisions of the male leadership. In 
order to run in the 2006 elections, the Palestinian government imposed upon each party a 
party list minimum quota of 20 percent female candidates.657 Although parties freely 
determined the placements of their female candidates on the national lists, and could 
technically place all their female candidates at the bottom said lists, Hamas nonetheless 
ranked Jamila Shanti as its third candidate.658 The movement’s realization of the need to 
cater to an otherwise politically neglected female electorate prompted Hamas to place 
Shanti in this prominent position. Yet the question arises of how Hamas women could 
campaign and run for a group that forces many women to wear its conception of Islamic 
dress, and continually asserts that a woman’s place is in the home.659
Women’s increased participation as fighters may have bolstered their political 
popularity. Both men and women listed “fighter” (27.4 percent) as the most important 
factor in choosing a candidate, followed by religious observance (24.1 percent), good 
character (17 percent) and active community service (16.3 percent).660 Not only was the 
women’s military wing of Hamas formed around the time Hamas announced its intention 
to participate in the 2006 elections, but images of the religious khaki-clad military 
women holding guns and grenades were used as campaign posters.661 In spite of their 
leverage of belonging to a new class of warriors, the female candidates have often
c.f/y
emphasized reform over military struggle. Hamas’s gender ideology is contradictory: it 
regards women as soldier-producing wombs but also emphasizes the “new Islamic 
woman.”
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In “Neo-Ottomanism and the New Islamic Woman in Turkey,” Jenny White 
discusses a belief held by many individuals in Turkey that the “new Islam is a route 
toward upward mobility,” where women adapt new and trendy styles in veiling and dress 
that have no precedent in their own cultural histories. Similarly, the adoption of 
‘Shari’ah’ dress, long robes and a particular kind of hijab, became an “invented tradition” 
in the Palestinian territories.664 Because relaxed clothing standards were perceived as “a 
Western scheme to invade the country’s culture,” ‘Shari’ah’ dress was intended to 
counter this cultural invasion by protecting and veiling Palestinian women.665 Within a 
year of the outbreak of the first intifada, Hamas’s pressure on women to wear hijabs was 
so great that unveiled Gazan women could not walk the streets bareheaded.666 At the time, 
Hamas’s primary targets were “educated, urban and petit bourgeois women.”667 The 
imposition of the hijab on women was therefore an oppressive tool, what Palestinian 
writer Rima Hammami calls “a direct disciplining of women’s bodies for political 
means.”668
In the years following the first intifada, however, the ideology that drove Hamas’s 
‘Shari’ah’ dress campaigns altered as Islamist women within Hamas slowly began to 
acquire power, in both the religious and social spheres. In spite of the prohibition of 
women serving as imams or preachers, in 1998 women nonetheless constituted 16 percent 
of the Hamas-controlled Gazan religious establishment and 9 percent in the West 
Bank.669 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics postulates that the recruitment of 
women into the religious establishment is an attempt to “mobilize housewives and ensure 
interpretation equates religious affiliation with conservatism, the validity of the latter 
interpretation is dependent on the nature of message being transmitted -  whether it
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f\K\encourages equity between men and women, or endorses male dominance.” Regardless
of whether or not the motivation of the recruitment is to indoctrinate women with a
particular gender and religious ideology, a different kind of woman, modem and religious,
was promoted by the movement. Hamas-affiliated political parties and the movement’s
women’s branch began to advocate the image of the “new Islamic woman”:
[They] opened [their] doors to the “new Islamic woman” who is highly educated, 
outspoken, moltazemah (veiled), and modern (a new form of veiling). Modernity is 
reflected in the fact that these women are educated, professional, and politically 
active. The veil is seen as a signifier o f modernity, since it is different from 
traditional dress. The new Islamic dress (a long robe of plain colour and a white orr 7  i
black head scarf) is seen as a uniform of conviction.
In dressing in this particular fashion, women are not only able to recognize their fellow 
“sisters,” but are also able to differentiate themselves from their less-educated and often 
illiterate mothers and grandmothers. 672 As Hamas enlarged their network of social 
services, the movement became a source of employment and upward social mobility for 
many women.
By the late 1990s, the integration of women into Hamas became a prominent 
concern for the movement. In response to the secular parties, which incorporated women 
into their political structures, the Islamists “focused on women -  particularly the highly 
educated -  and integrated them by the thousands into their party’s (Khalas) structure at 
all levels.” 674 Beginning in 1997, Hamas held annual conferences with the goal of 
increasing its female membership and widening its social base.675 These conferences 
were taken seriously by the Hamas leadership, many of whom presented papers.676
At the conferences, Islamist women’s approach to women’s issues evolved. At the 
first conference, the Islamist women undermined other female voices in the hopes of 
asserting their own authority as the voice representing women’s welfare.677 Speakers
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rejected gender concerns in favour of nationalist aspirations, and NGOs, wellsprings of 
secular women’s employment, were said to be linked to the corruptive West. By the 
third conference, the women were launching feminist critiques of the liberal rights 
approach, stressing the need for scriptural re-interpretation that “incorporated women’s
/<7Q
achievements thus far due to modernization processes.” The change in the women’s 
approach, from rejection to engagement of gender concerns, paralleled Hamas’s 
increasing development from a purely military wing into a political party. Unlike the 
military wing, the political wing could not afford to ignore its primary supporters.
In 2003, Sheikh Yassin announced the creation of a women’s wing of Hamas,
/OA
which would concern itself with women’s activism. Run by the widow of Hamas co­
founder Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Jamila Shanti, the wing hosts a variety of programmes for 
women.681 For instance, Hamas sends one of its militants on a weekly basis to host a 
religious class for women. Other classes include literacy for the elderly, education and
fiO'y
health, and are attended by up to 250 women. Women within the wing frequent the 
families of suicide bombers and those killed in operations against Israel to give them
/ O ' !
moral support, in addition to the financial support they may receive from Hamas. 
Given these services, a seemingly stark contrast to the movement’s oppressive measures 
in the early days of the intifada, it is not surprising that up to 70 percent of women voted 
for Hamas.684
The 2006 Palestinian national elections marked the first instance in which women 
ran as candidates for Hamas. Speaking a few weeks before the election, Hamas leader 
Mahmoud al-Zahhar foresaw that “Palestinian women [would] have an important role to 
play in the upcoming elections” alongside men, in part due to the “huge sacrifices” made
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by women during the second intifada.685 His statement reflects the confluence of two 
contradictory trends. Khalil Shikaki observed that Palestinian women had a certain 
degree of political equality with men because of the mass mobilization of society in the 
struggle against the occupation. Similarly, the very struggle also caused society to 
cling more strongly to “conservative social values” embodied in “its most traditional 
social networks: the family, the tribe, and mosque.” 687 Lama Hourani, a women’s rights 
activist in Gaza, concurs with Shikaki, asserting that the Hamas Islamists view men and 
women unequally. Women, she claims, are raised to subordinate themselves to their male
r o o
relatives and husbands.
Contrary to al-Zahhar, the female Hamas candidates did not explain their right to 
participate in the elections as a consequence or reward for their sacrifices. The Minister 
of Women’s Affairs under the Hamas-led government, Mariam Saleh, considers
/o n
Palestinian women to be the strongest and most courageous members of society. She 
did not, however, explicitly use this as a justification for participating in the elections.690 
Many of the female candidates stress the importance of religion and use religious 
justification to be both active politicians and family members. Muna Monsour, an elected 
Hamas candidate and the widow of a Hamas leader, views the Qur’an as a means of 
solving any policy question.691 Her dual responsibility toward public office and family 
embodies her concept of a ‘modem woman.’ Moreover, she regards religion as the key 
to women’s emancipation, an idea supported in her claim that “the low key role of 
women nowadays [is] due to the society’s habits and traditions rather than the Islamic 
standpoint.” She cited the decision by the Islamic-dominated Bani Zeid council to 
appoint a woman as mayor an example of Hamas’s “matured” regard of women.694
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In accord with Mansour’s observations, the movement claims that “Hamas 
women are striving hard as equal [sic] as the Hamas men in delivering the Movement’s 
ideology.” 695 The widow of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi admitted that Hamas hoped to 
implement Shari’ah law, as she “will not accept secularism.” 696 Moreover, she 
maintained a traditional Hamas outlook on Israel. “I reluse any compromise,” she said. 
“The liberation struggle will continue until we liberate all our land. Even if we enter 
elections our weapons will not grow dusty against Israel.” Promoting this position, 
female Hamas supporters visited hundreds of family homes campaigning in the national 
elections.698 They also had access to the vast array of social programmes in which women 
worked and sought assistance.699 Mkhaimar Abusada affirms that women’s campaigning 
is “something noticeable in the Gaza Strip” because Palestinian values “do not accept 
women to go out and campaign in the street.”700 Unprecedented in the territories “to a 
degree specialists said was new in the conservative Muslim society of the Gaza Strip,” 
notes journalist Ian Fisher, “Hamas used its women to win, sending them door to door
*7/ v i
with voter lists and to polling places for last-minute campaigning.”
In addition to door-to-door campaigning, female candidates hosted rallies and 
meetings, attended by a multitude of supporters. Hundreds of women attended lectures
7 0 9given by Mansour around Nablus. Hamas candidates Noha Saymah and Huda Naeem 
also hosted meetings in which tens of female Palestinians participated.703 The week 
preceding the election, Mariam Saleh spoke at a rally attended by 400 female Hamas 
supporters in Nablus, many of whom were professionals.704 Public meetings were also 
held in Nablus and hosted by the Islamic League for Palestinian Women. 705 Meanwhile, 
the candidates convened conferences in mosques, schools and villages, in order to raise
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“women’s consciousness” among the female attendees, and to make them aware of their 
rights.706 Throughout the campaign, both male and female Hamas candidates brought 
attention to women’s roles in supporting the Palestinian resistance “through offering sons, 
husbands, brothers, and fathers for the sake of Allah and for the sake of Palestine, 
pledging to enact pro-woman legislations [sic] if succeeded in the elections.”707
At the rallies, however, there was more emphasis on pro-woman legislation than 
on sacrificing men for jihad. Jamila Shanti, the third candidate on Hamas’s “Change and 
Reform” list, stressed the future parliament’s intention to safeguard and improve 
women’s rights, in the familial, social, economic and political domains. 708 Female 
candidate Dr. Majeda Fedda highlighted Islam’s recognition of women.709 Even the 
“Mother of Martyrs” made references to active female fighters, telling the female crowds 
that it was their “role to fight corruption, make reform, and avenge humiliation, like the 
women [suicide bombers] who took revenge on the streets of Tel Aviv, Netanya, and 
Jerusalem.”710
Concurrently, the women expressed beliefs that appealed to both men and women. 
Jihad was naturally a safe starting point on which women could campaign and maintain 
support from both sexes. “The role of women in jihad,” Shanti told supporters in October 
2005, “is to encourage their sons and husbands to participate. But women also have the 
right to wage jihad.”711 Candidates like Saleh also emphasized the need to serve the 
Palestinian people, help society and improve the lives of marginalized groups. 712 
Mansour, meanwhile, encouraged women to “set a good model in terms of steadfastness 
and resoluteness in face of the Israeli arrogance.713 She also highlighted the need for 
economic improvement and employment opportunities, as well as a reduction in
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poverty.714 Both Mariam Farhat and Huda Naeem emphasized preparing their “children 
to die when the homeland calls for it.” 715 Thus, throughout the election campagin, Hamas 
women advocated the need for gender reform on the one hand, and preparing their 
children for jihad  on the other.
Since their electoral victory, the Hamas female candidates, in their quest to
eradicate gender inequality, have stressed the need to follow religion instead of tradition.
According to Jamila Shanti, tradition is to blame for restricting women’s rights:
There are traditions [in Palestine] that say that a woman should take a secondary 
role - that she should be at the back. . .  But that is not Islam. Hamas will scrap many 
of these traditions. You will find women going out and participating. . . This 
doesn’t mean that [they] will depart from Islamic law. People think that Islamic law 
is about being veiled, and closed and staying at home - but that’s wrong. A woman
<7 1 /
can go out veiled and do all kinds of work without any problem.
Al-Rantisi’s widow, however, does not explicitly state the Hamas treats women unfairly: 
“I speak for my sisters. Hamas has always honoured women, but now the time has come 
for Hamas to give a role to women. We can participate in health and education, and 
politics too.”717 Shanti cautions that challenging gender discrimination and making legal 
reforms will be a process to which “men may not agree.”718 Like Shanti, Mariam Saleh 
also discusses the need to make women aware of their rights through education at school 
and at home, in order to make them efficient members of the evolving society.719 This 
sentiment is likewise shared by Huda Naeem, who before the election stated that she 
would
work hard to accord the Palestinian woman the position she deserves and to activate 
her role in the community, and to block all traditions that deny her such a right as 
well as impeding all attempts to turn her into a cheap propaganda item, in order to 
propagate anarchy and immorality in the community. . . the Islamic Movement is 
focusing on the woman being the cornerstone of education, change, and 
construction in the community.720
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For Naeem, all Palestinian women should be granted “complete rights” as accorded by 
religion, not tradition.721 Thus, for the female Hamas parliament members, both strict 
adherence to religion and reform of existing legislation concerning women occupied a 
paramount place in their political messages.
Conclusion
Since Hamas’s moderation, some women affiliated with Hamas have used the 
political goals of the movement’s discourse to challenge its gender norms. On the one 
hand, the Hamas Charter enjoins women to raise their children for jihad , and to be model 
homemakers. Accordingly, some members of the women’s military wing, as well as the 
female electoral candidates, have emphasized these imperatives in the movement’s fight 
to end the occupation of Palestine. On the other hand, the extent to which women can 
adequately educate their children if they themselves are training for, or carrying out, 
suicide operations is questionable. Nor can they fully care for their families as the Charter 
envisions while rallying for upcoming elections or serving as members of parliament. The 
statements of the female Hamas candidates embodied the tension between these 
expectations. Moreover, their potentially subversive calls for reform within their 
movement and tradition were offset by their devotion to religion, their encouragement of 
their sons’ martyrdom and their uncompromising stance toward Israel, in spite of the 
movement’s moderation nearly a decade earlier. Thus, in both instances, female 
participants promoted the political goals of the movement, while expanding the public 
space in which women were able to act.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The study of fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict has often diminished women’s political participation. In the few 
instances where women’s roles in the transition or moderation processes are discussed in 
contemporary discourse, women’s active political involvement is understood as a force 
that causes or hastens moderation. Contrary to this claim, women’s involvement in Gush 
Emunim and Hamas occurred after their respective groups’ moderation, and 
demonstrated strong ideological commitment to their groups’ original tenets.
Summary
This work focused on Gush Emunim and Hamas, two movements whose 
territorial conquest goals are similar and understood as divine mandates. In spite of 
women’s heavy involvement within the groups, the roles of the movements’ women have 
received little academic attention. Moreover, the movements have not been contrasted in 
comparative political discourse. As Gush Emunim and Hamas became institutionalized, 
they were forced to adopt more moderate stances toward their expansionist territorial 
goals. Naturally, these concessions restricted the political and military freedoms of the 
leaderships. Criticizing the men’s political ineffectiveness, some women assumed more 
prominent positions within their movements by advocating actions that were in line with 
their movements’ founding principles: territorial settlement for GE and constant jihad  for 
Hamas.
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Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the settlement movement Gush Emunim. In the first 
few years after its formal creation, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook strongly emphasized the 
importance of settling the territories acquired during the 1967 war, namely the Sinai 
Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Overnight, young male settlers established 
illegal settlements. This tactic was repeatedly and successfully employed, until it became 
commonplace. When the party favouring the settlers gained power in 1977, Gush 
Emunim’s influence and devotion began to weaken. Since the movement had received 
strong political support, administrative and political bodies were created to represent its 
interests.
As a result, however, Gush Emunim lost much of its strong leadership, leaving 
behind an inexperienced leadership to run the movement. The evacuation of the Sinai 
settlements failed to produce the anticipated extremely violent reaction from the settlers, 
marking a trend in the movement’s adjustment to political realities. Had Gush Emunim 
members been fully committed, that is, faithful to the merkaz harav philosophy and 
willing to endanger their own lives for the preservation of land under Israel’s control, a 
violent battle between the settlers and the military would have ensued. With one 
exception, the extent of women’s involvement throughout GE’s institutionalization was 
limited.
Almost a decade after the dismantlement of the Sinai settlements, a group of Gush 
Emunim women spontaneously founded a settlement. The act of settlement creation 
against the will of all authorities — the government and the military -  was a ‘masculine’ 
Gush Emunim tactic before the leadership adopted a more pragmatic approach. Yet the 
Rachelim women even opposed their husbands. They related to the murdered victim in
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whose name the settlement was founded and therefore justified the settlement’s creation 
through their identities as mothers, and to a lesser extent, as settlers. In defining their 
motives for establishing the settlement, they conformed to their movement’s gender 
expectations by regarding themselves as homemakers and as mothers concerned for their 
children’s welfare.
Perceived as safeguarding the individual and national family, the GE women 
secured the implicit support of the military and the government through their roles as 
protectors. Disgusted with the violence male settlers had used in the past, the women saw 
their act as a peaceful and constructive alterative. They expanded their roles from 
homemakers and mothers, to settlement initiators, before criticizing the male members 
for their political immobilization. Reticent in acknowledging the danger to their own 
families’ lives by living in settlements, the women understood this threat as one facing 
every Jewish Israeli family. Nonetheless, they were determined to continue their maternal 
routine practices in the midst of conflict.
In Chapters 4 and 5, the moderation of, and women’s involvement in, Hamas was 
discussed. Between the publication of the Charter in 1987, which outlines Hamas’s 
objectives, and its participation in the national elections in 2006, Hamas adopted 
moderate policies as it become more integrated into the Palestinian social and political 
fabric. Although the movement’s military and political branches were unified upon the 
movement’s creation, following the Oslo accords, a clear divergence between these two 
wings was discernible. As its political presence became more prominent, Hamas 
increased its pragmatism through references to ceasefires with Israel, a two-state solution,
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and a willingness to participate in elections that were constructed within a framework that 
recognized Israel.
With its institutionalization and moderation also came a shift in the emphasis o f 
the core problem: the need to regain lost Palestinian land eclipsed the need for creating an 
Islamist society. Like Gush Emunim, the political, military and religious leadership o f 
Hamas has been exclusively male. Like Gush Emunim, again, discussions of the 
movement’s moderation neglected the role of Hamas women as potentially hastening or 
stalling the moderation process. As made evident, however, Hamas’s moderation 
preceded women’s overt military and political campaign for the movement’s foundational 
goals.
Women have used Hamas’s charter to expand the very gender roles outlined for 
them. The Hamas Charter stresses the importance of women bearing males for the 
struggle, acting as model homemakers and educating their children. It also emphasizes 
that the commandment to participate in jihad  is equally incumbent upon both men and 
women. A few women have embraced jihad  in the form of suicide bombers, and many 
others have tried. In fulfilling this expectation, the women are simultaneously defying the 
norm that they be male-producing homemakers. Yet Hamas’s female electoral candidates 
emphasized the need for women to fight in jihad, and encouraged their sons to seek 
martyrdom. Given their active public involvement, these women could not preach that 
women’s primary obligation was to stay at home. Throughout the campaign, female 
candidates promoted the need for eradicating women’s inequality in Palestine, while 
affirming that tradition was solely to blame.
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The Mythologies of Women’s Involvement
The lack of scholarly attention concerning women’s role in fundamentalist 
religious-nationalist movements is due to a convergence of four myths. The first myth 
posits an essentialist bond between women and peace. The depiction of women as 
pacifists assumes that motherhood carries with it a moral compulsion to preserve life and 
prevent destruction at whatever cost. This heightened moral awareness, in turn, prevents 
women, but not men, from divorcing their own actions from the moral consequences o f 
those actions. Women’s innate moral obligation arises from their roles as preservers o f 
life and protectors of society. Consequently, their conscience does not permit them to 
isolate their actions from the moral implications.
Women supposedly channel their heightened moral awareness into their role as 
nurturers in the family domain. In this role, they develop preservative love and are also 
forced to learn the art of negotiation and compromise. By contrast, men are not subject to 
compromise as frequently and are thus more aggressive and focused on hierarchal 
relations than on ‘sharing’ interrelationships. Such attributed values are the very 
antithesis to the culture of war and destruction. Consequently, women are typically 
portrayed as non-combatants in violent conflicts. As a result of this myth, women become 
transformed into one-dimensional players whose motivations are often assumed, 
simplified and rarely questioned.
This study reveals the mendacity of women’s innate pacifism. Both Gush 
Emunim and Hamas women encouraged their husbands and sons respectively to 
aggressively carry out their goals against the other community. GE women’s perception 
of their actions as “peaceful” further illustrates that maternal thinking, which in this case
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helps feed settler militarism, can be the more destructive of the two forces. Similarly, the 
“Mother of Martyrs” and others like her, who effectively discourage their sons from 
reneging on suicide operations and returning home, manipulate matemalism for a 
destructive means. Conversely, the women of both movements emphasize construction 
over destruction, and the imperative for women to take part in the former’s process: for 
Gush Emunim, this is in the building of the settlements, and for Hamas, it is in the 
creation of an Islamic society. The preservation of life at whatever cost, as this study 
demonstrates, can be set aside for the preservation of the homeland and the national 
community.
The second myth assumes that women’s public political participation is coupled 
with a feminist agenda. Within nationalist discourses, the negation of the presence of 
women who do not promote feminism is once again overlooked. For this reason, women 
who affiliate with religious-nationalist movements that hold essentialist beliefs do not 
become objects of academic political curiosity, since they are thought to be fully 
complicit in their own subordination and subjugation. Yet this work highlights the 
participation of women who have embraced their movements’ nationalist aspirations, 
without promoting a separate feminist agenda. Increased women’s participation, they 
believe, would ultimately benefit their entire movement. Although the women later 
emphasized the importance of women’s involvement, they were careful to do so within 
the discourses their movements would allow: GE women could call for women’s 
initiative in creating settlements, in conformity to their movement’s primary goal; while 
Hamas women could exercise their right to participate in jihad, and to call for the
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implementation of women’s Qur’anic rights, since these too were consistent with their 
movement’s beliefs.
The third myth, originating in fundamentalist discourse, supposes that 
fundamentalism entirely and rigidly relegates women to the private sphere. History 
teaches that waves of fundamentalism arise as backlashes to women’s greater access into 
the public sphere. The origins of these backlashes are blamed on men, and rarely are 
women regarded as complicit. Defining fundamentalism as the preservation of traditional 
patriarchal structures within the familial, political and economic realms reveals that 
fundamentalism is not a gender-free term. This definition has diminished women’s 
importance as political actors by focusing on the movement’s (male) leadership, 
organizational structure, ideology and public persona. The emphasis on structural aspects 
not only undermines women’s involvement outside of formal political and administrative 
bodies, rather it ignores women’s sense of agency within these movements. Consequently, 
this study has employed a “women’s studies” approach to fundamentalism.
This unconventional methodology sharply diverts from the traditional focus of 
fundamentalist movements’ structures and instead emphasizes ethnography. By 
incorporating women’s attitudes, feelings and individual perceptions, and by explaining 
how women situate themselves within the ideological and social parameters of their 
movements, this study reveals how exemplary women in fundamentalist religious- 
nationalist movements experience a strong sense of agency in promoting their 
movement’s ideology. Gush Emunim women created a manifesto, imploring all 
settlement and Israeli women to “stand up” for the creation of Rachelim. Similarly, 
Hamas women preached women’s right to participate in armed operations and spoke to
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thousands of Palestinian women throughout the 2006 election campaign, emphasizing the 
rights owed to them by religion.
Ignored by the “men’s studies” of fundamentalism, these actions draw attention 
to some women’s vigorous involvement and empowerment within the movement, in spite 
of their absence from formal decision-making processes. The “women’s studies” 
approach asserts that women’s experiences cannot be essentialized, nor can their decision 
to be involved in these movements exclusively be attributed to their manipulation by men. 
In using women’s standpoint as the centre of reference, and stressing the role of agency, a 
more sophisticated understanding of women’s degree of autonomy within fundamentalist 
religious-nationalist movements emerges.
In the last of these myths, the Western public-private division is erroneously 
applied to the Middle Eastern context, in which the relationship between the two spheres 
is inextricably interconnected. Western social contract theory assumes the citizen’s 
universality and complete independence. In the Middle East, however, a relational or 
connective form of citizenship is prevalent, where one’s citizenship status is dependent 
upon sex, religion, family and the status of the family in society. These patriarchal 
hierarchies frequently lend greater authority to men over their female counterparts. 
Religion and family serve as a defining mechanism of citizenship, shaping women’s 
status as citizens through personal laws. The laws are deferred to religious courts whose 
rulings by the exclusively male composition frequently discriminate against women.
The division between the public and private domains is not clearly discernible, 
and women’s actions can occur in the semi-private domains. In both cases, motherhood is 
at once ‘private’ and ‘public,’ as this study found; Gush Emunim women mourned the
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loss of a fellow mother and established their settlement around this perceived common 
identity, while Hamas women used the authority of motherhood as a means of 
encouraging their sons’ embracement of martyrdom. With each side seeking victory in a 
demographic war, childrearing is a private, semi-private and public issue. Yet, the greater 
community of each side repeatedly called into question the women’s conception of the 
mother-child relationship: Israelis accused the settlers of needlessly jeopardizing 
children’s lives, and Palestinians criticized the (potential) female suicide bombers for 
orphaning their children. In justifying their actions, both GE and Hamas women 
subordinated part of their obligations and responsibilities to their families to the broader 
national communities.
Citizenship identity for these women is heavily influenced by religious and 
familial structures. Women’s full membership in society does not occur through their 
rights as individual citizens, but through families whose national affiliation is clearly 
defined. The family, therefore, is a domain in which women have the potential to be 
prominent political actors, even as wives or relatives of prominent politicians. Women’s 
small presence in the public domain gives the mistaken impression that the public-private 
division is to blame, when in actuality, the family is a unit in which women exercise 
considerable power. Both Gush Emunim and Hamas defined a woman’s primary duty as 
instilling religious values in her children and guiding her family’s religious course. These 
prescribed roles, therefore, allocate responsibility and a measure of autonomy to women.
This thesis examined in greater detail women’s political involvement within 
fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements and compared the occurrence of some of 
their political activities with the groups’ political moderation. Since gender issues were
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traditionally considered outside the scope of institutionalization processes, after decades 
of neglect, only recently has a gendered approach to movements’ institutionalization 
emerged. Considering women’s heavy involvement in fundamentalist religious- 
nationalist movements, the dearth of knowledge concerning women’s motivations and 
actions within these two movements is appalling.
This study of Gush Emunim and Hamas women has revealed that at least a 
minority of women in fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements are, at times, able 
to subvert some of their movement’s gender expectations. They do so by demonstrating a 
strict fidelity to their movement’s original political goals and by following a tradional, 
that is, male, script. By emulating the primary actions of the men in the movement, rather 
than drastically departing from their movements’ traditional narratives, Gush Emunim 
women’s decision to create a settlement and Hamas women’s resolve to participate in 
military jihad  garnered the eventual approval of their male leadership.
Conversely, in undertaking these actions, women used their movements’ 
prescribed female roles to draw attention to and criticize men’s lack of participation. To 
some extent, they felt they were left with little choice but to act. Gush Emunim women 
believed they had waited too long, even lamenting the lost time in which they could have 
acted as assertively as in Rachelim. Hamas women also implicitly criticized men for not 
being more involved in jihad, as well as their movement for its differential treatment of 
women, citing tradition as the main problem and pledging to rectify gender inequality 
through legislation. The women’s increased ‘feminist’ consciousness, however, raises the 
possibility of their retroactive dissatisfaction with their prescribed roles. Consequently,
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they must constantly and carefully negotiate their leadership roles within the family and 
within the community.
The notion that women’s political involvement is both an indication and a cause 
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Nevertheless, contrary to what some theorists have argued, women’s political 
participation is not inherently a moderating force. Lacking the support of their male 
counterparts initially, GE and Hamas women, unconstrained by their movements’ 
institutionalization, forced their movements’ formal leadership to accept their new roles 
in the quest for settlement expansion and military jihad  respectively. When women in 
movements such as Gush Emunim and Hamas are as militant as men, if not more so, their 
motives and the implications of their actions can no longer be ignored in favour o f 
simplistic assumptions that they are unknowingly subjugated and oppressed by men. 
Clearly, a more differentiated approach is needed in understanding religious-nationalist 
women’s political involvement.
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